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ABSTRACT 
While East Germany has been regarded since 1949 as the most 
subservient of the USSR's allies, developments in the latter part.of. 
the last decade, especially with regard to the West Berlin question, 
worked in such a way as to impel the GDR's leadership to attempt to 
assume a more important position within the Bloc. The intention of 
the Ulbricht government was not to achieve independence from the .USSR, 
but rather to elevate itself to a status from which it could exercise 
a veto over certain elements of Soviet policy. The area of greatest 
concern to Ulbricht was the Soviet policy toward the West. The USSR's 
pursuit of a policy of detente with the West, which required a 
demonstration of Communist "goodwill" on the West Be~lin problem, was 
viewed by the Ulbricht regime as a threat to the vital interests of 
the GDR. 
In the years after 1968, the West Berlin issue came to represent an 
increasingly divisive matter in relations between the GDR and the USSR. 
Ulbricht's reluctance to allow a demonstration of Soviet good intentions 
in West Berlin ultimately led to his removal as First Secretary of the 
SED in 1971. He was replaced by Erich Honecker, a man who has 
consistently exhibited his desire to bring the GDR to a position of 
more thorough compliance with Soviet wishes. In this effort, Honecker 
has demonstrated, as Ulbricht also did, the close relationship between 
foreign policy questions such as West Berlin and domestic .consideratio~s. 
ii 
iii 
The GOR's efforts to develop a sense of national.consciousness in recent 
years illustrates the .impact that foreign and domestic.matters have upon 
each other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of.this disse~tation is to examine the West Be~lin 
issue from the East German point of view during the .so-ca11ed era.of 
super-power detente. The ,significance of this issue is derived ,from 
its importance in international policies since World War TwO', an 
importance that has ,been attested .to by the frequent major power 
confrontations in Berlin in the years after 1945. It is appropriate 
that this issue ,be examined during the era of detente because for many 
years it represented one of.the major stumbling blocks to a relaxation 
of tensions in Europe. 
Additional significance is derived from the fact that the .West 
Berlin issue has had an especially important ef£ect on East German-
Soviet relations. during the years in which the USSR has sought a 
relaxation of tensions between East and West. Therefore, the West 
Be~lin dispute is examined here in terms of its bearing on th~ GDRls 
status within the Soviet Bloc. While the .GDR has long been regarded 
as one of the most obedient of the Soviet allies, the GDRls interest, 
as interpreted by SED First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, required it to 
endeavor to exercise a veto over the .po1icies of its Soviet patron. 
Accordingly, what one sees during this time is an effort by U1bri~ht 
to pursue a more independent East German policy regarding certain 
foreign policy questions related to the Berlin dispute. This is net 
to argue that Ulbricht sought to make the GDR an independe~t Communist 
1 
state but tha~ he intenqed to have it occupy a position of greater 
importance within the Bloc than in the past. Accordingly, the GDR was 
seen by Ulbricht as having the authority to "lecture" its allies, 
including the .Soviet Union, on their various policies. Ulbricht 
seemed to feel especially qualified by virtue of.his seniority within 
the hierarchy of.Conununist leaders and his long experience .in managing 
the affairs of a state on the "fz'ont line" of socialism. 
2 
The foreign policy dimension of Ulbrich.t '.s independence was the· 
most significant aspect of his "rebellion." This concern with foreign 
policy provides the justification for s·electing 1968 as. the starting 
point for this analysis. This was the year in which Ulbricht became 
most prominent as a would-be advisor to his allies. The August invasiqn 
of Czechoslovakia undoubtedly appeared to Ulbri~ht as a vindication of 
his views of the GDR's role as the USSR's closest and most valuable 
partne~. The. Czech invasion is also significant because it marked the 
beginning of , a serious.Soviet effort to reconsolidate its hegemony in 
Eastern Europe. This effort soon required the USSR to overcome East 
German resistance to Soviet initiatives.toward the West, initiatives 
that called for a show of Communist goodwill in Berlin, Ulbricht seemed 
determined to resist this policy and, as a result, in 1971 he was 
replaced by Erich Honecker. Honecker retur~ed the GDR to a .position 
of greater compliance with Soviet wishes and began to emphasize ties 
with the USSR more than ever before. The change in.the GDR's orientation 
was almost immediately reflected in the art;cles in the SED's official 
newspaper, Neues Deutschland. Whereas the last Ulbricht years has seen 
the ,paper's preoccupation with hostile stories about West Germany and 
Wes~ Berlin, under Honecker it began to stress more coverage of every 
aspect of Soviet affairs. 
3 
This analysis co~siders the West Berlin problem in terms of.the 
challenge that it poses for the GDR as well as in terms of the .function 
that it serves .for the SED's leadership. West Berlin is seen as.pre-
senting the GDR with both a threat and an opportunity. As a thr~at, it 
has political, mil i tary, and economi c aspec ts . Therefore, part of this 
dissertation is devoted .to an examination of the ',fundamental natur~ of 
the We~t Berlin problem. As an opportunity, it provid~s the SED with an 
element of tension and confrontation needed to compensate for 't::he lack 
of a complete popular identification with the GDR as an entity. Because 
of.this consideration" an effort is made to evaluate the problem of an 
East German sense of national consciousness and its effect on the .West 
Berlin issue. 
In the concluding chapter, an effort is made to develop various 
scenarios for a possible resolution of the West Berlin issue. The· 
purpose of this is to illustrate the persis~enc~ of the problem and 
to show how East German-Soviet relations will be affected by the various 
options.for settlement of this matter. This effort should also 
demonstrate how closely the West Berlin issue is linked with the· 
question of reunification of the ,two Germanies. 
The year 1974 is selected as the cutoff date, not simply for 
convenience, but be~ause of its possible significance as.a turning 
point and as a time for reflection on the GDR's position. The 
4 
resignation of Willy Brandt in the ,spring of,l974 following the ,exposure 
of one of his closest aides as an East Ge~man spy is important be~ause 
it reyeals something of the nature of the SED's view of detente. 
Brandt's replacement by Helmut Schmidt could well mark a turn toward a 
more cautio~s detente policy by the ,FRG in a time when there would seem 
to be greater distrust of the GDR. This year,is also important s~nce 
it is ,the twenty-fifth a~niversary of·the founding of the,GDR. As such, 
it has provided an opportunity for East Germany to make a special effort 
to evaluate itself and its progress. Thi,s process brought a revision of 
the GDR Constitutio~ which involved a rejection of the idea of 
reunification of Germany, even after a possible Communist revolution. 
This revision represents a further departure from Ulbricht's policies 
which had stressed the responsibility of ,the SED for the entire German, 
nation and facilitates ,the drawing of·the GDR even closer to the USSR. 
The revision has even,raised the possibility of changing the name of 
the SED by dropping "Germany" and replacing it with "German Demqcratic 
Republic. " 
The methodology used in this analysis is traditio~al. It has 
involved a concentration on examinations of the major East German 
publications dealing with the questions ,being considered. The principal 
sources were the SED's official daily, Neues Deutschland, the SED's 
theoretical monthly journal. Einheit, and the foreign affairs week~YJ 
Horizont. For Soviet views, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press has 
been most frequently relied upon. In addition, it has considered 
Western publications, dealing with East Elrropean affairs and numerous 
Western studies of the West Berlin issue and related matters. The 
purpose, of this approach was to gain an understanding of the views of 
the major East Gerrnanfigures on issues relevant to this inquiry and, 
at the ,same time, an apprecia~ion of current ,Western analyses of 
developments. 
5 
The principal advantage of this approach is that it facilitated the 
accumulation of information regarding the public views ,of the figures 
involved and, simultaneously, aided an effort.to examine implicit motives, 
for certain policies. This frequently required that ce:ctain elements of 
public statements be discounted in favor of other analyses that seem to 
more adequately explain motives or meanings of particular decisions. 
Matters such as the timing of East German ,statements compared with 
Soviet statements are especially important, in making such determina tioIlS.' 
The absence of Soviet or East ,German statements ,has also been significant 
in certain cases and has been seen as an indication of unstated 
opposition to certain policies. This approach also permits an effort 
to examine the ,nuances of vario~s,statements in these endeavors to 
understand the meanings of actions by the GDR and Soviet governments. 
Other methodologies might be ,considered for their applicability to 
the problem of this dissertation, but none would adequately substitute 
for the traditiollal approach used here. One might consider an approach 
such as decision·making analysis fo1' this topic. However, t1\e first 
problem encountered in an effort to apply this method is the ,nature of 
the East German system. Here, the ,researcher is dealing with a ,closed 
system. In effect, he can usually know only what he ,reads in the SED 
6 
newspapers or journals. There would be n~ possibility of constructing 
meticulous narratives of steps in the decision-making process ,as has 
bee~ done regarding such matters as t~~ United ,Stat~s' entry into the 
Korean conflict. Generally, all the researcher sees in this type of 
system is the ,end product. The decision-making process i tsel,f is 
totally closed thus creating a serious problem in data collection. The 
same difficulty would also serve as a decisive b~rrier to the application 
of ,such methodologies as game theory and bargaining to a problem such,as 
this. 
Given the fact that the researcher on East German,affairs has 
little more than the public media to rely upon, the ,most promising of 
the nontraditional methodologies would be content analysis. This,would 
enable one to carefully and systematically weigh various statem~nts,in 
terms of the~r minor variations and to chart numerous c~rves on graphs 
to illustrate shifts in policy. However, you would stil~ face the, 
problem of how to consider other important elements such as the absence 
of a public statement on ,a particular policy. Also, there is the, 
question of how to weigh actions such as Ulbricht's failure to appear 
at the Hungarian Communist Party Congress in 1970, the ,increase in the 
delays of traffic at checkpoints, or the opening of new telephone lines 
between East and West Berlin. 
Considering the ,numerous problems of data collection and evaluation 
associated with research ,about the policies of a Communist state, the 
traditional approach seems to be the most flexible and useful. While 
it, too, suffers from cer~ain defects, when all other factors are taken 
into consideration. it is still the most appropriate. 
CHAPTER I. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST BERLIN AS AN ISSUE 
OF EAST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
I. THE FALL AND OCCUPATION OF BERLIN 
The "crowning achievement" of the Soviet Union's.efforts in World 
War Two came on the eve of May 1, 1945 when two Soviet soldiers.hoisted 
the Re4 Banner of Victory on the Reichstag building in Berlin. This is 
the claim advanced by tqe anniversary issue of·the USSR military 
journal, the Soviet Military Review. l While this event signaled the 
end of almost five years of fighting by the Soviet troops, it also 
marked the beginning of a problem which has plagued Europe as well.as 
the world for more than a quarter of a century now. 
As an American war correspondent flew into Berlin in the spring of 
1945, he described the city as a "great wilderness .of debris dotted with 
roofless burnt out buildings that look like litt1~ mouse traps with low 
autumn sun shining through the .spaces where windows had bee~.,,2 This. 
hardly conveys the impression of Berlin as a tremendous war prize. Yet, 
for years Berlin had been the ,symbol of .Nazi Germany andtne capital of 
ISoviet Military ReView, No.4, 1973, pp. 8-10. 
2J~hn Man, Berlin Blockade (New Yor~: Ba~lantine Books, 1973), 
p. 9. 
., 
I 
8 
Hitler's Third Reich. During the lastwe~ks of the war, Berlin became· 
the central objective of the Soviet military efforts. 
On April 16, 1945 the Soviet. tro()ps under .. the leadership of 
Marshall ZhukoV crossed the Oder River and by the .afternoon of April 21st 
they were.just.outs~de Berlin. At the same time, elements.of the U.S, 
69th Infantry Division \'lere linking up with Soviet troops on the Elbe 
River. Meanwhile, the American advance was halted 60 miles. from Berlin 
in order to allow the .Russians to take the capital city. 3 
Ha4 the ,Americans desired to take part in .the capture of. Berlin, 
they could.have done so. Yet they did not. Several consideratiolls 
played a part in this decision. One of the ,most important reasons·was 
that the occupation zones of Germany had already been agreed upon so 
further advances would not mean more territory to be·held by the 
American occupation authorities after the war. 4 U.S. troops had 
advanced fifty miles into the area which was to have been.libe~ated 
by t~e Russian forces by thi~ time. A second consideration was an 
. . 
increasing American concern for maximizing its forces in Bavaria instead 
of the Berlin allea! There was a preoccupa1;ion in the ,U.S. command for 
the need to occupy the .birthplace of the Nazi ideology and an.area which 
was· seen as the likely last stronghold of the Nazi command. American 
tactical thinking in the last weeks.of the war was shaped by the Goebbe+s 
3William L. SlUrer, The Rise .and Fan of the Third Reich (New· York:· 
Simon and S~huster, 1960), p. 1106. 
4Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 142. 
threat, which turned out to be l~cking in.substance, th~t the Nazis 
would use Bavaria as the "Natio~al Redoubt" of the Third Reich. S And, 
finally, some,U.S. military leaders saw Berlinas nothing more than a 
prestige objective which was hardly worth the lives that would b~ lost 
in the effort to take the city.6 
In spite of the apparent willingness of the Western Allied powers 
9 
to hold back ,while the Russians ,took Berl~n, some Sovie~ accQunts insist 
that the Americans and British were in a race with the Soviet troops to 
e~ter,the German capital city. The disposition of American troqps by 
the ,second week of April certainly did raise the possibiltty of an 
Ameri~an entry into Berlin prior to the ,Russians. After covering up to 
thirty miles a day, on April 11, the U.S. Ninth Army reached the Elbe 
River nea~ Magdeburg and on the next day crossed it. The Americans were 
within sixty mile~ of Berlin with only a few scattered and disorganized 
German units blocking their way four days before the Russians had 
crossed the Oder River. 7 The Russians undoubtedly felt that their fears 
might be justified. According to a~ account by Soviet Marshall Ivan. 
Konev who participated with Zhukov in the Berlin operation, on April 1, 
1945, Stalin informed him and Zhukov that the U. S. -British command ',was 
staging an operation to capture Berlin with the intention of depriving 
the Soviet forces of the opportunity to occupy the Nazi capital., Konev 
5 General Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Simon and 
Schuster" 1951), p. S36. 
6 Man, pp. 11-14. 
7 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945 (New York:. Norton 
and Company, 1967), pp. 90-92. 
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writes that: Stalin asked .them, "Who. is going to take, Ber~in, we or, the 
Allies?" Their. response, of course, was that the ,Soviet forces, were 
going to take the city. Kanev says that plans were immediately made for 
an operation which be put fully into effect on April 16. 8 The completion 
of· this plan came within two weeks when the Soviett:roops did in fact 
occupy Berlin. 
Thus, from the very first, W~stern-Soviet relations on the question 
of Berlin were chara~terized by a certain degree of suspicion. The 
first meetings ,between Marshall Konev and t~e American General Omar 
Bradley at the time of the Berlin campaign were, in.the K~nevaccount, 
tinged.with distru~t on even the smallest and most seemingly trivial 
matte~s. Konev, for example, insis.ts that General Bradley tried t~ pass 
off a world-famous ,violinist as an American soldier during a Soviet-
American party. On another occasion Konev charges that Bradley did not 
believe his explanation about how a troupe of Russian dancers happened 
to be at the front. 9 This mistrust on minor matters was.to be.exten.ded 
to much more impqrt~nt i~sues in the coming weeks. 
Th~ primary concern of the Western allies after the fall of Germany 
was to establish an Allied Control Council which would be responsible 
for matters affecting Germany as a whole· and for each of the occupying 
powers to assume responsibility for his own zone of occupatio~. In 
order to carry out these plans. a meeting was scheduled for June 5, 1945 
8V• Sevruk, editor, How Wars End (Moscow: Progress Publishe.rs, 
1969), pp. 9-11. 
9Ibid ., pp. 121-124. 
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in Berlin between the ,three Western ,commanders and th~ Soviet comma~der, 
Marshall Zhukov. Three documents were signed at th~s meeting. One 
dealt with the assumption of supreme authority in Germany by the Allies, 
the second,with the divis~on of Germany into four,occupation zones with 
Berlin under joint occupatio~, and the ,third with the ,establishment of 
occupatio~ control machinery. After these doc~ents were finally sig~ed, 
General Eisenhower,suggested that they begin steps to install the Contrql 
Council in Berlin. Zhukov insisted that this issue could not even be 
disucssed until all troops in Germany had returned to their proper zones. 
His main intention, of course, was that th~ American and British troops 
be ordered to withdraw from Saxony and Thuringia, those areas of the 
10 Soviet zone which they had occupied in the last days of combat~ 
On June 15, despite Churchill's strong objections, the American 
and British commands jointly informed Stalin of their,intentio~ to 
withdraw their,troops from Saxony and Thuringia.on June 21st. Stal~n 
replied that they would still not be ,able to come to ,Berlin for 
establishment of the Control Council even though Zhukov had impl~ed 
~hat such a move would be possible. Stalin's explanation was that 
Berlin had still not been completely cleared of land mines and that 
Zhukov was going to have to be in Moscow for a parade and, therefore, 
be unable to return to Berlin before the end of June. Thus, Ju~y 1 was 
set as the date to begin joint occupatio~. However, another possible 
explanation for the Soviets desire for delay could have been their 
lOJean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 75-76. 
, , 
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determination to allow sufficient ,time for the es~ab1ishment of a ci~y 
gover~ent in Berlin which would be amenable.to Communist control. This 
suspicion is supported by accounts of Walter Ulbricht's activities in 
Berlin shortly after his return from the USSR with the .so-called 
"Ulbricht Group." During this time the members of the group were at 
work finding suit~ble.people to serve in the new Berlin borough 
administrations. Th~ goal of this ~alent search was to establish 
administrations sympathe~ic to the .Communists while giving the 
fb " d "" h" " "11 Th d appearance 0 e~ng emocratlc .~n t e~r or~entat~ons. e ten ay 
delay in beginning j9int occupation wo~ld have been an extremely. 
valuable extension of time for the Ulbricht Group. Still anothe~ 
possible reason for the Soviet delay migh~ have been tha~ the ,Russians 
wanted more time to .remove "war booty" ,from Berlin. 12 This would have 
been consistent with Soviet behavior throughout the other regions of 
Germany that they occupied. 
Prior to the actua~ withdrawal of British .and Ameri~an troops from 
the·Soviet zone, the Americans insisted that some provision~ be made 
regarding access rights to Berlin by the Western.powers. However, since 
the British and American commands ha~ already announced their inten~ion 
of withdrawing from Saxony and Thuringia, their bargaining position with 
the Russians was weakened. This weakness was reflected in.the difficulty 
of the negotiations. In spite of the Western de~and for several air, 
11 Carola Stern, Ulbricht (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 
pp. 98-100. 
l2F . 144 e~s, p. . 
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road, and rail corridors for use by the Western forces, the Russians 
agreed to only one of each. The He1mstedt~Ber1in au~obahn was to be the 
highway for the Wester~ allies and the rail connections which ran roughly 
parallel to it were to serve as "their rail link with Berlin. The air 
corridor would be on the same route a~ far as Magdeburg where ,it 
divided into two ,routes, one to Hanover and one to Frankfurt/Main. Thi,s 
agreement was verbal and never reco~ded in an official document. The 
reason, according to the U.S. negotiator General Clay, was that they 
feared the incorporation of the agreement into an official document 
might be interpreted ,as a denial of Western ac~ess,over,all other routes 
B l ' 13 to er In. One point on which the West felt it achieve4 what it 
wanted was the issue of the freedom of Western acc~ss over the land 
routes. The Western commanders stressed that all Allied traffic into 
and out of Berlin must be free from the burden of search at the ,border. 
This meant that neither civilian nor military authorities were to be 
allowed to search Western vehicles on the ,access routes. 14 
Finally, in the ,first days of July, 1945, the Western garrisons, 
moved into Berlin as the ,American and British troops pulled out of 
Sa.xony and Thuringia. The Control Council was set up tQ administer 
all of Germany and a four-power Ko~andatura, th~oretically subordinate 
to the Control Council, was established to administer Berlin wh~ch was 
to be treated as a separate entity from the zones of occupation of 
l3S ' h 83 85 ml.t , pp. - . 
14E' M ' Bl k d (N Y k rlC orrls~ oc a e ew or: Norton and Co., 1962), p. 45. 
14 
Germany. The twenty boroughs of ~erlin were divided into four.sectors. 
The largest was the.Soviet se~tor consisting of eight borqughs in the 
eastern part of the city. The Americans tC?ok six boroughs.in the 
southwest while the British received four in the west and the French 
occupied two in the north. 1S This division was made on the basis of 
the 1920 law defining the admin~strativt:} districts of Greater Berlin 
with the populatio~s of the boroughs as the .determining factors regarding 
their disposition in the.respective zones. The intention was to divide 
the population of the city in accordance with the ,contributions of the 
16 
various powers who defeated Germany. The Western powers ,were ,to be, 
responsible for bringing in food and other supplies for their,twelve 
buroughs since Zhukov had declared that the surrounding regions which 
were now the .Soviet zone and formerly had supplied food for Berlin were 
no longer able to support the entire city of Greater Berlin. Thus, the, 
sectors which came to be.known as West Berlin were immediately dependent 
on the West for total support. 
When the Kommandatura held its first me~ting on July 11, the 
four-power occupation of Berlin became a reality. The first. item of 
business was a Soviet demand that all orders issued by the Russians 
during the previous weeks.remain in effect until further notice. The 
Western representatives agreed to this and in doing so committed 
lSIbid., pp. 68-69, 46. 
16Wal ther Hub~ tsch, editor, The German Question (Ne~ York: Hex:der 
Book Center, 1967), pp. 246-249. 
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what Western authorities now consider a serious mistake. 17 This action 
has subsequently been cited by Communist sources as proof that all of 
Berlin was to have been considered under the control of the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany and therefore part of what is now 
the German Democratic Republic. 18 
Having reviewed briefly what transpired after the fall of Berlin 
and what provisions were made for the city during those first weeks, it 
is important to note what the respective parties felt had evolved out of 
this situation. The Eastern view obviously differs markedly from that 
of the Western nations. For the West, the designation of Berlin as a 
"special area" separate from the zones of occupation meant that it was 
not part of the Soviet zone. A succinct statement of the views of the 
governments of the United States, Britain, and France was presented in 
1948 in the identical notes addressed to the Soviet Union. In those 
notes, the Western powers asserted that "Berlin is not a part of the 
Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation." The notes 
also reiterated the view that the American and British troops had been 
withdrawn from the Soviet zone only on the basis of an agreement with 
the USSR to guarantee Western access rights to Berlin. 19 This joint 
statement reflected the uniformity of the Western positions regarding 
the status of Berlin. 
l7S . h 89 mlt ,p. . 
l8Yuri Rzhevsky, West Berlin (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1969), 
pp. 21-22. 
19U. S. Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in 
Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 205-206. 
While publi~ations of the .government of the Federal Republic of 
G d d h f f B 1· 20 B h 1 ermany conce e t e our-power status 0 . er 1n, onn as a so 
asserted from time to time that "West Berlin is a Land of the FRG.,,21 
This view has represented the most extreme .opposite of the Communist 
posi tion on the status of West Berlin. Thi.s view has been noticeably 
lacking in support from the occupying powers. The crises of 1948-49, 
1953, 1958, and 1961 brought no changes in the positions of the FRG's 
allies on this question. 
The Soviet scqo1ar Yuri Rzhevsky, in evaluating the postwar 
deve10pments.on Berlin, emphatically stated the Sovie~ position when 
he declared". . . Berlin . . ., despite the special occupation 
arrangements instituted for it ... , was not excluded from the .sphere 
of , supremacy of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, nor was it divorced 
terri torially from the .Soviet zone of occupation. ,,22 The Soviets, cite 
Section A, paragraph 1 of the Potsdam Agreement.in defense of their 
position. This paragraph states .that "supreme.authority in Germany" 
will be exercised by each.of the occupying powers "each in his own 
zone of occupatiol1." The Control Council .is to act on the ,basis of 
unanimous.votes "in matters affecting Germany as a whole.,,23 For the 
16 
20A bis Z: Ein Taschen- ulld Nachschlagebuch uber den anderen Teil 
Deutsch1ands (A to Z: A Fact and Reference Book on the Other Part of 
Germany) (Bonn: German Federal Press, 1969), p. 93. 
21 Helmut Arntz, Facts About Germanr(Bonn: Press and Information 
Office of the FRG, 1968), p. 19. 
22 Rzhevsky, p. 16. 
23 Germanr 1947-1949: The Storr in Documents, pp. 47-48. 
Soviets, the important·contrast is betwee~ the "supreme authority" of 
the occupying powers and the .functions of "administration" which were. 
tv be.he1d by the Ko~datura in Berlin. The view that the .West has 
the same rights in Berlin as the USSR is specifically rejected. The 
17 
West may have the right to "administer" twelve boroughs of Berlin on a. 
temporary basis, but the USSR is still the "supreme at,lthox:ity" in those. 
areas accQrding to Soviet spokesmen. 24 In addition, occupation of West 
Berlin by the Western powers "does not make the occupying state t~e 
soVerf'igll of the.occupied .territory.,,25 
According to Soviet accounts, the Western troops, entered Berlin, 
not as a result of any agreement regarding the withdrawal from Saxony 
and Thuringia, but essentially as "guests" of.the Sovie~ forces which 
had 1iberested the city. In its notes of July 14, 1948, addres~ed to 
the U.S. and Britain, the Soviet government stressed that the Wester~ 
right of access to West. Berlin was nothing more than an act of goodwill 
h f h S . U' 26 on t e yart.o t.e OVlet nlon. Soviet historians declare that the 
agreement which estab~ished four-power administration of Berlin "d~dnot 
grant the Western powers any special rights to determine the order of 
access to Berlin.,,27 The agreement on access was not written down as 
24 Rzhevsky, pp. 14-18. 
25 Ibid ., p. 19. 
26Germany 1947-1949: The StOry in Documents, pp. 207-208. 
27 B. Ponomaryov, editor, History.of Sovie~ Foreign Policy 
1917-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 473. 
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the Western powers, for various reaso~s, saw no need. for a specific, 
written agreement. Apparently, some Westerners feared tha~ by raising 
the questio~ of access rights, they might: cal~ into questioJl. the Western 
presence in Berlin. That presence itse~f was seen by many as implying 
. h h' t 28 access r1g ts to t ,e C1 y. 
After the formation of , East Germany as a s~ate, the new East·Ge~man 
government adQpted a position similar to that of theUSSR.regarding the, 
stat4S of Berlin. One East German authority described th~ situation in 
this way~ "Berlin and the Soviet occupation zone were one and the same, 
there was no difference b~tween them; b9th were under jurisdiction of 
the Soviet occupation forces.,,29 Concerning the matter ,of West Bex:lin 
itself, the charge is made that "West Berlin is not ev~n a city, but 
only part of one. II30 The implication of this is quite clear. Since 
West Be~lin is only part of .a city, it must be part of ,the city of 
Greater Berlin. Since Berlin and the Soviet zone were parts o~ a single 
entity, West Berlin is clearly being designated as part of the German 
Democratic Republic. Carrying this. further, the .autho~ of these 
statemeI)ts asserts that West Berlin is obviously not a Land of the 
FRG. 31 The East German account repeats the Soviet version of the 
Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura as mere administrative 
28William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," 
Wcrld Politics, Vol. XVI (Oc~ober, 1963), pp. 23-25. 
29Gerhard Kegel, Twenty Five Years After Potsdam (Berlin, GDR: 
Ve~lag Zeit,im Bild, 1970), p. 96. 
30 Ibid ., p. 92. 31 Ibid ., p. 95. 
organs exer~ising no real authority over the territory of Berlin. The 
four-power status of Berlin is labeled as temporary since'the Western 
powers "never had and today do not have any 'original' rights .•. to 
the occupation of the western sectors of Berlin." The fact that even 
after the Western garrisons were moved into the city the Soviet 
authorities retained control of all railway installations plus the 
Berlin waterways is declared to be a practical confirmation of the 
Soviet's already "unequivocal" legal position. 32 
II. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1945 TO 1948: THE BLOCKADE OF BERLIN 
In the first months after the establishment of four·power control 
in Germany it became apparent that the eastern and western zones were 
following vastly different policies. Presumably, four-power control 
had been intended to facilitate unity in the .efforts to reconstruct 
Germany as well as Berlin. However, this was certainly not proving to 
be. the case. 
Both economic and political issues divided the four occupying 
powers. One of the first disruptive qUesticns was the matter of 
reparations. American officials objected to the fact that while their 
country was spending substantial amounts to prevent the Germans from 
starving the Russians were systematically taking reparations from the 
current production of Soviet zone factories without consulting the, 
Western powers in accordanc~ with the requirements.of the Postdam 
32 Ibid ., p. 99. 
19 
Agreement. In response to t~eseSoviet ac1;ions, on.May 3, 1946, th~ 
Wes~ halted delivery to the .Russians.of dismantled plants from th~ 
Western zones even tho~gh, according to t~e Potsdam Agreement, t~ey 
20 
were entitled to 25 percent of .the dismantled factories in West Germany 
, 33 
as reparatlons. 
In Berlin further disagreements a~ose.because of the uncooperativ~ 
activites of·the borough administra1;ions in the western sectors of the 
city. These administrators, of course, had been appointed under the 
supervision of.the Russians and under the immediate d~rection of the 
Ulbricht Group in the firs1; days after the fall .of Berlin. As a result 
of their open defiance of tbe military authorities many of the borough. 
hadt b db th 'I' 34 mayors 0 e remove. y e ml + tary . 
Additional problems were posed in Berlin because of,the conti~uation 
of Soviet marauding in th~ Western. sectors. Allied Military Policy had 
to use force to restrain the Soviets on many occasions. Kidn;pping of 
West Berline~s also became a continual thr.eat .as East Berlin agents 
crosseq. into the West to get not .only ordinary .citizens~ but several 
important officials also. In addition to this, disagreement ~ose 
regarding the use of Berlints press and radio facilities. The West 
believed that it was entitled to share in control of Radio Berlin and 
the national German transmitter. The Western authori~ie$ also suggested 
33John C. Campbell, editor, The United States in World Affairs, 
1945-1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. l82-l~7. 
34W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton:. Princeton 
University Press, 1958), p. 32. 
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that four-power control be established over the .newspaper of the German. 
city gove~nment, the Berliner Zeitung. The. Soviets refused to yield on 
any of these issues. However,. when the Bri Ush announced. their 
intentions to publish a German~language newspaper th~mse1vesin Berlin, 
the Russians. insisted that it would b~ better if all of the four 
occupying powers sponsored one newspaper jointly. As it turned out, 
there .. was to be no jointly controlled media in Berlin. In 1946 the 
35 U.S. military government started its own radio station, R.I.A.S .. 
In spite of these disagreements, for the first year four-power 
ad~inistration in Berlin proceeded without serious disruptions. The 
first major dispute came with the attempt in 1946 to merge the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Communist Party. It became obvious that 
what this amounted to was an effort to swallow up the SPD in a new 
party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), 1.'Jhich would be dominated by the 
Communists and manipulated by the Soviet authoritie~. We~tern 
occupation authorities insisted that democratic procedures be used in 
implementing the merger and that it be allowed only after an affirmative 
vote by the membership of both parties. The West also took measures to 
protect antimerger SPD leaders who were subjected to Soviet intimidation .. 
The result was that a vote was taken on March 31, 1946 in which the West 
Berlin SPD voted agatost me~ger by a margin of 19 to 2. Even though the 
Eastern SPD under the leadership of Otto ,Grotewohl was merged with the, 
Communist Party, the West Berlin SPD remained independent and, after the 
35 Ibid ., pp. 32-33. 
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merger, got rid of its m~st slavishly pro-Soviet eleme~ts.36 The ,SED's 
party history ignores the vote by the membership of the West Berlin SPD 
and simply insists ,that the leadership of the West Bex:lin SPD was in the 
. f" . C ." d'" . l' ,,37 serv1ce 0 , ant1- omm~n1sm ,an 1mper1a 15m. 
The second,crisis of major proportions.arose over the issue of 
municipal elections for Berlin. After considerable Soviet objectio~s, 
the date for the elections was set as October 20, 1946. During the 
election campaign the ,entire resources of the Soviet cOIl)l1land in Berlin 
was, thrown behind the ef.forts of. the SED. The SED was, provided with, 
ample li~erature to distribute as well as with food and coal briquettes 
to hand out to the voters, In a further effort to pressure the voters, 
in the Western sectors, the amount of electric power allowed to flow 
from Soviet-controlled generators into West Berlin was sharply reduced. 38 
In. spi te of this m.assive effort, the SED received only 21 percent of the 
votes in the Soviet sector and even less in the Western sectors. The 
SED citywide total was 412,000 votes. The strongest pax:ty was the SPD, 
which had better than 48 percent of the vote citywide, a tot~l of over, 
1,01~,OOO votes. The Christian Democratic Party was second with 462,000 
39 
votes and a total of 22 percent of the total vot~. The Soviet command 
responded to this defeat by r~fusing to allow the newly elected city 
government to assume the full authorities due to it. When it became 
36 Ibid ., pp. 37~45. 
370tto Reinhold, editor, Seht, welche Kraftl (See, What Strengthl) 
(Berlin, GDR: Dietz Verlag, 1971) ,. p. 67 •. 
38Davis~n, pp. 45-47. 39Reinhold, p. 79. 
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cl~ar that Ernst .. Reuter, who was seen as unlik~ly to yield to. Soviet 
pr~ssure, was going to become the new mayor, the Russians refused to 
allow him to take office .. As a result, BerHn had no mayor during much. 
of 1947'and all of 1948.40 
As the struggle for both governmental and nongovernmental power·. 
was continuing in Berlin, British, American and French representatives 
met for talks in London. The Benelux countries were invited but no 
I invitation was· ·given to the USSR .. On March 6, 1948, the conference 
announced that it had agreed on further economic coordination among 
the Western zones and also on plans for a federal form of government 
in those areas. 4l Amid rumors that the .Soviets planned to blockade the 
city, on March 20th the Soviet delegation walked out of the ,Control 
Commission in protest to the actions of.the London conference. 
In the following weeks there occurred a rapid sequence of even~s 
which made the USSR's intentions to apply pressure o.n West Berlin very 
clear. On March 3l.the Soviet authorities announced that inspection by 
Soviet military personnel would be required before Western military 
passenger trains were allowed to travel through the Soviet zone. On 
April 1 they announced.that.Soviet approval would be required before. 
freight could leave Berlin. One of the .most.serious incidents.occurred 
on April 5 when a Soviet interceptor collided with a British plane While 
40Davison, pp. 49-51. 
4lJohn C. Campbell, editor, The United States in World Affairs, 
1947-1948 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 466-467. 
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harrassing its entry into We~t Berlin. In May the u.s. Army Signal 
Corps personnel who ,maintained communications lines between,West.Berlin 
and Wes~ Germany were expelled fro~ the Sovie~ zone. Later in May the 
Soviets began to require additional documentati.on for freight coming 
int.o Berlin, from the .west and i~ June an increasing num~er .of civilian 
1 ' h 1d ' hn' 1" 42 supp y tra1ns were e up on var~.ous.tec 1ca 1t1es. 
The climax of this series .of c.onfrontatio~s came in the middle .of 
Jtlne. The Western Allies, rea~izing that the S.oviets were.n.ot going to 
cooperate in measures to halt the inflation that was destroying the 
German ec.onomy, announced that a new currency W.ou1d be intr.oduced. Less 
than a week later, on June 24, the new currency was secretly brought 
int.o West Berlin and ,replaced the city's old.curr~ncy. The Soviet 
response was to i JllJllediate1y halt all rail tra~fic int.o West Berlin. 
The Western reply was the initiati.on of a massive·air1ift operati.on 
for the city. In an effort to appeal t.o West Berliners, the East 
Germans made an offer in July of 1948 to give rati.on cardst.o any West 
Berlinex:s who would "register" in the Eastern sector. In spite of the 
deprivations West Berliners suffered duriIlg the eleven month blockade, 
the number accepting the offer never rose above 70,000 out .of the city's 
population of .over two million West Berliners. 43 
The apparent Soviet belief that the West would surrender West. 
Berlin was dem.olished by the determined. united resistance of the Allies 
42Frederick Hartmann, Germany Between East and West (Englewoo~ 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc .• 1965). pp. 41-42. 
43Ibid .• pp. 42-44. 
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and the citizens of West Berlin. The fact t~t the USSR had ref~sed to 
supply the Western sectors,as soon as ,the American, British, and French 
garrisons moved in in 1945 actua~ly helped the ,West ,since they. had. 
already developed a system of supplying West Berlin. The·.b1ockade 
simply forced them to find another met~od of bringing in supplies which 
had formerly moved,by land routes. American and British aircraft became 
the.alternate means of transportation in spi~e of the many difficulties 
associated with this method. Had th~ Soviet Union not refused to supply 
West Berlin with many essential mat~ria1s in 1945, the Western task 
would have been much.more difficult. 
After several months ,of bargaining with the Russians over a variety 
of demands, the Western powers were successful. At midnight on ,May l~, 
1949 the highways and rail lines to West Berlin were reopened. Th~ 
success of the air+ift operation had made this possible without any 
major Western concessions to tqe USSR. Yet, while the West had not lost 
during the bargaining, it had not gained much either. There was still 
no written guarantee of Western access rights to West, Berlin. The 
situation remained as it had been during the summer of 1945. 
III. THE 1958 BERLIN CRISIS 
While the years after the ending of the blockade were free from anY 
major crisis, there were several significant confrontations. The first 
was in 1949 as a result of West Berlin's inclusion in the Marshall Plan. 
This was met with strong objectio~s by the Communists who, in a GDR 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, described this as·an effort to 
develop West Berlin as an outpost ,of "imperia.lism.,,44 In ,response to 
this development, the USSR imposed a processing slowdown of Western 
military traffic on the ,He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn in January, 1950. 
While the slowdown was not uninterr,upted, it was \ reimposed from time 
to time fQr almost,two months. In July the Soviet Union began 
short-term interruptions of the ,flow of electricity into West Berlin. 
In September the West Berlin powe:r plant buH t under the Marshall Plan 
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was able to meet the requirements o~ West Berlin witho~t as~istance from 
the East, so the effectiveness of ,this Communis~ lever was terminated. 
In 1952 another trayel ban was imposed on the autobah~ aga~nst,Amer~can 
and British vehicles, but was lifted within eight days after a.stat~ment 
by the U.S. Secretary of State declaring the intention of the ,U.S. to 
remain in West Be~lin. Several days later the East German authorities 
cut West Berlin's telephone service with the East and the USSR closed 
the ,border between East and West Berlin to West Berliners. The effect 
of this action was to deprive over 30,000 West Be~liners of bungalows 
and allotments which they possessed in the Eastern sector. 45 
Lack of agreement between the nations ,of·the a~ti-Hitler coalition 
led, in 1949, to the completio~ of plans .for the creation in the Western 
occupation zones of a new federal republic. In May the ,Western Military 
Governors ,approved the Basic Law for the new Germ~n state and elections 
44Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ,GDR, How Germany Was Divided: 
Documentation (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 19~6), p. 63., 
4SStefan Brant, T~e East Gepnan:Rising (New York: Praeger, 1957), 
p. 33. 
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were held for the Federal Republic's par liaJl\ent in August. The elections 
resulted in w~t U.S. Secretary of Sta~e Acheson des~ribed as.a "victory 
for moderation and common sense" and the formal establishment of a 
gover~ent for the Federal Republic of Germa~y under the leadership of. 
Konrad Adenauer. 46 Adena~er himself described this develQpment and the 
Occupation Statut~ which facilitated it as Germany's ,best ch~nce for 
regai~ing its freedom. 47 The view from the East was somewh~t different 
regarding this development. The official SED history describes this 
event as a signal of the intention of the Western powers ,to create a 
separate German state which would be a "satellite" of the United States. 
Furthermore, it continues, the selection of Adenauer.to head the new 
government proved the willingness of the new state to be a tool of 
imperialism and capitalism. 48 The creation of the German Democratic 
Republic shortly after the establishment of the Federal Republic was· 
described not only as evidence of the determination of the USSR to 
refuse to allow all of Germany to be. turned into a capitalist "puppet," 
but also as a1) "historic achievement" by which a "workers and peasants 
state" had been created to aqvance the interests of.all "peace-loving 
46Richard P. Stebbins, editor, The United States in World Affairs, 
1949 (New York: Hal'per & Brothers, 1950), pp. 177-181-
47Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953 (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1965), p. 185. 
48Reinhold, pp. 95-97. 
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49 Germans." This new Soviet-oriented state was ,placed ostensibly under 
the .leadership of the newly created Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED) • 
Meanwhile, the steady flow o~ refugees from East Germany:and gast 
Berlin into West Berlin and the FRG served as evid~nceof the ext~eme 
unpopula~ity of the Soviet administration in the East wh~ch was now 
acting at least partially ~hrough the SED dominated GDR gove~nrnent and 
thus marl5.ing the first significant step in the evollltion of tQ.e East 
German state. The lack of popular support for this new creation became 
painfully obvious when, on ,June .16, 1953, riots broke out in East ~erlin 
which were followed by mor~ disturbances thrqughout the zone the next 
day. Order was restored only after Soviet military interven~ion saved 
the regime. In spite of.the opportunity that these events seemed to 
offer the Western powers, there was no Western effort to interfere in 
East German affairs during the riots. The failure of the. West to .show 
a willingness to act with force in order to free East Germany from 
Soviet domination undoubtedly' served to strengthen the inclination of 
East Germans to resign the~selves to their situa~ion. In an effort to 
stabilize the East German regime the ,authorities of the .GDR government 
prohibited travel from East Germany to Berlin on August 1, 1953. 50 
The exodus from the ,Soviet zone, however, continued in spite o~ these 
efforts. 
49B• Ponomaryov, editor, History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1~70 
(Mo~cow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 198-200. 
SOSmith, p. 370. 
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In the years after 195~, West Berlin served as a continual source 
of irritation to the Soviet Union •. Not only was it an embarrassment, 
it was a threat to the stability of.a mil~tari1y important.sate1lite 
state. By 1958~ the USSR felt strong enough to issue a direct challenge. 
to the West on the question of West Berlin. In a Kremlin press 
conference on November 27, 1958, Khrushchev declared that ,the situation 
in Berlin was "ab~orma1" and that West Bedin was a."convenient place" 
for the Western powers to conduct an aggressive policy against Ea~t 
GeI:many, the USSR, and all of the Warsaw Pact states. Accordingly, the 
Soviet government suggested the abolition of the ,"outworn foreign 
military occupation of West Be~lin and turning it into a free 
demilitarized city.,,5l Should the West refuse to consider this 
suggestion, a separate peace treaty between the .USSR and East Germany 
would be signed and Western rights in Berlin would be terminated ,without 
Western consent. Th~ plan, as presented by the Soviets, would not upset 
the political order in West Berlin or alter the independence of.the 
city. The USSR would beco~e the guarantor of ~est Berlin's independence 
and the supplier of those materials essential to its survival. The 
Western powers would no longer be needed in Berlin and would be compell~d 
to depart from the Western sectors. 
While the Soviet offer was phrased in very conciliatory terms, it 
left no doubts about what rejection of this plan would mean. Should the 
Western powers refuse to sign a peace tre~ty with both German states 
5lPonomaryov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-lQ70, 
pp. 366-368. 
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incorporating the plan for a "free city" of West Berlin, th~ USSR would 
sign a Separate peace with East Germany. The result would be that East 
Germany would have "sovereign rights" over West Berlin and the West 
would have no access rights to the city. A Western effort.to use force 
to enter Berlin would be considered as the beginning of war by the, 
Soviet Union .. This threat wa~ coupled with a reminder a few days later 
by a Soviet general that the USSR now had the military capability to 
give the United States an "annihilating defeat" in the event of wa~.52 
The Soviet Union had given the West a period of six mon~hs to 
withdraw their troops' from West Berlin. When the deadline passed, the 
Soviets responded by ~xtending the deadline. Finally, when negotiations 
were underway at Geneva on the Berlin question, the Russians could claim 
that the West was in the process of fulfilling the requirements of the 
ul timatum. Meanwhile, Otto Grotewohl,. Minister President of the GDR, 
boasted that Ea~t Ge~many had gotten de facto recognition by being 
allowed to participate in the G.eneva conference in an advisory capacity 
along with West Germany. In June of 1959 another time limit for a 
Western withdrawal was announced but it too was later extended for an 
additional six months. Finally, in July Soviet Politburo member Fro1 
Kozlov, according to Western reports, denied while visiting the United 
States that any ultimatum existed.53 By the end of 1959, it .became 
clear that the USSR had no intention of forcing a solution of.the West 
Berlin problem or of.enforcing any withdrawal deadlines. 
52Hans Speier, Divided Berlin (New York: Praeger,. 1961), p. 29. 
53Ibid .. , pp. 33-35. 
31 
IV. THE BVILD:NG OF THE WALL. 
The only point on which both sides were in agreement at the .end of 
the Geneva conference in 1959 was the Western offer not.to station 
nuclear.or rocket ~eapons in West Berlin. 54 Aside from this relatively 
unimportant issue not~ing else was resolved regarding the futur~ of 
Berlin. For the West, the uncertainty of access rights and the challenge 
to their continued presence in Berlin remained. For the East, the 
serious drain of East German manpower through Berlin continued. For 
both sides, Berlin continued to be an important stage of.espionage 
activities of all sorts. 
It was the Eastern problem which most con~ributed to the instability 
of the Berlin situation over .the next two years. The drain· on the East 
German economy caused by the steady loss of many of its most qualified 
people across the border into West Berlin and the ,Federal Republic 
threatened to topple the SED regime. Prior to 1958, th~ rate o,f ,escapes 
averaged approxima~ely.200,000 per year. In 1953, the. number had risen 
to over 330,000 while in 1951 the country had lost only 165,000 across 
the frontier. While in 1959 the figures dropped to 144,000, by early in 
1961" the regime was experiencing the ,loss.of 25,000 each month, 
55 
according to West German sources. 
54John Mander, Berlin: Hostage for the West (Baltimqre: Penguin 
Books, 1962), p. 77. 
S5B l' C" d Ch 11 (N Y k er ~n: r~s~s an a enge ew or : German Information 
Center, 1963), p. 28. 
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East German officials described the situation as ,intolerable but in 
so doing their ,references were not to the flight of East German:citizens 
alone. While it is reasonable ~o assume that 1;his was the primary 
reason for the sealing of the border in Berlin, the GDR officia~s 
insisted that there was a far graver justification. It was ,charged that 
during the summer of 1961 ,sabotage and "subversionist activit~es", 
against East Germany from West Berlin had increased to drastic 
proportions. A fire in, the East Berlin stockyards on August 7 was 
blamed on saboteurs from West Berlin. 56 An even more fanta~tic ,charge 
was made by SED Politb~ro member Albert Norden who has alleged that the 
West was preparing for war against ,East Ger~any in 1961. NATO is 
charged with having no less than "thirty-two different plans fO,r B~rlin." 
A military truck convoy was to challenge the .Eas1; "Gernm,n in~pectors, on 
the, He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn and attempt to crash through the bar~iers. 
If this convoy was fired on by East German guards, it was to return 
fire. If additional East German troops were brought up, a',second convoy. 
wi th supporting tanks was to join the first., If necessd..I.'y, a II small 
atom bomb!' was to be dropped on a big concentration of Eastern troops. 
Simultaneously, the~e were to be attacks ~n the GDR's Baltic coast. 
According to Norden, NATO had already rehearsed its attack on the East 
German northern, flank. Western troqps were ~o enter East Berlin from 
the western sectors of tQe city. Norden concedes that many of the GDR's 
most highly skilled citizens were leaving by way of West Berlin but 
56How Germany Was-Divided, p. 155. 
insists that they were merely. being vic~imized by the, "enticements'~ of 
the West which were part of the ,campaign to destroy the .GDR as a state 
and incorporate it into West Germany.57 
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B~rlin was· filled wi~h rumors during the weeks before the beginning 
of the constru~tioll of the Wall on Augu~t 1.3. There were rumors that 
there might be ,an explosive uprising in E.ast Germany and stories that 
many East German officials.had made statement~ about taking over ,West, 
Berlin. In spite of this atmosphere, most of the ,Western leaders did 
not anticipate that something would happen until that fall. For example, 
in an interview.several years. later, former U.S. Secretary of State Dean. 
Rusk said that while "we had expected the Russians to take;some measure 
to halt the hemorrhage of East Germans.into West Berlin," that action 
had not been expected until much 1ater. S8 
The first official word tha~ the border with West Berlin had b~en 
closed came in an ear~y morning broadcast on Radio GDR. The announcement 
began with a list of threats said. to be emanating from West Berlin, 
including a reference to the "systematic enticement of ,GDR citizens afld 
a thorough-going tra~fic in human beings." For these reasons, listeners, 
were told, the GDR Council of Minister~, in agreement with the Political 
Consultative Committee of ,the Warsaw Pact, had adqpted a series of 
mea~;ures . Controls were to be introduced "along the frontiers of the 
57 Albert Norden, Thus Wars Are ,Made (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 
1970), pp. 285-286,·290.292. 
58E1eanor Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1962), pp. 25-27. 
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GDR, including those with the W~s.tern sectors of Greater Berli~.'" In 
Berlin, "reliable surveillance and effective controls" were.to be. 
established along the West Berlin frontiex:s "in order to block subversive 
activitie$." East Berliners.would require a special permit to go to 
West Berlin although West Berliners would still be allowed to. visit the. 
East. The announcement concluded with the statement that these measures 
would remain in ef.fect "pending the conclusion of a German .peace tre~ty." 
Later broadcasts went into detail 'regarding the physical arrangements 
that were being made for closing certain.subway lines and the Berlin 
elevated rail service, the S-Bahn. In addition, . East German citizens 
not working in Berlin were "requested to refrain from journeys to Berlin 
until further notice. ,,59 
. . \ 
The first measures in const~ucting what ~he East·German government 
referred to as an "antifascist, protective wall" consisted of barbed 
wire fastened by wood~n posts. However, within a few days, the concrete 
wall that eventually was const~ucted began to takE) shape. On August 20, 
East ·Be~liners who lived in houses or apartments al~ng the border were 
ordered to move out as preparations began to clear a.wide area for 
patro~s inside the Wall. 60 Security measures along the Wall were 
steadily tightened and on August 29, the first escaping East German 
61 wa~ killed by border guards. 
59BBC Summary of·. World Broadcasts (hereafter noted as SWB), 
August 14, 1961, EE/71S/ All 3-4. 
60Arno SchQlz, Stacheldraht.um Berlin (Barbed Wire Around Berlin) 
(West Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1961), p. 36. 
61 Ibid ., p. 74. 
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Although General Lucius Clay and Vice-President ,Lyndon Johnson 
arrived in West Berlin,within a few days to symbol~ze the United Stat~s' 
concern for the ,independence of West Be~lin, the American response was 
deliberately restrained. The America.n note which was delivered to the 
Soviet commanders in East Berlin was not a formal protest as such, but 
simply a statement of what had taken place and a condemnation of the 
Communist actions. 62 One U.S. Senator, Fulbright, actually defended the 
East German actions. 63 This restra~nt was typical of the reactions of 
all the Western powers in Berlin. There were massive protest rallies in 
West Berlin and West Germany, but the Western powers too~ no actio~ to 
. . 
comply with the West German demands to knock the Wall down. Apparently, 
the West saw the ,Berlin situation as explosive an~ unstable before the 
erection of the Wall and felt that by constructing the Wall, the 
Communists had at least brought ,stability to a situat~on that had 
contained the potential for erupting into war. 
V. FROM THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL THROUGH 1967 
The West ,evidently felt tha~ Western rights in Berlin were not 
endangered by the construction of the Wall. Only after the massive 
East German military concentrations were observed around the Western 
64 
sectors did the allied commanders put their troops ,on alert. Finally, 
62 Dulles, p. 76. 
63Smith, pp. 259-260. 
64 Ibid ., p. 279. 
. 
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they began to feel that their rights might possibly be affected. The 
threat, however, was seen in pureiy tactical, not political, terms. 
The milc;lness of the Western .response doubt;less encouraged the East 
Germans ,to make their measures much more exten~ive. After the border 
was sealed, they cut the telephone ,and telegraph lines. On August 15 
West Serlin vehicles were prohibited from entering the ,East withqut 
special permits by the Communist authoJ.:'ities. 65 This action represent~d 
one of the first real threats to Western rights in Berlin. 
While the thoroughness of .the GDRls measures resulted in an,a1most 
immediate decline in trade between West Berlin and East Germany, the 
East German economy up to this tim~ had such a national orientation and 
placed so little emphasis on foreign trade that litt1~ significance can 
be attached to this rnatter. 66 Of greater signif~cance was the ,diminished 
human contacts b~tween West Berlin and the East. Shortly after the 
initial East German half of regular .visits by West Berliners to the East, 
it ,became apparent that the Communists intenqed to sever human ties as 
completely as possible. The only grounds.for approval of visits by 
West Berliners on a routine basis, as opposed to those following from 
special governmental arrangements, after ,the construction of the Wall 
became that of "compassionate" reasons, to vis~t a seriously ill or 
dying relative, for example. The first "cqmpassionate.passes" were 
65Ibid ., p. 279. 
66Wolfgang Stolper, The Structure of the East.GeI:'IDanEconomy 
(Camb~idge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 12-13. 
· .. 
granted in October of 1964 and by the . end of 1967 over 70,000 had been 
. d 67 ~ssue' . 
In December of 1963 the first Christmas'passes were issued· after 
the completion of.in arrangement negotiated by West Berlin's·Mayor 
37 . 
~randt and the East German government. Approximately 1.2 million passes 
were issued for a period of eighteen days during the .Christmas season. 68 
The East used these agreements ,in an effort to extract as much 
recognition as possible for the GDR government by making a,vari~ty of 
demands during the issuance of the passes ~ Repeated demands, for 
example, were ,made that higher ranking Western,officia1s deal with the~ 
rather than the medium-ranked officers who were involved .inmost of the 
69 
contacts. 
For the ,next.three years there was considerable succes~ in the 
efforts to renegotia~e passes for Christmas and other special days. 
In September, 1964, a new pass agreement was concluded with the East 
Germans.by the Bonn Erhard government which was scheduled to extend 
until June, 1965. Under the same agreement re~ired pensioners were 
allowed to go from East Germany to visit relatives in the West fot: as 
long as four weeks. During the summer ·of 1965 another agreement ,was 
70 
reached on passes for the next year. 
67David Shears, The Ugly: Frontier (New York: Alfred A. ,Knopf, 
1970), p. 200. 
68E1eanor Dulles, Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever· (Chapel Hill ~ 
University of·North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 93-94. 
69 Ibid ., p. 9~. 70Ibid ., pp. 97-98. 
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In spite of the occasional breaks in the East German policy of 
severance of human contacts across the Wall, the political climate after 
the construction of the ·Wal1 improved very little. In October, 1961, 
just as the Soviet leader Gromyko was making a speech in Moscow berating 
the determination of the West to defend the rights of West Ber1in"l one 
of the most serious confrontations was taking place. On October 26, 
East German border guards stopped a group of Americans in a civilian car. 
with military- license plates attempting to pass through Checkpoint 
Charlie. The East Germans refused to allow the Americans to pass 
without showing their military identification cards. The American 
vehicle went back to the West only to return to the Checkpoint 
accompanied by an armada of tanks as an escort. The East German guards 
stood by as the tanks proceeded with the civilian car into East Berlin. 
For several days afterward combat ready Soviet and American forces faced 
72 
each other across the Wall. 
In early 1962 another confrontation occurred when Sovie~ planes 
began to interfere with the air corridors into West Berlin. After a 
strong American and British protest the interference was finally 
stopped. Shortly afterward, in April, the Americans toyed with the 
idea of having the Berlin access routes placed under the supervision 
of a thirteen nation agency which presumably would have operated 
7lRobert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 399. 
72 Scholz, p. 80. 
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through the United Nations. When the intensity of West German opposition 
to this proposal became k~own, it was promptly forgotten. 73 
Political and military pressure on.WestBerl~n decreased 
considerably after the Cuban crisis .in October, 1962. Not only did this, 
Soyiet-Ameri.can confrontation, seemingly unrelated to the West Berlin 
issue, help raise the sagging prestige of the United States in Berlin, 
it seemed to ,deflate the USSR's apparent self~confidence regarding 
Berlin. This development clearly illustrated how closely the West 
Berlin issue was tied in the ,fabric of major power policies. The Cuban 
crisis of 1962, a clear defeat of an important Soyiet policy and an 
apparent Western triumph, resulted in the adoption of.a more ca~tious 
policy by the .USSR on West Be~lin. Some scholars have hypothe~ized 
tha~ the .Soviet introduction of missiles in Cuba in 1962 was intended 
as,a lever for forcing a settlement of the .Berlin and the .German 
problems favorable.to the Kremlin. The Cuban defeat, therefore, had 
consequences seemingly unrelated to Cub~.74 
In 1963, W~stern st~nding in West Berlin was further improved,by 
the visit of U.S. President Kennedy to the city. In a mass rally after 
a personal visit to the Wall, Kennedy assured West Berliners that 
freedom throughout the world was ,at stake in Berlin and that the U.S. 
was willing to fight, if necessary, for the rights of. West Be~liners. 
In June, 1964, the Soviet Uniol1 concluded a treaty with East 
Germany which was, apparently a substitute for the long-awaited separate 
73 Hartmann, p. 126. 74 Slusser, p. ix. 
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peace treaty. While. it called for a ."no~~lization" of the situation in 
West Berlin and pledged the USSR's support in maintaining the ."integrity 
of the state f:rontiers of the GDR," it did.not threaten Western rights. 
Wes,t Berlin was described. in th~ treaty as "an independent political. 
, 75 
entity." 
When the. West German legislature held a plenary session in.West 
Berlin th~ next April, a custom it;had followed for more than a decade, 
the Communist re~ponse was relatively restrained. Access routes were 
not threatened and the USSR limited.itse~f to occasional interruptions 
of the .speeches in the Bundestag with sonic booms caused by the 
low-flying Russian fighter planes over the building in which the session 
was being he1d. 76 
Aside from th~ infrequent cQnfronta~ions such as t~ose.mentioned 
here, the. first six years after the construction of the Wall were 
relatively peaceful. There were many incidents ,along the .Wa1l and five 
East German border guards were killed by West Berlin policemen.when they 
fired on escaping refugees who had reached West Berlin territory. 
During the same time over sixty refugees are known to have been killed 
d · ld b . B l' 77 M h'l . th d E t ur~ng wou - e escapes ~n er ~n. eanw ~ e, over s~x ousan as 
Germans.were reportedly arrested an4 jailed by the .GDR autho~ities for 
75Mi1estones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967. (Moscow: Prqgress 
Publishers, 1967), pp. 222-223. 
76 Shears., p. 198. 
77Rainer Hildebrandt, Es Geschah an der Mauer. (It Happened at the 
Wall) (West Berlin: Arqeitsgemeinschaft 13 August e. v., 1968), p. 60. 
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attemp~ed."flight from the Republic,". an of£ens~ carrying a se~tence·of 
f 'ft hs" 78 Th b f h h d ~ een mont . ~mpr~sonment. e exact. num er 0 t ose w 0, succee ed 
in their.flights is not .known. There seems.to be.gene~al agreement.that 
approximately 16,000 escaped by going over, th~ough, or under the .Wa.ll, 
or by crossing the .so-called "green frontier" between East and West 
Germany during the first two years after .the erection of the Wall~79 
During subsequent years:the number was.considerably.smaller although 
there.is litt1e.agreement on just how ~arge that number is. 
MeaIlwhi1e, the East German ecqnomy finally begaIl to improve. The 
Wall played no small part in thi~ improvement. The importance of the 
Wall to the .East German ec~nomy was· emphasized by Politburq member 
Albert Norden who has written·that after August 13, 1961, the GDR was. 
"at last able to put the laws of Socialism into practice without 
disruption from outside.,,80 For years the open border in Berlin had 
drained most of the average of over 200,000 people who left East Germany 
every year. Of these refugees, 50 percent were under. twenty-five and 
74 perc~nt were under forty-five. They represented many of ·.the youngest 
81 
and best trained people in East Germany. Now·that the flow had all 
but ended, the East German economy.was freed from one of its greatest. 
handicaps. 
78Ibid ., p. 75. 
79B l' er ~n: Cr~sis 
80 Norden, pp. 282-283. 
81 Hartmann, p. 124. 
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VI. FROM 1945 TO 1967: . AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE EAST GERMANS 
It was obvious. when the Sovie~ Army entered Berlin in.1945 that the 
local Germans in their zone of occupation were playing the ,most minor of 
roles in a script written entirely by the Russians. The Ulbricht Group 
and those it recruited were clearly not.allowed to ac~.with any 
independel)ce. If the role of the Germans in t~e Western zones differed 
it.was only to the degree that they were ignored more than their Eastern 
counterparts who were acting, literally, as agents for the Soviet 
Military Administration and. the Commul)ist .Party of the Soviet Union. 
By the time of the .1948.Berlin blockade, the status .of the East 
Ge~mans had risen only slightly. The creation of the People's Council. 
in 1948 by the Soviet authorities as a response to Western intentions 
to create·the Federal Republic of Germany assigneC;l the ,East ,Germans a, 
somewhat more.important role, but it was still a Soviet-written script 
in a Soviet drama. 
The 1958 ultimatum by Khrushchev represented an additional increase 
in the status of the East German~. They now, of course, had their own 
government and that government had become the pivot of an important 
Soviet diplom,atic and poli ~ical . offensive against, the West. The clear. 
meaning of the Soviet me~sage to the West was that the Western powers. 
were.going to b~ having to deal with the.East.Germans directly if they 
did not cooperate. The East Germans could.almost be .seen as a club with 
which the USSR could threaten the Western powers. 
The Berlin crisis of 1961 found the East Germans playing a major 
role even though it is safe to venturt: that the .drama was.still of a. 
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Soviet design. Krushchev has written that he relied on Soviet forces 
whil e establishing border control for East Germany. However. the Soviet 
troops were dispersed and well back from the focal point of the actions 
. A 82 h ln ugust, 1961. A CIA agent W 0 spent the night of August 12 in.East 
Berlin is reported to have seen only one Russian jeep with two Soviet 
officers actually on the scene during the preparations for sealing the 
border between East and West Berlin.83 The central roles in this 
particular scene were assigned to the East Germans themselves. They 
were the ones who undertook the actual closing of the border and the 
construction of the Wall. The years after 1961 found the East Germans 
continuing to play an increasingly important and, on matters such as 
the Christmas passes, apparently independent role. The exten~ and 
importance of this evolution of the SED regime will be the major concern 
in the chapters that follow. 
82Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (New York: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1971), p. 506. 
83 Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts, p. 38. 
CHA.PTER II 
THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE, FROM 1968 TO 1971:, THE ULBRICHT ERA. 
The period covered in this ,study, 1968to,1974, can be divided into 
two phases. The first covers the .years from 1968 up to the spring of 
1971, the last years of W~lter Ulbricht's 4omin~nce. The second ,phase 
covers the years since Ulbricht's removal as.First Secretary of the 
Socialist Unity Party, the ye~rs in which Erich Honecker has been the 
dominant East German political figure. Before examining this first 
phase, th~ subject ,of this chapter, the West Berlin issue must ,be 
considered in its role as a central element in ,Soviet-U .,5. relations. 
in recent years and what many see as the key to detente in Europe ,today. 
It ,WOUld be a~ understatement to say that the postwar arrangemen~s 
had a profound effect on the political situation in Europe. In many 
respects, the East-West confrontation in Europe, centered on what was 
and what ,was not done in those months after ,the concl~sion of hostilities 
in May, 1945. Nowhere was the confrontation more bitter, however, than 
'. '. '. 
in the case of the ,so-called German probl~m. The division of Germany 
came to symbolize, on a small scale, the ,division of Europe. The 
division of Germany was, further c~mpU,.cat~d by the unresolved ques,tions 
of the relationship between the newly-created German,statEls and the, 
frontiers of Germany with Poland. The Western-oriented Federal Republic 
of Germany found considerable support in the first years ,after its 
creation for a ,policy which refused to recognize either the territorial 
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status quo in Europe or the permanence of the partition of Germany~ 
However, by the early 1960's, th~ formal W~stern commitment to 
4S 
reunification and the provisional nature of,the Oder-Neisse line became 
uncertain and the F.ederal Republic soon found itself increasingly. 
isolated from its allies on these questions,l 
The Federal Republic responded to. the threat ~f isolation by an. 
Ostpolitik which, according to then Foreign. Minister Willy Brandt, was 
i'intended to help overcome the division of Europe. ,,2 The new policy 
also carried with it a vision of a new role for West Germany, a role 
which implied that the ,conception of the value of the Western alliance· 
system might be undergoing a change. "For centuries," Brandt declared, 
"Germany was a·bridge between East and West. We are ,striving to.build 
anew the shattered bridge, better, sturdier, and more reliabl~."~ The 
realization of such a goal, ho~ever, was not.expected to come easily or. 
soon. What was seen as a very real .possibil~ty in the ,near future wa~ 
an improvement in the lot of the East Germans whom Brandt referred to 
as "Germans.who are our countrymen." Brandt decla1;'ed that the FGR 
wanted closer relations with its "fellow ,Germans," that it wanted "the 
barriers to b~ lowered." If such relief for the East Germans was sought 
in the short run, th~ goal of reunification was not re~ounced for the 
lCharles R. Planck, The Changing Status of German Reunification 
in Western Diplomacy, 1955-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1967), pp. 57-60. 
2Wi1ly Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (Ne~ York: Holt, R~nehart, 
and Winston, 1968), p. 105. 
3Ibid ., p. 116. 
long run. The partition of Germany was described as the "source of 
mischief" and something which the Bonn government wanted to eliminate 
"by means of peaceful understanding.,,4 
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The West German hopes for gradual "liberalization" of the political 
systems of the Communist Party states in East Europe were effectively 
ended by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Any 
illusions that might have existed about improving West German relations 
with East.Europe in general and East Germany in particular without. 
granting demands for an acceptance of the territorial and political 
status quo in Europe were dispelled by the events o~ August, 1968. The 
Soviet invasion was followed by a phase of West German foreign policy 
characterized by acceptance of many basic Communist demands regarding 
the status quo in Europe. The first fruits of the new phase were the 
treaties with the Soviet Union and with Poland. A key point regarding 
West German contacts with Poland and the other East European states was 
stressed earlier by Brandt when he asserted, 
The development of our relations with the other countries 
of Eastern Europe should supplement the development of our 
relationship to the Soviet Union, not run counter to it. s 
The realization of the promise by Brandt to the USSR meant that Bonn 
had effectively recognized one of the Soviet Union's most longstanding 
and vital aims regarding its policy toward Europe. What this amounted 
to was that Soviet control over East Europe had been legitimized by 
West German policy. In the past, the Soviet goal of legitimization of 
4Ibid ., pp. 122-123. sIbid., p. 105. 
its control over E~st Europe had always been tied with a second goal, 
the dissolution of the Western alliance system in.Europe. This linkup 
was no longer ,necessary, so with the West German recognition of SQviet 
dominance in Eastern Europe ,came Soviet ac~eptance ,of West Germany's 
conti~ued membership in NATO. 6 
Wi th ..its position in the ,Western alliance system granted by the 
USSR after Bonn acceptance of the European status quo, the Federal 
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Republic could now concern itself with its own direct inter~sts and with 
the continuing problem of West Berlin. In discussing this ques1;ion, 
Richard,Lowenthal has written, 
From the point of view of,the Federal Republ~c, 
normalization of its relations with the Soviet bloc entailed 
as its corollary recognition 'by the So~iet Union and by the 
East Ge~an stat~ of special ties of West Be~lin with the 
political, legal, economic, and financial institut~ons,of 
the Federal Republic, including the right of the Federal 
Republic to negotiate on 'behalf of West ~erlin.7 
Consequently, progress on improving the .position of West Berlin was 
d~clared by theFRG government to be a prerequisi 1;e for its final 
approval of the .treaties with Poland and the ,USSR. Brandt labelled 
. , 
West Berlin as t~e key of detente in Europe. Detente ,could not bypass 
West Bet:lin, Brandt declared. "Berlin must remain the barometer on 
8 
which ,not only bad but good weather can be read." ,The signing of , the 
6peter C. Ludz in Eastern Europe. in the 1970s, 
Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and Peter C. Ludz (Ne~ York: 
p. 231-
7Ibid ., pp. 231-232. 
8 Brandt, p. 139. 
edited by Sylva 
Pr~eger, 1972), 
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Four Power Agreement on Berlin on September 3, 1971 signified the 
realization of the progress that the Bonn government sought. 9 With the 
affixing of the appropriate signature~ on the Four Power Agreement, the 
Federal Republic was in a position to continue its policy of improving 
its relations with the East. 
If West Berlin is seen as the key to success for the West German 
government's Ostpolitik, it must not be forgotten that it is more than 
that for many West Germans. West Berlin is an emotional issue ior many 
West Ge~ans who in the past two decades have come to view West ,Berlin 
as part of the territory of the Federal Republic. Even West German 
politicians such as Brandt, who would have to be considered far more 
"liberal," or re<lHstic, on the West Berlin issue, have made repeated 
assertions of the ties of West Berlin to the Federal Republic. While 
Foreign Minister Brandt emphatically declared that "West Berlin belongs 
to the Federal Republic of Germany,,,lO the inclusion of nonvoting 
members in the Bundestag from West Berlin adds to the illusion that the 
isolated city is formally a Land of the FRG. Official government 
handbooks have continuously listed West Berlin with the various Lands 
of the FRG when giving information about the Federal Republic. ll 
Furthermore, even population charts list the population of West Berlin 
9Neues Deutschland, September 3, 1971, p. 1. tHereafter noted 
as ND). 
10 Brandt, p. 137. 
IlHelmut Arntz, Facts About Germany (20nn: Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Republic, 1968), p. 79. 
49 
as.resident of the Federal Republic. 12 In addition to official 
information, family tie~ link many West Germans emotionally with West 
Berlin and the unofficial policy o~ encouraging public school.chil~ren 
to visit West Berlin before completing the~r education insures that 
young citizens have firsthand knowledge of West Berlin. In short, West 
Germans are encouraged to regard West Berlin as "theirs." The result 
is an emotional attachment to ,West Berlin, the ,strength of which is 
illustrated by the rhetoric of leading politicians in the Federal 
Republic. 
Finally, th~ material resources of ' West Beriincanno~,be overlooked 
as an important factor regarding the Berlin issue. Population alone 
makes West Berlin an extre~ely valuable region of Germany. The West 
Berlin population of over 2.1 million is larger than that of any othe~ 
city in either East or West Germany.13 The commercial position of West 
Berlin further enhances its importance. Trade in ,goods bet~een West 
Berlin and the Federal Republic amounts to 25 billion marks annually, 
a figure which is about on~ half the ,size of the entire amount of import 
14 
and export tr~de for West Germany with all of Europe for a,year. 
Therefore, while the West German emotional attachment may receive 
considerable attention in any examination of the Federal Republic's 
policy tow~rd the Berlin question, it cannot obscure the very real 
I 12Handbook of Statistics for theFRG CWiesbaden: Federal 
Statistical Office, 1970), p. 16. 
l3Ibid ., p. 17. 
l4Ibid ., pp. 100, 108. 
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importance.of West Berlin to the economy of·West Ge~many. Bonn's,policy 
is·by no·means simply a response to the demands and pressures,of those 
who regard West Berlin as.a symbolic test for the West but is .also a 
reflection of important ecqnomic needs of the Federal Republic. 
Just as West Berlin plays a major role in affairs of the Fe4eral 
Republic, it also figures prominently in East German politics. For the 
German Democratic Republic, We~t Be~lin represents a serious securi~y 
problem in three ways. This thr~efold threa~ is political, military, 
and economic. However, it should also be kept in ,mind that the present 
situation of West ~erlin also gives the East Germans one important 
advantage in its relations with the ,West. 
West Berlin poses ,a threat to the ,political security of East 
Germany in several ways. First, there is the possibil~ty t~at a 
confrontation over West Berlin might erupt into an actual exchange 
of fire. While this seems unlikely at this time for a,variety o~ 
reasons, the ,likelihood that any large-scale shooting incident might 
lead to a nuclear exchange being the most prominent, it is ,nevertheless, 
a possibility. While such an event would be a tragedy for both sides, 
the ,fact is that GDR terr,itory, along with .West Berlin, WQu1d be most 
affected. rne possibility of such a violent eruption must be considered 
a thIteat to ,the political stability not only in th~ sense that any war, 
threaten~ the security of the governmental institutions on whose. 
territory it occurs, but also in that it offers hope of outside 
intervention for tho~e within the country who might be,viol~ntly 
opposed to the regime. 
". 
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This leads to the .second way in which West Berlin represents.a 
thr~at to the political security of the GDR. Th~ danger for the GDR 
comes from the possibility of damage to the.prestige of the East German 
regime tha~ could result in th~ event of a confrontation over Berlin 
that is resolved by what looks like an Eastern retreat. Be~ause of 
almost constant negotia~ions or cQntroversies oversome .. aspect of .the 
West ~erlin problem, the .East German leadership is in a position in 
w4ich,its standing in the ,community of "socialist states".is likely to. 
be·measured by decisions that are made over various disputes connected 
with the West Berlin issue. In many cases, such as the negotiatio~s 
over the Four Power Agreement of 1971, th~ East Germans are not direct. 
participants .themselves but are, in effect, represente4 by ~~e Soviet 
Union. Should. the Soviet Union not secure what can be considered a 
"good deal II with regard to East German interests, the ,conclusion may be 
drawn·in the West, in.othe~ Communist stat~s, and even in the GDR that 
the SED leadership is no longer highly regarded by its Russian patrons. 
Th~ result would be a weakening of the leaders~ip's positions at home. 
and abroad. In the case of violent .opponents to the Communist regime 
in East Germany, the GDR faces a threat in the event that such 
individuals might seek to cause incidents along the Wall that will make 
it necessary for the West to respond with force. In other words, politi-
~al opponents could provoke violent incidents with the goal of either 
bringing about a certain Western response or of simply embarrassing 
the regime. The East German leadership h~s recognized this.possibility 
on a number of occasions by referring to the desire of those. who do not 
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like "the way things are going" to see border incidents,involving 
. 1 . B l' 15 v1o.ence 1n .er 1n. In an ,effort to ,over~Qme.the adverse effect of 
the publicity surrounding a border shooting a few days:before the World 
Yo~th F~stival was to be held in East ,Berlin du~ing the s~er of 1973, 
the East German authorities expelled an individual who was alleged to 
be the .supposed shooting victim and declared that his obvious good 
he,al th demonstrated the ,dishonesty of· West~rn reports about a killing 
at the Wall. While discrepancies in th~ man's story led to speculations. 
regarding whether or not he was actually the man, the East Ge~mans' 
action illustrates their.sensitivity to incidents ofthis.sort. l6 In 
the twelve years following construction of the Wall, sixty-nine people 
were known to have been killed in border incidents in Berlin.17 , The 
detrimental effect.of these actions on the GDR's prestige is 
incalculable. 
The third way in which West Berlin poses a threat to East German 
political security is economic. Numerous GDR commentaries have 
re~ognized the importance of the construction of.the Wall in bringing 
stabili ty to. the East German economy. 18 Albert Norden cites .a figure 
of 30 thousand million marks as the cost.of the damage to the .GDR 
15 ND, July 20, 1973, p. 1. 
16Ber1iner Morgenpost (West Berlin), July 22, 1973, p. 1. 
17BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 13, 1973, EE/4371/Al/6. 
(He~eafter noted .as SWB). 
18 ND, August 13, 1973, p. 1. 
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economy suffered during the time before the Wall. 19 The mass exodus 
ended in 1971. However, escapes have continued and have actually 
increased in recent years. In 1973 a total of 6,450 GDR citizens are 
known to have successfully fled East Germany, usually by way of West 
Berlin, an increase of 16 percent from the previous year. While this 
number is of almost no consequence when compared with the annual n~T.ber 
of escapees before August of 1961 when the Wall was built, it remains 
very important bec~use it includes many of the best trained people in 
East Germany, people who qualify for jobs in West Germany which offer 
considerably more monetary-return than East German jobs bring them. 
In fact, many West German firms are said to have paid the expense 
involved in hiring professional escapee services to aid certain 
highly-trained persons in leaving the GDR illegally.2l For most of 
the escape~, West Berlin is either the destination or a base of 
operations from which to launch an escape. 
In addition to the economic damage resulting from loss of valuable 
personnel, the GDR is threatened by West Berlin in another economic way. 
In the past, economic sabatoge has frequently been launched by West 
Germany, according to some Western accounts , using West Berlin as a 
base. Such sabatoge involved the manufacturing of phoney bills of 
19A1ber~ Norden, Thus Wars Are Made (Dresden: Ve~lag Zeit in Sild, 
1970), p. 286. 
20 SWB, January, 2, 1974, EE/4489/ Al/!. 
2l0er Spiegel, No. 34, August 20, 1973, pp. 23-34. 
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lading that were ,introduced into East Germancc~~ercial de~lings,in such 
a way as, to sidetrack valuable shipments of certain conunoditie~ and thus 
damage the GDR' economy. 22 While such fantastic aciventur~s are apparently 
no longer under~aken, GDR reports continue to stres~ the damage to the 
economy resulting from the activities of Western banks, especially those 
in West Berlin, which have a, harmful effect on ,the GDR currency. In 
1973 East German charges of speculation in GDR currency by Western ban~s 
reached a peak during the time that tourist trade to East GermanY,was 
reaching its highest levels. Neues Deutschland,on November 8, 1973, 
charged that West ,Berlin authorities were toh~rat;ing qlegal currency 
transactions resulting in practices described as "basically a repetition 
f th th ' l' b fAt 13. 1~6l.,,23 o ose at were ~nuse a ong,t~me ago, e ore ugus , 
The East German response to this situat;ion,was to double the amount of 
GDR currency that Western tourists were required to exchange at ,the 
border. ~le reporting that more than half,a million illegally 
imported GDR marks had been confiscated during the ,last year, Nues 
Deutschland announce~ that the new exchange requirements shoulci have 
the effect ofdecreasi~g the tourists' need for illegal ,marks to a, 
certain extent. The old minimum exchange requirements, ten marks a 
day fo~ each day of,a visit to the GDR, were declared to be insufficient 
24 to meet the minimum needs of a tourist in East Germany. East German 
22 John Dornberg, The Other Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 
p. 81. 
23ND , November 8, 1973, p. 2. 
24 Ibl.'d .. N b , ovem er 5, 1973, pp. 1-2. 
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attacks on alleged currency speculation in ,the West as a threat.to the 
East German economy have contin~edJ indicating that the GDR still feels 
a threat to its economic security. West Berlin, of course, is only one, 
source of ,this particular threat. However, it i~ a significant 
participan~ . and for this reason can justifiably be vieit{ed as posing a. 
threat to.the economic security of the GDR. 
The third way in which West Berlin is a security problem for East 
Germany is, mill tarily. The possibili ty o~ the .Western outpost sex:ving 
as a focal point for the·outbreak.of war has already been mentiQned.in 
another context. However, it should be a4ded that,in th~. event of 
conventional hostilities, assuming that such.a conflict is possible in 
Europe, West Berlin would be an iI\lportant beachhead from which mi1i~ary 
operation~ could be launched early in the hostilities. East Ge~man 
h . h fIll d d h 1 f W B I' 25 r etor1C as requent y a u e to s~c a ro e Qr est er 1n. 
Assuming that no war erupts, West Berlin is still of military importance 
for espionage directed against not only the East German military, bu~ 
also the Sovi~t military installatiQn in the GDR. On tho~e occasions 
that the GDR hosts Warsaw Pact·maneuvers, West Berlin provides the 
opportunity for espionage against the WTO forces in general. In this 
connection, the observation might be made that West Bex:lin is valuable 
fo~ a wide variety of types of espionage, not only ~he military type. 
Espionage, of course, works two ways, and it can be expected that the. 
East also uses.WestBerlin for considerable espionage endeavors. 
25Norden, pp. 290-291. 
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Finally, an evaluation of what· West Berlin means for East Ge~many 
would not be complete without making the observation t~t thi.s city can 
be extrelllely valuab1e.to the GDR and its Soviet ally. The value of West 
Berlin to t~e East lies in its convenien~ position for blackmail. We~t 
Be~lin, in short, can.become a hostage in an Ea~t-West confronta~ion~ 
Brandt's observation about Berlin as a.barometer for both good and bad 
weather indicates this. Just as Communist goodwill can be demo~strated 
in Be~lin, bad will can also be given expression here. The years of 
what we refer to as the .ColdWar are filled with evid~nce of West 
Berlin's value to the .East as a means.of applying pressure. In balance; 
this advantage which the East Ge~mans and. their allies enjoy bec~use of 
the extended, isolated position of West Berlin may outweigh all of the. 
disadvan~ages discussed above. 
I. THE COMMUNIST CONCEPTION .OFDETENTE 
Both Communist and non-Communist sides.agree tha1; the.Berlin 
problem is of considerable importance.to the effort to achieve detente 
in Europe. While the emphasis may differ depending on.whether the 
account is an Eastern ora Western on~, th~re are no .ques~icns raised 
about the crucial nature of what happens either in Berlin or relating 
to Berlin. East German accounts typically cite such things as visits 
by officials of the ,government of .the Federal Republic to West.Berlin 
for the performance of official duties as proof of the West German 
desire to perpetuate the Cold War. 26 Meanwhile, West German authorities 
26 ND, June 23, 1968, p. 1. 
such as Claus Soenksen, counsellor ,for the FRG Embnssy in .. Washingtonp. 
describe successful develQpments relating to the Berlin problem as 
verification of the validity of ··their policy for achieving detente .in 
27 Europe. 
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In order 'to bet~er evaluate developments i~ the disputes over, 
Berlin, it is appropriate at this point to make some brief observat~ons, 
regarding the character and·significance.of detent~ in Europe. Since 
an expressed concern for detente has served as the public motivatio~s 
for both East and West German initiatives on the Berlin problem, a 
better understanding of the meaning of.detente might.improve our.ability 
to view this particular issue as part of the larger pic.ture. of East-West 
relations. 
The events.which have been transpiring in Europe for the past five 
years and are described as elamentsof·detente are not isolated instances 
but are part of a worldwide trend toward accommodation with the Sovie~ 
Union and its allies. This desire for accommodation is cl.early based on 
a new estimate of the reality of world power in which the United States 
is seen as weaker relative to the USSR. Th,e aftermath of Vietnam has 
left the United States in a position in which it possesses the 
instruments of modern warfare but seems, in the Soviet view, to lack 
the will to use those weapons. The American desire to withdraw from 
global military commitments is dramatically evidenced not only by 
speeches of many leading U.S. Senators, but also by the policy of 
27Sinanian, Deak, and Ludz, p. 23Q. 
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withdrawal from Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, as Walter Laqueur of the 
Center for Stra~egic and,International Studies of Georgetown University 
has written recently, "while America is in r~treat, th~ Soviet Uniot:l 
still has a global poliCy.,,28 In a time when the U.S. is reexamining 
its present commitments, th~ USSR is expanding its cQmmitments in such, 
areas as the Middle East and elsewhere. The res~lt is a situation in 
which many world le~ders must feel a compelling desire to reach an 
"understanding" with the power whose fortunes are in apparent ascendancy. 
If other nations see the United States as a power of·reduced 
stature, it should not be ,surprising that th~ Soviet Uniot:l today views 
detente as a,cons~quence of a spiritually and militarily weakened West. 
Detente iS,not considered evidence of good will on the ,part ,of the West. 
In ,the words of one Soviet autho~ity: 
The deepening of the crisis ,of imperialism's foreign 
policy is forcing political leaders of Western countries 
tQ fo~mulate their plans and their policy towards the. 
Soviet Union and other socialist states more cautious~y 
than theY did until now. 29 
Yet, according to SQvie~ 1eaders.and their ,East European allies, the 
West has not weakened to such an extent that it .is no· longer basically 
hostile. The Soviet autho~ity quoted above observes that "the policies 
of the chief imperialist powers are not undergoing any fut:ldamenta1 . 
change." The things which some mistake for real change are in,fact 
28Wa1ter Laqueur, Neo-Iso1ationism in the World of the Seventies 
(New York: Library Press, 1972), p. 48. 
29Sh . Sankoyev, "Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the Two 
S}'stems," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, 1972, p. 14. 
only "tactical changes. II30 In discussing West German foreign policy, 
the SED official newspaper Neues Deutschland ,commented that the 
anti-Communist crusade of the Federal Republic was being continued but 
wi th the ,utilization of "differentiated ,and selective methods. ,,31 In 
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short, the East feels that the policy of , detente signifies no real 
change in the Western outlook but simply reflects the decline of their, 
systems. Meanwhile the ideological struggle is said to b~ intensifying 
at the very time the West talks about the end of the Cold War. 
Meanwhile, during the time that western unity s~ems to be,declining 
in many important ways, the nations of the ,Soviet bloc enjoy what W~lter 
Laqueurdescribed in 1973 to a Senate subcommi t''tee ,as detente. 32 The 
Wes,t obviously enjoys no such" consensus on how to deal with the Commut:list 
states. While few would assert that there is abso1ut~ Communist unity 
on the ,question of relations with the West, the Czechoslovakian invasion 
of 1968 c~rtainly helped clarify the matter considerably. The situation 
for the West remains as difficult as ever, if ,not more so, in the wake 
of the 1968 intervention in Prague. 
Detente is quite properly regarded by many as, in ef~ect, a wa~ting 
game. 33 Th~ goal of detente is not merely the acceptance of the status 
quo in order to perpetuate the status quo indefinitely. The goal, 
30 lbid ., pp. 14-15. 
31 NO, February,27, 1972, p. 4. 
32Walter Laqueur, "Detente," Survey, Vol. 19, No.3; 1973, p. 74. 
33Robert Bowie in Sinanian, Deak and Ludz, p. 240 
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rather, seems to be more a matter of each side desiring acceptance of 
the status quo for the present time in hope of altering it in the future 
to its advantage. Each side sees time as.on its side, offering the 
prospect of weakening the position of the adversary. The East looks at 
the West and hopes for a historical vindication of Marxist-Leninist 
predictions about capitalism. Meanwhile, the West bases its hope on 
such ideas as the theory of the eventual convergence of both systems 
and the internal liberalization of the Communist party states. Neither 
sees the status quo as the most desirable of all world.s. While the 
issue of a divided Germany is not the most important question for either 
the United States or the Soviet Union, that division does represent one 
of the most conspicuous concerns of the East-West confrontation. The 
economic and political interests involved are considerable but 
insufficient by themselves to determine the outcome of competition 
between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. 
In the present era of detente, the Soviet Union enjoys a definite 
advantage in that the legitimacy of its empire in Eastern Europe is no 
longer challenged by the major Western powers. The only power of 
consequency which refuses to acknowledge the validity of the Soviet 
Union's claim of leadership over the East European states is another 
Communist nation, China. Western leaders no longer speak of a 
"rollback" of Communism or the liberation of Eastern Europe. Many give 
the appearance of simply hoping that a rollback of capitalism does not 
occur. The West has placed itself in a situation in which it does not 
challenge the right of its adversary to control a considerable portion 
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of the earth's surface,while the adversary continu~s to quest:io~ the 
legitimacy of capitalist governments ,throughout the world. The extent 
of such a disadvantage for the w.est is obvious. 
The East ,German ' regime has alsQ come to ef!.joy the advantage ,of 
having the attack on its legitimacy withdrawn to a considerable extent. 
The w.est German, foreign policy since 1967 has no longer sought to 
isolate the GDR from its allies as it did in the yearsprior to tl~at 
time. 34 With tras change, the ,East Germans can now negotiate for vastly 
different stakes. Earlier the situation was such that, for a variety of 
reasons, the East Germans preferred not to n~gotiate ,at a1l,. The, GDR's 
position has improved to the extent that while a few years:ago it had 
diplomatic rela~ions with only two dozen or so nations, mos~ of which 
were , Soviet allies, by spring of 1974 it enjoyed ,full diplomatic 
relations with 105 nations. 
Regarding the West German Ostpolitik, it is clear that because of 
its size and importa,nce, any actions of ,a West German government are" 
going to have far different consequences from similar ~ctions by a,French 
or an Italian government. Bonn spokesmen, including B~andt, frequently 
have referred to their desire for relations with the ,Communist states 
which are no more or no less than the relations of France ,and Italy to 
the East European nat~ons. The power of the Federal Republic, however, 
both real and potential, is such that its rela,tions can,never be the 
same as.those of France or Italy. The FRG simply poses too great a 
34Pierre Hassner, Europe in the ,Age of Negotiations (Bever~y Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 57~58. 
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potentia~ threat to theEas~, militarily, economic~lly, and politically. 
This is true for several reasons. The most obvious is the economic 
strength of the West German· economy which ,has been so great as .to make 
all of Europe stand in awe.· An additional factor has been the, 
frequently stated desire of , the FRG for access to nuclear. weapons. 
Given the ,economic and industrial potenti~l of the country, this desire 
must s.eem to b~ one· capable of fulfillment. Finally, thex:e is the East 
European memory of German aggressiveness in the past, a memory which the 
USSR has done.its best to keep alive. Since t~e FRG was clearly the 
most powerful of the ,two Germanies, it seemed to inherit something of 
the unfavorable ,German image in East Europe. Therefore, any FRG 
overtures will likely be.met by the East wi~h a united policy .. The way 
in which the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw were achieved demonstrates 
tQis. The negotiatiqns on Berlin have b~en no differe~t so .far and no 
departure from this. pattern. seems likely in the foreseeable future. 
While independent action on the part of the SED leadership is possible 
within certain limits, no one can seriously dispute the ,fact tha~ there 
are,very definitely limits to the freedom of action enjoyed by East 
Berlin. 
These considerations have affec~ed developments on the .entire 
German.question and t4e Berlin problem, which has ,been a part of it for 
the past quarter of a century. Any possible resolution of, the Berlin 
problem ultimately involves consideration of the ,balance of power 
between the United States and its allies and tbe Soviet; Union and ,its 
allied states. The problem is not one subject to any sort of bilateral 
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resolution by t~e two states directly affected acting alo~e. The disput~ 
is intimately wrapped in the fabric of East-West relations as well as 
the tangled web·of·relations b~twe~n East an4 West Germany! 
II. ULBRICHT'S WESTPOLITI~ 
Few individuals have placed their imprint on the Berlin problem in 
a more personal way than Walter Ulbri~ht, who for almost a quarter of a 
century was Fir~t Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party. Befo~e lqoking 
at the GDR policies and rhetoric directed.specifically at.the issue of. 
West.Berlin during Ulbricht's last years, we should first examine the 
general orientatio~ of the Ulbricht-~ed gover~ent toward the West in 
general and West Germany.specifically. This examination is necessary 
in order to fully understand the Pankow regime's concern over West 
Berlin. After all, the West Berlin issue would assume a vastly different 
nature in the .absence of a West German issue for the .GDR. Any improve-
ment in East Germany's relations with Bonn should be expected to bring 
at.least some improvement in the former's relations with West Be~lin. 
In t~e same manner, a deterioration in East-West Ge~man.relations seems 
likely to signal a worsening of East German-West Berlin relations. The 
last two and·one half years. of the Ulbricht regime a):'e characterized by 
a generally unpleaseant preoccupation with the Bonn OS1;.politik, the. 
alleged West German military threat,and what East Berlin considered the 
generally aggressive nature of the West German government. This 
preoccupation colored the GDR's relations wi1;.h West Berlin in almost 
every respect. 
64 
Walter Ulbricht's. toast on the .occasion of the 19t:h anniversary of 
the GDR set the tone for East Germany's general orientat:ion toward the 
West in this period. In his toast, Ulbricht declared that it was 
"necessary to be vigilant, to counter effectively and oppose the methods 
of psychological warfare, of economic warfare, anq of antisQcial 
activity" that characterized Western policy.35 This analysis was echoed. 
by th~ GDR Foreign Minis~er, Otto Winzer, in an interview in which he 
declared that while imperialism had not.become st~onger in recent ye~rs, 
it haci becQme mQre aggressive. 36 The East German vie\>{ was·that this 
aggressiveness was reflected in. NATO policy wh~ch, accordingly, was 
pursuing an increasingly hostile policy toward the East, a policy which· 
was enjoying the support of the FRG gover~ent.37 As a consequence ,of 
such policies of·Western powers, according to the GDR's Public Prosecuto~ 
General, Josef Streit, there were many plots against the GDR and in 
order to aid prosecution of those behind such activitie~, the goyernrnent 
was introducing a new penal code designed to war "the spies, agents, and 
s~boteurs.that in attacks against the GDR they risk their necks.,,38 Not 
only did the new penal code contain.the normal strictures again~t such' 
offenses as treason, it included specifications. for more unique crimes 
such as economic diversion and sabatoge. According to a cornrnen~aryon 
35 
'ND, October 7, 1968, p. 2. 
36SWB, January 3, 1968, EE/2659/Cl/8. 
37 ND, December 12, 1969, p. 1. 
38Ibid ., January 13, 1968, p. 3. 
the new code, it was,.designed to protect; the society the GDR citizens 
had constructed by incorporating the lessons,gained "41,U'ing the, 
39 confrontation with the enemies of socialism"during the past years. 
An additional reflection of the official atti1;ude towa~d the West cam~ 
6S 
in the form of an or4er passed by the GD~ Council of Ministers in March, 
1969. According to the order, in view of the harmful inf1uence,of 
Western communications directed against the GOR. 
A,ll citizens.are bound to protect chi~dren and young 
persons.fro~ influences which endanger or harm the~r 
development as socialist personages. They are responsible 
for keeping the influence of imperia1ist.ideo1ogy, especially 
through the, printed word, television, and radio, from 
children and yOung peop1e. 40 
In summary, the conception presented by official GOR sources during the. 
last years of Ulbricht's administration was that the GOR was an embattl~d 
g~~rjSQn'which was reinforcing its defenses against a hostile and 
. ~ • ,.1\.... -
aggressive West. 
The principal agent of the anti-East German campaign, accord~ng to 
official GDR, was the Federal Republic of Germany. While East Ge~man. 
press and officia~s seldom missed an opportunity tO,condemn Western 
so~iety, their special fury usually was.directed.against the FRG and 
its policies during these years~ The introduction of the new West 
German Ostpolitik did nothing to change the East German attitude. In 
spite of.Bonn~s overtures to the East, Ulbricht insisted that it was 
39Heinrich Toeplitz, "The New Penal Code," Law and Legislation in 
the GDR (Berlin, GDR), No. Z, 1968, pp. 11-12. 
40 NO, March 27, 1969, p. 2. 
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West Germany which was blocking detente. Th~ n~wOstpolitik was labeled 
by the First Secretary as simply another effort to change the ,territor~al 
status quo in Europe. 4l This negative evaluation was· echoed by othel: 
leading figures, including Politburo members Erich Honecker and Professor 
Albert Norden, who charged that the Brandt-Scheel government of the FRG 
had infringed on the sovereignty of other states by threatening reprisals 
if they normalized their relations with East Berlin. According to 
Norden, West Germany was, as always, still the -"troublemaker" of 
42 Europe. On March 7, 1970, the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland 
editorialized that "the .much vaunted 'acconunodation' shown by the 
Federal Republic these days consists of a flood of more or less 
43 beautiful words, and nothing else." 
Ulbricht portrayed West Germany as a nation that had set itself on a 
course that was certain to l~ad to war. In his opinio~ the ,West German 
government was "playing with war. ,,44 A frequent E.ast German theme which 
was used to reinforce Ulbricht's warning was that the .FRG was bent on 
possessing nuclear weapons. In July, 1968, Dr. Rudolf Muen~e of the 
GDR Nuclear Research Institute said that Bonn's ,refusal to sign the. 
nuclear nonproliferation tre~t.y was a tactic designed to give West 
Germany time to develop its ow~ nuclear weapon production.45 This 
4lND, January 7, 1968, p. 1. 
42Ibid ., February 27, 1970, p. 3. 
43Ibid ., March 7, 1970, p. 1. 
44 Ibid ., January 1, 1968, p. 1. 
45sWB , July 13, 1968, EE/2820/Al/2. 
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picture was embellished with the additional charge that Bonn was engaged 
in the development of weapons for chemical and bacteriological warfare. 
In December, 1968, the GDR press aired the charges of a microbiologist 
who had defected to East Germany from the FRG and who insisted that West 
Germany was making plans for chemical and bacteriological warfare. 46 
The nature of the West German Bundeswehr was also cited by East 
German sources as evidence of the danger posed by the FRG. A pamphlet 
distributed by the GDR charged that the West Germany military was an 
instrument for changing the territorial status quo in Europe and that 
it was being prepared for a blitzkrieg against the East. Helmut 
Schmidt, who was then West German Defense Minister, was described as 
a person who was committed to the "abolition of the socialist order in 
the GDR.,,47 In May, 1969, the East German news agency bolstered another 
common Ulbricht theme when it reported that, according to the account of 
a Bundeswehr major who had defected to the GDR, the West German military 
was a haven for neo-Nazis and that many members of the Bundeswehr, 
including officers, were leaving for that reason. 48 Also, West German 
military exercises always provided what East German sources labeled 
proof that the Bundeswehr was readying itself for a war against the 
East and that the Bonn government had no real interest in contributing 
46ND, December 28, 1968, p. 2. 
47 The Bundeswehr: Spearhead of Revanchism (Dresden: Verlag Zeit 
im Bild, 1970), pp. 12-16. 
48SWB, May 7, 1969, EE/3067/A1/l. 
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to detente and· European security. According to Neues.Deutschland, there 
could be little ,doubt that the ,military-industrial complex was in control 
in both. West Germany and West Berlin.49 
The East German response to this was to assure its own populatio~ 
and to warn the FRG government t~t, in the ,words of Major General Hans 
Ernst of the National People's Army, the aggressor would receive a 
"devastating blow" from the GDR military should it attack,sO Howe,(er, 
lest there.be any doubt, East German military leaders ,insist that, due 
to Bundeswehr "agressiveness," tqe GOR must devote more effort to 
i~proving its defenses. According to Army General He~nz Hoffman, tqe 
"welcome foreign policy gestures" by the FRG were a clo~k for increased 
aggressiveness ,and necessitated even greater stress on the combat 
readiness of the East Germany military.forces. sl 
East German attac~s on the FRG went beyond. simply charging that it 
was militarily aggressive. Ulbricht added to t4is by stressing that 
West Germany had developed more sophisticated means of carrying out its 
aggression. Spe~king at Prague Castle on February 22, 1968, Ulbricht 
charged that Bonn. had failed in its effort to isolate the GOR.from its 
allies and was now concentrating on trying to extend its influence 
toward the ,East.by the "methods of psychological.infiltra1::ion and 
economic dependence. ,,52 This psychological war was said to have an 
49 NO, October 1, 1970, p. 2. 
sOrbid., July 9, 1968, p. 4. 
SlSWB, January 19, 1971, EE/3587/Al/7. 
52 NO, February 23, 1968, p. 1. 
69 
adyan~ageover.the traditional typeof.military exercise in that it was 
more subtle and difficult to d~tect. Furthe~more, it ,could be presented 
as a gesture of friendship when in fact it was noth.ing more than 
aggression in a new.form. 
The broader attack on West German society also included a 
condemnation of the country as economically imperialistic. While such 
charges are fairly standard rhetoric in the .press of Communist party 
states, the extent to which the GDR press engaged in such charges was 
exceptional. "Revelations" appeared almost daily regarding t4e 
activities of West German "monopoly capital • ." The impression conveyed 
was that there was absolutely no.limit to West German imperialism. In 
Neues Deutschland on January 24, 1970, Foreign Minister O~to Winzer 
charged that the FRG was. scouring the entire world for raw materials 
and exploiting the underdeveloped countries which provided those 
materia1s. 53 The West German imperialistic .activities were presented 
as being so far-reaching that ther~ was· probably "no trail ·of dirt and 
54 blood" that did not lead to Bonn. 
West German talk about a "special relationship" between East and 
W~st Germany or·about "intra-German relationsll were described as further 
evidence of the generally aggressive character of the Federal Republic, 
although the aggression in this case was of . a sophisticated, "legal," 
nature. Neues Deutschland declared that the West German.desire for 
53lbid ., January. 24, 1970, p. 2. 
54Ibid ., January 3, 1971, p. 3. 
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"special relations" witn tne GDR simplr amounted to.a demand for the 
subjugation of EastGe~any to the Bonn government. 55 Ulbricht insisted 
t4at only full diplomatic relations between the .b'o states would be 
considered aS,an acceptable .basis for normalization of relations.between 
the GDR and Bonn. The notion of· "in~ra-German ~ela tiol1s" was seen as . 
nothing more than anew name for an old policy which had the annexation 
of the GDR as its goal. When the Austrian government refused entry to 
an SED delegation led ~y Politburo member Kurt Hager in 1968, Neues 
Deutschland a~nounced that this was.evidence that Bonn.wanted to 
represent Austria as well as East Germany.56 Even after several years 
of the .new FRG Eastern policy, the GDR continued to insist tha~ the, 
formally renounced Hallstein Doctrine of the FRG was still being 
practiced since Bonn was trying to prevent.recognition of the .GDR by 
other states. An editorial in Neues Deutschland expressed Ulbricht's 
view in January of 1971, 
Th~ methods.change but the substance and aim of their 
policy has not changed because the chara~terof the system 
has not changed. . . . The rulers of the Federal Republi~ 
are.devious and aggressive, whatever particular methods 
may seem to s~ow. They are devious and aggressive ju~t 
as German imperialists have always .been.57 
Few issues of the time better illustrated the attitude of the ,GDR 
government toward West Germany than that of the reforms in Czechosloyak~a 
55Ibid ., May 13, 1970, p. 1. 
56 Ibid . , January 17, 1968, p. 1. 
57 Ibid., January 9, 1971, p. 2. 
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in 1968. Ulbricht.became one of the principal exponents of the 
hard-line on.Czechos1ovakia and the West German "menace" constitute4 
his central theme in discussing developments in Czechoslovakia during 
the .Dubcek era. According to an analysis by Francois Fejto, Ulb~icht's 
press during this time reflected an intolerance and aggressivenes~ in 
. . h hi h h S . d . bl . d 1 58 compar~son w~t w c t e ov~et press appeare am~a y ~n u gent. 
Typical comments in Neues Deutschland described develqpments in 
Czechoslovakia as "dangerous for socialism" and warned about the 
increasing influence of the West in Czechoslovakia. 59 The Dubcek-led 
Czech Communist Party was said to be under.heavy attack by imperialists 
...... ho were attempting to smuggle "anti-Communist theories" into the 
country.60 While stressing the importance of the leadership of the 
Party in.the nations. of the "socialist conunonwealth," official GDR 
publications charged that the Party was no longer in control in 
Czechoslovakia, but had been displaced by a variety of imperialists 
61 
and Western agents. 
The spectre of West Germany loomed large in East German accounts 
of·the Czech developments. In March, at a philosophy conference on 
Marx in East Berlin, Professor Kurt Hager spoke ominously of West 
German interest in the events taking place under Dubcek's administration. 
58Francois Fetjo, "Moscow and its Allies," Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 18, November-December, 1968, p. 36. 
59 ND, May 12, 1968, p. 4. 
60Ibid • , May 24, 1968, p. 1. 
61 Ibid ., May 11, 1968, p. 2. 
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Czech Minister Josef Smrkovsky was singled out as one of several Czech 
leaders whose attitudes gave the West Germans "hope that Czechoslovakia 
will be drawn into the whirlpool of revolution in the sense in which 
the Springer Press uses the word.,,62 The East German daily, Berliner 
Zeitung, charged that not only had Western and West German influence 
grown in Czechoslovakia, but that West German and U.S. troops were 
actually in the. country. According to an account in Berliner Zei tung 
in May, a number of West German troops plus three FRG tanks were 
actually in the western part of Czechoslovakia. While the official 
excuse for their presence was the filming of a movie, "The Bridge at 
Remagen," the real reason, according to the paper, was to begin the 
West German occupation of Czechos1ovakia. 63 
East German accounts gave regular warnings against the types of 
activities which GDR leaders asserted were taking place in Czechoslovakia. 
"Tourists of a special kind" were said to be pouring into Czechoslovakia. 
The "most illustrious amoung these 'tourists'" was said to be Professor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski from the United States. According to Neues 
Deutschland, "All this, of course, is not ac~idental" but is part of 
the counterrevolutionary plans of the imperialists' powers. The events 
in Czechoslovakia were compared with those in Hungary in 1956 and 
antisocialist elements were declared to be in "open attack." The 
situation was viewed as particularly disturbing because the "vital 
62SWB , March 29, 1968, EE/2733/Cl/7. 
63Ber1iner Zeitung (Berlin, GDR), May 9, 1968, p. 1. 
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interests" of the GDR were at stake just as much as those of 
Czechos1ovakia. 64 As t~ climax of the Czech drama neared, East German 
charges accelerated with intensified attacks on the "policy of 
interference and subversion conducted by Bonn".and almost daily reports 
of the discovery of Western arms caches in the'Czech countryside. 6S On 
the day of the Warsaw Pact invasion in August, Neues Deutschland called 
for a defeat for imperialism similar to the defeat that the GDR had 
given imperialists when it built the Berlin Wall in August, 1961. "The 
socialist camp," the SED paper hinted, "is preparing the ,same fate.for 
the new variants of the policy of interference. ,,66 
The official East German attitude on specific issues related to 
West Berlin during the period from 1968 to Ulbricht's ,retirement was 
consistent with the attitude on the West and the Federal Republic during 
this time. The same tone which was used in characte~izing the West 
German foreign policy, the Bundeswehr, West German society in.general, 
and the events in·Czechos1ovakia was evident in the rhetoric surrounding 
matters relating to West Berlin. 
III. ULBRICHT ON THE WEST BERLIN QUESTION 
Just as Ulbricht had charged that the West had: "hardened Germany's 
division and built a high political wall between the two German 
64 ND, July 13, 1968, pp. 1-2. 
65 Ibid ., September 17, 1968, p. 1. 
66.Ibid., August 20, 1968, p. 1. 
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states, ,,67 he also accused the United States, Great Britain, and the 
"right wing Social Democratic leaders" of West Berlin on responsibility 
for the division of Berlin. Speaking on the occasion of the presentati,on 
of the draft of the new GDR constitution in February, 196$, Ulbricht 
declared that the present division of Berlin was not necessary and would 
not have occurred if the "right wing Social Democratic leaders" had not 
been subservient to the Americans and the British who were determined to 
1" h " f B l' 68 sp 1t t e C1ty 0 er 1n. 
Continuing the theme of Western responsibility for the present 
division of Berlin, Ulbricht charged that the West also bears.the 
~esponsibility for what West Berlin has become today. While the West 
was speaking of·West Berlin in connection with the economic "miracle" 
that the ~ederal Republic was enjoying, th~ East German officials were. 
charging that WestBerli~ had become an outpost of anticommunist 
subversion directed against the .GDR and other communist states in 
Eastern Europe. For Ulbricht and his ass.ociates West Berlin represented 
a menace, a threat to the peace in Europe, not \<lhat the West Germans 
described as a city of "vi tali ty" where one could benefit from the ,full 
"enjoyment of life.,,69 
Utilizing the theme that West Berlin was a threat to the peace in 
Europe, on the twentieth year of the existence of the GDR East German 
67 Ibid., March- 8, 19~O~ p. 2. 
68Ibid ., February 16, 1968, p. 2. 
69Berlin in Brief (West Berlin: Press and Information Office of 
West Berlin, 1969), p. 3. 
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citizens were exhorted by Ulbricht and his associates ,to "resolutely 
oppose" all aspirations of the West for extending West Berlin as "a 
center of provocation and aggression against the GDR and other socialist 
states." The GDR declared determination to prohibit the development of, 
any situation in which there could bea more serious threat to the 
"foundations of world peace." The building of the Wall in 1961 and the 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were cited as proof of this 
determination. 70 
The relationship between Bonn and West Be~lin was pictured as 
adding to the danger to peace posed by West Berlin. A constant,theme 
of the GDR leadership was that Bonn was the "main troubl,emaker in 
Europe" and, therefore, the consistent support that the West Berlin 
Senate gave to the Federal Republic made West Berlin a "principal stooge 
of this troublemaker." 71 The description of West Berlin as ,a "stooge", 
is indicative of the belief in official GDR circles that ,it was not West. 
Berlin itself which was the cause'of the danger, but rather those who 
were misusing West Berlin. West Berlin's error, in the East German vie~, 
lies in allowing itself to be misused by West Germany and its allies. 
The primary vi Uian, in Ulbricht's conception, was, the Federal Republic, 
which insisted on using West Berlin as a base for attacks on the GDR. 
The West Berlin Senate, of course, was attacked for permitting the West 
Germans to, in effect, occupy West Ber1in. 72 
70 ND, January 16, 1969, p. 1. 
71 SWB, August 13, 1969, EE/ 3150/ AI/I. 
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The specific abuses that Ulbricht and his associates were concerned 
about were the performance of official functions by West,Germqn officials 
and governmental bodies in West Berlin, the use of the ,city as a base 
for espionage activities, and a variety of activities considered both" 
disruptive and insulting by,the East German authorities. Walter 
Ulbricht frequently reminded the ,West Germans that "no West German 
official has the right to carry out any official actiQn in.West 
Berlin,,,73 yet ,a continuous procession of West German officials.visited 
West Berlin for the purpose of performing various functio~s in their 
capacity as officials.of the Bonn government. Almost every week of the 
period under examination saw a visit to West Berlin by either a. 
legislative committee from Bonn; a minister of the governmen~, or some 
other prominent FRG officia.l such as President Heinemann, who. was,a 
particularly frequent visitor. One of the most serious ,incidents of 
this type occurred in 1969 when the West German government. announced 
that the Bundestag would be meeting in West Berlin in March for the 
purpose of electing the West German head of state. The East Germans 
declared that such a meeting would be a grave international·provocatio~ 
and would also illustrate the continuing West German desire to 
incorporate West Berlin into t~e Federal Republic. Such a meeting, they 
charged, would lead to neo-Nazi, revanchist activities and, furthermore, 
would involve "an abuse of ,the access roads" to West Berlin. The West 
Berlin population, they concluded, would suffer as a result of this 
73Ibid ., March 14, 1968, p~ 1. 
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meeting. 74 On this occasion Ulbricht enjoyed the support of the Sovie~ 
Union and was able to enlist Soviet assistance in measures designed to 
prohibit the West German Bundestag from having its West Berlin meeting. 
However; although such measures included the ,closing of the ,He1msted~- ' 
Berlin autobahn before and during the time of the Bundestag meeting, 
they proved unsuccessful. The Bundestag did meet and elect West 
Germany's new President in West Berlin. 
The second alleged abuse with which the Ulbricht leadership was 
concerned regarding West Berlin was the use of the city as a base for 
espionage activities by Western agents. In 1969 the publicity 
surrounding the trial of West German agent Klaus Thalmann was used to 
make the point that West Berlin was serving as a base for Western spies 
against the GDR. In a report after Thalmann's indictment, the East 
German news agency, ADN, charged that "West ,Berlin is the sluice gate 
for spies, terrorists, agents, provocateurs, and subversive elements" 
working against the interests of East Germany and its allies. In 
another report West Berlin was referred to as an "Eldorado for 
" "1" t" ,,75 ~mper~a ~st secre serv~ces. Even ,the British Broadcasting 
Corporation was viewed with suspicion by the East German leadership. 
The GDR foreign affairs weekly Horizont accused BBC of working with 
British espionage groups and using its West Berlin offices ,for meetings 
of agents. Even innocent-appearing news and musical programs played a 
74SWB, February 8, 1969, EE/2995/A1/1. 
75Ibid ., February 20, 1969, EE/3005/A1/1. 
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part in espio~age activities since they were allegedly used to convey 
76 information to agents. This obsession with West Berlin as.an espionage 
center permeates East German discussions of the city and is frequently 
used as justification for measures taken to isolate the western sectors. 
of Berlin. 
The third principal concern of the East German leadership during 
Ulbricht's last two and.one half years was the issue of the disruptive 
and insulting activities for which West Berlin was alleged to have been 
used. Here the East German objection was to frequent incidents of an 
anticommunist nature, meetings and other activites by right wing 
political groups, and certain types of so-called "legal" disruptions 
that, in fact, simply amounted to legal discrimination against East 
Germany. 
The East German news media gave considerable atte~tion during this 
period to incidents involving violence directed against either the GDR 
or the Soviet Union. A bombing attempt against the sections of the 
GDR-operated S-Bahn in West Berlin were declared to be part of a 
conspiracy to inflict violent injury to personnel wor.~ing for East 
Germany and property owned by the GDR. 77 When one of the Soviet 
soldiers guarding the .Soviet War Memorial in the Tiergarten near the 
Brandenburg Gate was shot, the East Germans charged the West Berlin 
Senate with responsibility for the incident, since it had allowed 
76H · t N 2 1969 3 7 orlzon, 0., ,pp. -. 
77ND , December 17, 1970, p. 6. 
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"fascist terror groupsll to operate within the city.78 Incident~ such as 
these and others along the Wall, including escape attempts, were never 
allowed to pass as individual incidents, but were consistently declared 
to be part of a conspiracy directed against the GDR. 
The second type of disruptive activity with which the .Ulbricht 
leadership was concerned consisted of meetings, rallies, and other 
activities by right wing political groups such as the National 
Democratic Party and the more conservative of the two major West Germany 
parties, the Christian Democratic Union. For example, when the COU 
announced in the fall of 1968 that it would hold its sixteenth congress 
in West Berlin, the East German government declared that this action was 
a violation of the independent political status of West Berlin and would 
"increase the tension in Europe." The GDR insisted that the CDU cancel 
the congress and avoid "poisoning the political atmosphere." It also 
charged that the holding of the CDU congress.in West Be~lin would result 
in misuse of the GDR communications to and from West Berlin, the same 
charge which it made regarding the Bundestag session which elected the 
Federal president. 79 The extreme right wing NPD was a constant source 
of irritation to the East Germans. Not only NPD meetings, but almost 
any NPD activity was seen as threatening by the GDR. The SED newspaper 
charged that the NPD had infiltrated the West Berlin police force and 
was working to increase extremist political actions in the city. Such 
78 Ibid ., November 7, 1970. 
79SWB , November 2, 1968, EE/29lS/Al/1. 
activities, the paper warned, constituted a menace to the well-being 
of the population of West Berlin. 80 Another complaint of the GDR 
leadership was the activities of expellee organizations such as the, 
80 
West.German "Youth of the East." When this organization announced plans 
for a West Berlin rally, the East Germans once again charged that the 
't b . d f h' N" .. 81 C1 Y was e1ng use or revanc 1st, neo- aZ1 act1v1t1es. The East 
German complaints, however, frequently went beyond attacks on groups 
whose programs were of an openly anticommunist nature and were aimed 
at those groups for whom one might have expected a more tolerant East 
German attitude. The announcement by the Conference of Chairmen of the 
Social Democratic Party of the FRG that they would hold a meeting in 
West Berlin provided an example of this. The East Germans accused the 
SPD of not only wanting to make trouble, but of wanting to make "massive 
trouble." The conference was described as a "deliberate disturb,ance"by 
the SPD, a violation of the sovereign rights of the GDR, and an effort 
to prove that the ,SPD "can stage provocations. just as well or even 
better" than the CDU.82 
The Allied Travel Office in West Berlin represented what Ulbricht. 
and the East German leadership were concerned about in terms of official 
or "legal" disruption by the West in West Berlin. If an East German 
wished to visit a NATO country and his government permitted him to do 
so, he had to apply at the Allied Travel Office for a Temporary Travel. 
80 ND, November 10, 1970, p. 7. 
81 SWB, June 17, 1970, EE/3406/A1/10. 
82ND , December 25, 1970, p. 7. 
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Document. This procedure was required because no NATO country, at that 
time, recognized an East German passport. The East German government 
viewed this as a serious disruption of East German travel rights. 
Brandt's support of the Allied Travel Office operations was cited by 
the East Germans as proof that the FRG was unwilling to contribute to 
better East-West German relations. 83 In the opinion of the East 
Germans, the presence of the Allied Travel office in West Berlin 
constituted one'more example of the use of that city to disrupt the 
normal existence of the GDR. 
The most consistent East German position during this time on the 
status of West Berlin was that West Berlin was an independent, separate 
political entity. This view first began to be voiced with frequency in 
1968. Ulbricht and other GDR officials very emphatically denied that 
West Berlin was or ever could be a part of the Federal Republic. 
According to them, it was not possible to concede that while West Berlin 
had originally not been intended to be part of the FRG, its status had 
been changed through the years to a point where it had become a de facto 
part of West Germany. Before the 1969 Bundestag session in West Berlin, 
the East German government announced: 
. . . Senate politicians talk about an "evolved status" 
But unlawful acts do not cre~te rights, however often they 
may be repeated. All that has evolved as a result of the 
ties with Bonn--which aI"S contrary to West Berlin's status 
as a separate political entity--are uncertainty and' 84 insecurity ... for the inhabitants of West Berlin. 
83SWB, March 19, 1970, EE/3333/Al/S. 
84ND , February 14, 1969, p. 1. 
However, the question of the four-power status of.the city has 
tended to vary from time to time. In 1968 Ulbricht, following an. 
argument used by the USSR, denied that a four-power status existed for 
all Berlin. The section excluded from such status, of course, is East 
Berlin. The issue of Berlin, especially from the East Ge~manpoint of 
view, is a question of the status of.West.Berlin. For them, one does 
not properly speak of the Berlin issue, but rather of the West Berlin 
issue. The term "East Berlin" becomes, in this context, a revanchist 
attack on the GDR. As Neues Deutschland pointedly declared, !'East 
Berlin is a city that does not exist." What does exist is Berlin, the 
capital of the sovereign GDR and West Berlin which is a separate, 
independent political entity.8S 
82 
The East German description of West Berlin as a separate political 
entity during the last years of the .Ulbrichtregime is tinged with what 
must be described as a.certain reluctance. Writing on this question in 
a book published in 1970, Albert Norden explained that Berlin, all of 
Berlin, was intended to be a part of the Sovie~ zone of Germany. No 
W "f f B 1" "d 86 Th permanent e~tern occupat1on 0 part 0 er 1n was·env1sage . e 
decision to regard West Berlin today as an independent political entity 
is described as a "concession"by the East Germans in return for Western 
pledges that the city cease to be used as a "factor for insecurity in 
87 the world." The implication that the West has not lived up to its 
85Ibid ., March 7, 1970, p. 1. 
86 Norden, p. 244. 87Ibid ., p. 260. 
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part of this arrangement is clear and all that is left to conjecture is 
the matter of what the GDR would like to do now that. the perfidy of the 
West has been proven. An indication appeared in the East Berlin dai1~ 
Berliner Zeitung in March of 1970. In an article entitlecl "Berlin is 
the Capital of the Sovereign GDR," the Western attempt to create a "West 
Berlin myth" was attacked as an effort to violate the status of Berlin. 
All of Berlin, East and West, according to Berliner Zeitung, is part of 
the German Democratic Republic. The Western demand for guaranteed 
access rights to West Berlin was described as a "new 'Danzig corridor'" 
and another Western effort to violate the rights of the GDR. 88 Questions 
of traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, Ulbricht 
insisted in a TV interview in 1970, had nothing to do with the .FRG or 
any of the Western powers who were part of the West Be~lin occupation 
force. The West, he insisted, had no right to demand guaranteed access 
because that was a matter to be handled by the GDR authorities and the 
West Berlin Senate alone. 89 From such statements as these, one can only 
conclude that the East German designation of West Berlin as an 
independent political entity comes grudgingly and; as other evidence 
would indicate, at the insistence of the Soviet Union. 
While the official East German attitude.toward West Berlin could 
best be described as hostile during this time, the period was. not devoid 
of nonhostile appeals to the West German population. Speaking on the 
88Berliner Zeitung, March 25, 1970, p. 1. 
89sWB , November 10, 1970, EE/3530/i. 
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occasion of the presentation of the draft of the new GDR constitution in 
1968, Ulbricht declared that he and his associates "feel linked with the 
workers of West Berlin, with its intelligentsia, its students, with all 
progressive forces of West Berlin." Ulbricht's conception here was that 
the ,best friends the West Berlin population had were those in leadership 
o 0 0 E G 90 tho h dOE pos1t1ons 1n ast ermany. 1S t erne was constantly stresse 1n ast 
German protests against certain West Berlin activities which were 
condemned for being contrary to the interests of the West Berlin 
residents. 
The principal vehicle for the East German appeal to the West Berlin 
residents was the West Berlin-based Socialist Unity Party which was led 
by Gerhard Danelius. The GDR press gave considerable attention to the 
efforts of the SEW ,to influence West Berlin public opinion. The program 
of the SEW has as its goal the building up of support in West Berlin-
East German relations. Accordingly, the SEW, while either offering 
candidates for the Senate ,or simply addressing itself to current issues, 
has presented itself as the alternative to the cold war, an alternative 
involving the establishment of a neutral, self~governing West Berlin 
free from West German political influences and the military prote~tion 
9" 
of the United States, England, and France. - Dane1ius says that this 
would enable West Berlin to "playa pC';3i tive role, in German and 
90 ND, February 16, 1968, p. 2. 
91 Junge Welt (Berlin, GDR), March 11, 1971, p. 7. 
international politics" and provide the population of the .city with 
security which it does not enjoy today.92 
The Ulbricht government.offered several proposals to the West 
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Berlin Senate for improving the West B~rlin situation during this time. 
Most related either to the question of the political presence of the 
Federal Republic in West Berlin or to the disruptive activitie~ discussed 
above. The first major proposal dealing with West Berlin was presented 
in June; 1968 as part of a plan for improving East-West German relations. 
The plan, offered in the name of the GDR Council.of State h~aded by 
Walter Ulbricht, called on both East and West German governments to sign 
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, to renounce the storing of nuclear 
warheads on their territories, and to agree to an inter~ationally valid 
renunciation of the .use of force. The offer was tied to a rejectiqn by 
the FRG of any claims on West Berlin. Acceptance would require the West 
Germans to avoid any· future "intrusions" into West Berlin's affairs and 
to refrain from any future "hostile activities" regarding East Germany 
and. its allies. While the proposal did not specify exactly what it 
meant by "intrusions" and "hostile activities" it was coupled with a 
denunciation of the presence of the West German NPD in West Berlin and 
a charge that the Brandt Ostpolitik constituted a threat to the East. 93 
Speaking several days later at the opening of the .eleventhannual Baltic. 
Week, Ulbricht reaffirmed the proposal and said that if West Germany 
92ND , October 31, 1970, p. 5. 
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was sincere in its expressed desire for an easing of tensions, it should 
94 
offer "deeds" as evidence by accepting the .East German proposal. 
The next important East German offer came the following year.on the 
eve of the Bundestag session in West Berlin. In a letter to Brandt, 
Ulbricht made an offer of Easter passes for West Berliners to visit East 
Berlin if the Bundestag session would be held elsewhere. When West 
Germany insisted on a treaty guaranteeing access to West Berlin, 
Ulbricht declared that the Bonn government was attempting to blackmail 
the GDR. According to the SED First Secretary, the FRG had been 
maneuvered into an impasse as a result of the offer for Easter passes. 
Speaking of the FRG's reaction to the offer for Easter passes, he said, 
When it heard this, it immediately raised the .maximum 
demands. It demanded that the Soviet Union and the GDR 
should more or less recognize that West Berlin belongs to 
the FRG.95 
With the rejection of the offer for passes for West Berliners, the .East , 
Germans responded by, in Ulbricht's words, securing and protecting the 
GDR's communic.atj ons. routes against West German provocations. 96 The 
result, of course, was the closing of·the He1mstedt-Berlin autobahn 
which normally carried Allied traffic to West Berlin. 
Although the question of passes for West Berliners.was raised again 
on several occasions, the next major indication of an East German 
interest in making proposals relating to West Berlin came in Ulbricht's 
94Ibid ., July 8, 1968, p. 1. 
95Ibid ., March 4, 1969, pp. 1-2. 
96Ibid • 
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New Year's mcssage on December 30, 1970. In his speech Ulbricht spoke 
of conc luding a transit agreement with the West Berlin Sena.te. The 
offer, however, was coupled with a demand that the FRG halt its 
"troublemaking activities" in West Berlin. Ulbricht presented this 
offer primarily in terms of an attack on the West German government. 
His first expression of interest in a transit agreement was preceded 
by a statement that the time had "clearly come now to conclude agreements 
which will put a stop to the troublemaking activities" of the West 
Germans in order to make "normai relations" possible. Furthermore, 
the agreement that Ulbricht spoke of was to be concluded between the 
West Berlin Senate and the GDR rather than with the Federal Republic 
The major powers in West Berlin were also to be excluded by Ulbricht's 
offer. As advice to the FRG government, Ulbricht said that Bonn should 
stop using the three Western powers as part of the effqrt to improve 
h W t B 1 · . . 97 tees er 1n s1tuat1on. 
Council of Ministers Chairman Willi Stoph added to the Ulbricht 
offer scveral weeks late'!" when he affirmed that the "termination of the 
political presence of the FRG and the cessation of all revanchist, 
militarist, and antipeace activities" in West Berlin could lead to what 
he termed a "broad development of normal good-neighborly relations" 
between the GDR and West Berlin. By good-neighborly relations, Stoph 
said he meant such things as entry by West Berliners into East Berlin 
and other parts of the GDR, assurance of transit traffic for goods and 
97 Ibid ., December 31, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
persons to and-from West Berlin to all states, and the possible 
conclusion of an agreement with the West B,erlin Senate on "frontier 
adjustment" in connection. with the ,enclaves such as Steinstucken. 98 
In terms of positive results, the several Ulbricht proposals were 
ess~ntial1y unproductive, especially in 1968 and 1969. Th~ first year 
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was characterized by disagreement.on virtually everything regarding West 
Be~lin's relations with the GDR. The extent of the hostility was 
evidenced by disagreement on such minor matters as the West Ber.lin 
sewage treatment debt to the GDR. 99 The relationship between Bonn and 
East Berlin, of course, was no better. The next ye~r brought some 
improvement with the submi~sion of the draft of a treaty on relations 
b~tween East and West Germany which contained an article dealing with 
West Be~lin. The substance, however, was such that it did not in fact 
mark any dramatic breakthrough but rather simply a reaffirmation of the. 
100 basic East German position on West Ber.lin. Yet, the submission of 
the draft of a treaty attempting to bring some formal improvement in, 
relations must be considered a step above the sort of polemics that were 
generally characteristic of relations between East Berlin, West Berlin, 
and the third member of the triangle, Bonn. This year also saw the East 
German trade organization, the FDGB. make an effort to achieve a detente 
98 February 4, 1971, p. 3. 
99 January 20, 1968, p. 7. 
100"Draft Treaty on the Establishment of Relations of Equal Right 
Between the GDR and the FRG," Documents on the National and International 
Policy of the GDR, No.7, 1969, p. 7. 
of its own with the West German Trade Union Federation. lOI Although 
this action was accorded very little fanfare in the East German press) 
it does signify some change. In the same sense, the September.meeting 
of the FRG Action for Democratic Progress group with East German, 
Polish, and Soviet officials. in Ea.st Be~lin signified a small degree 
f . 102 o l.mprovemen t . '. This group consisted of Bundestag members who 
fayored a policy on West Berlin closer to that advocated by the East 
Germans, and therefore could properly be considered little more than 
part of a stage prop for an East German propaganda move. However, th~ 
fact that the props in this case were Nest German el~cted officials at 
89 
least made it necessary for the GDR to recognize in public that not all 
West German politicians fit the stereotype depicted in most issues o~ 
Neues Deuschland. 
The most dramatic events of 1970 would have to be considered the 
Brandt-Stoph meetings which would be expected ,to bring some improvement 
in relations between the GDR and West Berlin also. However, even ,these 
meetings and the arrangement surrounding them were marked by considerable 
displays of the continuing bad relations between East and West in, 
Germany. Ulbricht's evaluation was that Brandt's attitude was 
"disappointing" since he was unwilling to talk about equal relations 
under international law between the.two states and the acceptance of 
the independent political status of West Ber1in.103 However, in economic 
101SWB, May 13, 1969, EE/3072/AI/3. 
102ND, September 6, 1969, p. 2. 
103Ibid ., March 21, 1970, p. 1. 
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relations there was at least the promise of improvement. In September, 
Horst Soelle, GDR Minister of External Economic Relations, speaking at 
the Leipzig Trade Fair, mentioned the willingness of East Germany to 
expand its trade with ~oth the Federal Republic and West Ber1in.194 
Such a statement, even while dealing primarily with economic matters, 
could not be considered without important political meaning in .terms 
of the relations between East Germany and West Berlin. 
I 
I 
Ulbricht's last few months in control of the SED were marked by two 
important developments in relatioIls with West Berlin. Th~ first came in 
January with the restoration of telephone links between West Berlin and 
the GDR, which had been severed in 1952. The second most important event 
occurred in March following Stoph's speech on West Berlin. This was the 
opening of negotiations between the GDR and the West Be~lin Senate on 
March 12. The West Berlin-GDR talks were taking place at the same time 
as.the talks between the Federal Republic and the GDR. While the 
Western delegations were attacked by t~e GDR press for making no 
contribution to progress in the talks on Berlin,106 the fact that the 
talks were in progress.must once again be considered an indication of 
an improvement in relations. 
In summation, Ulbricht's last years were characterized by both 
success and failure in improving relations with West Berlin and West 
104SWB , September 4, 1970, EE/3473/Al/2. 
105Ib;d .. J 7 / ~ , anuary 2 , 1971, EE 3594/Al/3. 
106ND, April 17, 1971, p. 1. 
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Germany. It is important to note that mo~e of, the failures occurred in 
the earlier years and more of the successes in the latter.part of this 
period. This seems. to indicate that an inevitable change in relations 
between East and West in Germany was,taking place. The change can be 
described as inevitable because it was, in the opinion of many leading 
Western authorities on Soviet and East European affairs, dictated by the 
USSR. l07 The question automatically arises then of whether or.not 
Ulbricht welcomed this change.. Did Ulbricht desire an improvement in 
relations. between East Germany and the .FRG and West Berlin or did he 
reluctantly accede to Soviet d.emands that he take certain measures 
simply in order to support the Soviet policy? This matter also raises 
the question of Ulbricht'S retirement. Did he in reality simply resign 
of his own free will or was he encouraged to do so, either by his 
associates in the SED or by his Soviet allies? Was Ulbricht, as one 
might be tempted to believe, becoming "dizzy with success" as a result 
of the vindication of his views on Czechoslovakia by means.of the 1968 
invasion, the growing prosperity of·the East German economy, and the 
personal prestige that he could claim by virtue of being one of the 
world's senior Communist leaders, one of the few living contemporaries 
of Lenin? 
107 Peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," Problems 
of Communism, Vol.. 22, March-April, 1972, pp. 58-60. 
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IV. THE REVOLT OF A PUPPET? 
The question to which we shall first turn is the issue of Ulbricht's 
relations, with the USSR on matters of policy relating to West Berlin and 
the Federal Republic. Th~ contrast between Soviet and East German 
rhetoric during Ulbricht's last month~ as First Secretary of the SED 
supports the belief that there was a clash between the policies of the 
two leaderships. The different interpretations placed on the November, 
1970 Tiergarten shooting incident provides an especially telling 
illustration of this contrast. In reporting the incident, Pravda not 
only observed that the crime "has provoked the indignation and anger, 
of West Berliners," but also included a statement by Mayo~ Klaus Scheutz 
f W t B 1 · . hi d .. f h . . d 108 Th E t o es er 1n express1ng ,s con emnat10n 0 t e 1nC1 ~nt. e as 
German·,accounts charged the West Berlin officials with responsibility 
for the incident and declared that the autho~ities in West Berlin were 
attempting to "cover up" the true facts behind the shooting .109 The 
East German news media discussed the incident for days in a manner which 
could only be.described as hysterical and would indicate an official 
desire to use the event as a pretext for postponing the development of 
improved ,relations with the West, a development which by this time 
appeared inevitable. 
108Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXII, No. 45, 
December 8, 1970, p. 18. (Hereafter noted as CDSP). 
109ND, November 8, 1970, p. 1. 
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The more optimistic Soviet coverage of the West German treaties 
with Poland and the USSR provides another illustration. While Soviet 
accounts did not ignore "revanchist circles" in the FRG, the stress was 
clearly placed on the promise of these developments. The Soviet press 
continually emphasized that the treaties with West Germany constituted 
"an important act to promote the easing of the international 
situation.,,110 Meanwhile, East German ac~ountsp1ayed down the 
importance of the West German treaties and reminded readers that the 
revanchists in the FRG were not simply an isolated fringe element, bu~ 
highly placed individuals within the Bonn government. The West German 
leaders such as Strauss and Barze1, the GDR press warned, would never 
allow the Bonn government to go so far as to implement a treaty 
. l' h .. f f . h E 111 S h lnvo vlng t e renunclatlon 0 orce agalnst t east. . uc accounts. 
made the GDR's reluctance to support an improvement in relations with 
West Germany extremely obvious. 
Differences between Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership became 
particularly apparent in statements regarding possible solutions ,to the 
West Berlin problem. Ulbricht's proposals, such as the 1968 offer 
discussed above, involved primarily sacrifices by the West. The 1968 
plan not only would have had a detrimental effect on West Germany's NATO 
position through its provisions to the prohibition of storage of nuclear 
warheads, but it also required an apparently complete abandonment of 
110CDSP , Vol. XXII, No. 47, December 22, 1970, p. 22. 
lllND , August 8, 1970, p. 1. 
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West Berlin by the Federal Republic. The incentives offered by Ulbricht 
for acceptance of his plans made the one-sided nature of the .offers even 
more apparent. The incentives consisted mostly of vague promises, such 
as an "improvement" in the life of. West Berliners, and much more specific 
threats, many of which the GDR carried out. The initiation of.a passport 
requirement for all travel and transit traffic to and from the FRG and 
West Berlin in June of. 1968 following the passage of emergency 
legislation by the FRG which was to b~ applicable to West Berlin was 
one such threat. The refusal of the GDR postal service to handle mail 
with a West German stamp marking the occasion of the election of the 
FRG president in a West Berlin Bundes.tag session in 1969 and the closing 
of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn at the same time are additional 
evidence of the willingness of the GDR to implement many of its threats. 
In summary, most of the incentives Ulbricht offered were of an 
es~entially negative character. 
The Soviet attitude on West Berlin presented a sharp contrast with 
Ulbricht's approach. Not only did the Soviet Union praise Brandt's 
Ostpolitik in connection with developments on easing tension in 
Europe,l12 in contrast to the East German charges that the Ostpolitik 
was hostile and directed against the East, but the Soviet leaders spoke 
in a considerably more promising tone regarding the prospects for 
progress on West Berlin. In discussing the Soviet position, First 
Secretary L. E. Brezhnev said, 
112V. Shakov, "European Security Systems: Soviet Effort," 
International Affairs (Moscow), No.5, 1971, p. 36. 
We believe that normalizatiQn of the situation with respect 
to West Berlin is fully attainable. For this purpose, all 
that is required is that the interested parties display 
goodwill and work out. decisions that will mee~ the wishes 
of the West Berlin population and will tak~ into account.the 
legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German 
Democratic Republic. 113 
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Continuing with the more moderate Soviet theme, Soviet Foreign Affairs 
Minister Gromyko, speaking of the successful conclusion of the ,talks on 
West Berlin and other European security matters, declared that all of 
these issues "must be carried out simultaneously, without,waiting for 
matter to be concluded in one area before moving on to another.,,1l4 
While this statement can be considered as having application to the 
FRG's insistence on progress on West Berlin's status before ratifying 
its treaty with Moscow, it also applied with equal force to Ulbricht, 
\'lho had been demanding diplomatic recognition of East Germany by the 
FRG before continuing work on the West Berlin question. 
The nature of these disagreements, plus others which have been 
d d b b f GDR S · I' f h' . d 115 ocumente y o servers 0 - OVlet re atlons 0 t lS perlo , 
clearly indicates that the most faithful of the old Soviet "puppets," 
Walter Ulbricht, had in many respects revolted against his patron. The 
next obvious question, therefore, is: Did this revolt result in 
Ulbricht's ouster or did he, in fact, simply retire due to his failing 
health and advancing years? 
113CDSP , 
114CDSP , 
115L d u z, 
Vol. XXII, No. 48, December 29, 1970, p. 23. 
Vol. XXIII, No. 17, May 25, 1971, p. 34. 
pp. 56-60. 
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A number of facts support the contention that Ulbricht was forced 
from his office as First Secretary of the SED. The absence of any 
warning that IJlbricht , ... as going to retire is one of the most conspicuous 
indications that the move was intended to be a surprise for the aging 
First Secretary. On the eve of the Sixteenth SED Conference in May, 
1971, there was no reason for anyone outside the innermost circles of 
the SED leadership to expect a change in the top leadership position of 
East Germany. It is reasonable to expect that if Ulbricht had planned 
on stepping down, he would have desired some public notice in order to 
facilitate the preparation of proper tributes to him for his years of 
service. If the preparations that preceded his sixtieth birthday in 
1953 are any indication, Ulbricht was certainly something less than an 
unassuming, humble public servant. On that occasion, his birthday was 
to be both an official state affair and a national celebration with 
116 
singing and dancing throughout the entire country. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that he would have wanted his retirement to 
have been marked by even more elaborate commemorations. However, there 
were none. The matter was handled as casually as though such personnel 
changes were an almost annual occurrence. Had Ulbricht been responsible 
for the move, it would certainly have been handled differently. 
The matter of his advancing age would also support the belief that 
the resignation was not of Ulbricht's free will. The .iogic in this case 
revolves around what must certainly have been both a Soviet and an East 
116 Carola Stern, Ulbricht (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 
pp.135-l36. 
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German· concern: the possibility of· Ulbricht's sudden death. Such a 
demise could have required the hurried and unplanned designation of a 
successor, and might have involved the installation of an individual 
who .did not meet Soviet desires and expectations. However, by moving 
before the seventy-eight year old's death, the Soviet Union could plan 
carefully and in secrecy by.working with selected members of the East 
German ruling establistment. The fact that few were aware.of Ulbricht's 
immi~ent replacement meant that fewer GDR politicians were in a position 
to start making their moves to grab whatever.,advanced.positions they 
might feel were available. In short, such a move was.easier to plan 
and carry out. That the Soviet leaders, or anyone, would desire it to 
be so is obvious. It is also obvious that those members of·the East 
German leadership who were closest to the Kremlin insiders, Honecker 
being one of .them--as his. selection clearly indicates--would prefer that 
the matter be handled in this manner. Ulb:dcht' s movements in the ,three 
months preceeding the party conference e~rly in May would have 
facilitated such actions. On February 8, Ulbricht, accompanied by his 
wife, arrived in the Soviet Union f9r a vacation at the specific 
invitation of· the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
U . 117 nl.on. He did not leave the USSR for his return to Berlin until 
March 14, after a meeting with Brezhnev at which "certain ques~ions of 
the international situation" were discussed in what was described as a 
118 
"friendly and cordial atmosphere." Ulbricht's five-week absence from 
117CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No.6, March 9, 1971, p. 30. 
118rbid., Vol. XXIII, No. 11, April 13, 1971, p. 22 .. 
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East Berlin, at the invitation of the CPSU, it should be noted, gave 
Honecker and his allies sufficient time to plan a move set for the 
Sixteenth SED Conference set for the first week of May. The fact that 
Ulbricht and his wife were vacationing in the USSR meant that they could 
be under constant, thorough surveillance where any contacts could be 
monitored. His meeting with Brezhnev just prior to his return could 
have given the Soviet leader a last opportunity to determine if the 
move against Ulbricht was absolutely necessary. While the Pravda 
account simply says that "certain questions of.the international 
situation" were discussed, the matter of the GDR's policy toward West 
Germany and West Berlin would surely have been one of them. If Ulbircht 
showed.no signs of freely altering his rigid posture on these issues it 
could have served to give Brezhnev the final evidence he needed to 
demonstrate that the First Secretary had outlived his usefulness. 
An additional very obvious indication that Ulbricht's retirement 
was not voluntary appeared almost two years after the event. In March, 
1973, the Ulbricht Stadium in East Berlin was renamed the Stadium of 
World Youth. At the same time, the nearly underground station which 
had borne Ulbricht's name and the Walter Ulbricht Ge~an Academy for 
Political Sciences and Jurisprudence at Potsdam-Babelsberg were also 
11 Q renamed.--~ Such actions may be considered strong evidence that 
Ulbricht's retirement came not as a result of advancing years and 
declining health, but rather as a result of diminished political 
influence. 
119SWB ,. March 21, 1973, EE/4250/ B/5. 
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The facts mentioned above are supplemented by the policy 
considerations which pointed to an Ulbricht ouster rather .than a 
vol~ntary retirement. A little ,over a month after Ulbricht's return 
from the USSR, Radio GDR home service announced that the Soviet Union 
had made a proposal on West Berlin which involved the acceptance of 
West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic, including consent to 
consular protection for the permanent residents of the city and the 
representation of their interests abr9ad by the FRG. 120 This statement 
clearly went against Ulbricht's publicly-stated position on West Berlin. 
In the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin concluded in September, these 
offers were officially agreed to by the Soviet Union and the three 
Western powers in Berlin. Their inclusion further indicates the exten~ 
to which the views of Ulbricht we~e at variance with those of t~e USSR. 
In such a situation it would be surprising if the Kremlin made no move 
to replace Ulbricht. 
However, the Soviet decision to replace Ulbricht required an 
additional decision regarding the question of with whom should Ulbricht 
be replaced. Why was Erich Honecker selected as the replacement? The 
most obvious reason would be his position within the ,SED in contrast to 
that of the other most frequently-cited possible successor, Willi Stoph, 
within the State,apparatus. Communist ideology dictates the predominance 
of the Party over the State and the history of power struggles within 
Communist Party states shows that those individuals with Party c~reers 
l20Ibid ., April 29, 1973, EE/3670/Al/l. 
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are more likely to rise to the top than individuals with careers in the 
State bureaucracy. Honecker had become a member of the Central Committee, 
of the Communist Party in 1946 and continued to rise through the Party 
ranks after the union with the East German Social Democrats. In 1958 he 
became a full member of the Politburo of the ,SED after considerable 
experience with the East German youth organization of which he was one 
of the founders, and two years of political training in the Soviet 
Union. As a Politburo member he was responsible for military affairs 
and internal security, both very important matters for the GDR during 
the following years. 12l In addition, Honecker had a safe, conservative 
background in terms of positions he had taken during the past. While he 
had adopted stands opposing rapproachment with West Germany and was 
rumored to have opposed the Stoph meetings with Brandt ,in 1970;122 he 
was part,of a group among the GDR leadership noted for its f1exibility.123 
Such a trait would have increased his value to the ,USSR in a time of 
change in Communist policies toward theWest~ The fac~ that Honecker 
had a long career in the SED was of further value in lending an air of 
stability during a time of transition in the GDRls leadership. For a 
nation which is frequently noted for its instability, such an appearance 
could be of considerable importance. Finally, the fact that Honecker 
12lDie Volkskammer (The Peoples I Chamber) (Berlin, GDR:, 
Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972), pp. 354-356. 
l22peter C. Ludz, "The SED Leadership in Transition," Problems of, 
Communism, May-June, 1970, p. 27. 
123peter C. Ludz, The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 
1970), p. 49. 
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was strons within the Party but not too strong must have added to his 
attractiveness for the Soviet Union. An individual who was very weak 
within his own party would have been extremely easy for the Kremlin to 
control, but he could have lacked the capability, at least initially, 
to command his own organization. An individual who was too strong might, 
have become independent from the USSR and could have been inclined to 
carry out a purge within the Party in order to strengthen his position 
further. This would ,have not been desirable either, from the Soviet 
point of view. What was best for the USSR was a man like H~necker, 
strong but not too strong. The fact that no ,purges of ' Ulbricht 
faithfuls such as Friedrich Ebert and ,Margarete Muller occurred 
indicates that Honecker's position within the ,Party is not at all 
similar to what Ulbricht's was fifteen or twenty years ago. Honecke~'s 
nondominance of the SED increases his dependence of the Soviet 
leadership and thereby further increases his usefulness to the USSR. 
The view that Ulbricht's retirement was other than a voluntary move 
on the First Secretary's part has been supported by three authorities on 
East,German affairs: MelvinCroan, Peter C. Ludz, and Heinz Lippman. 
Writing shortly after Ulbricht's retirement, Croan, while not 
specifically advancing the thesis that Ulbricht was ousted against his 
will, presents an impressive array of justifications.for such a ,move. 
In short, he argues that the SED leader was advocating foreign policies 
that ran counter to detente, insisting on a special position for himself 
in European bloc affairs, and presenting the GDR rather than the 
102 
USSR th d 1 f 'ff' , d 1" 1 b' l' 124 as e mo e 0 econom1C e 1c1ency an po 1t1ca sta 1 ~ty. 
Ludz has likewise presented a catalogue of .Soviet-GDR policy differences 
in Ulbricht's last days. Ludz hypothesizes that U1bricht~s "unwilling-
ness to modify his rigid posture" on a variety of issues precipitated 
his downfall, 12S Honecker's biographer and former associate~ Heinz 
Lippmann~ has insisted that Ulbricht's removal was brought about by a 
combination of East German and Soviet efforts. Honecker, he writes, 
was reported to have been urging Ulbricht's removal as early as mid-l970. 
Lippmann notes that there was conspicuous tension between.Ulb~icht and 
Soviet Ambassador Abrassimov in the last days, and that the Berlin 
Agreement had become a principal issue becaus~ of Ulbricht's 
obstructionist tactics. He believes that the choice for the USSR beca~e 
one of either Ulbricht or the Berlin Agreement, but not ,both together. 
LippmanJ:} argues that the crucial characteristic of Honecker's that 
prompted the Russians to select him as the successor was his 
"unconditional loyalty to the CPSU and the USSR.,,126 
In order to more fully evaluate the wisdom of Honecker's selection 
as well as to understand GDR policy on West Berlin since 1971, we must 
next examine the developments on West Berlin and re1ate4 questions since 
the Sixteenth SED Conference. The following chapter is devoted to such 
an examination. 
124Melvin Croan, "After Ulbricht," ,Survey, Vol. 17, Spring, 1971, 
pp. 78-81 .. 
l25L d u z, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," pp. 57-58. 
l26Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Europe (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 214-223. 
CHAPTER III 
HONECKER'S WEST BERLIN POLICY 
The Honecker policy toward West Berlin has differed sharply from 
the Ulbricht policy in terms of actual progress on issues ,relating to 
the city of West Berlin. One of the most notable of these, the ,Four 
Power Agreement on Berlin, came within just a few months of Ulbricht's 
replacement in May. However, the rhetoric of the three Honecker years 
has had much in common, with that of the last part of the Ulbricht era, 
suggesting elements of continuity in GDR foreign policy along with 
elements of change. The tone of the East German rhetoric toward the 
West in general and the FRG and West Berlin in particular, has been 
characterized by a concern over the persistent negative qualities of 
the Federal Republic, attacks on West German and West Berlin policies 
and personalities, continued emphasis on the ,Western military threat, 
and charges that West Berlin has permitted itself to be misused by the 
West. 
Honecker himself made the East German view that West Germany had 
not changed explicit in his report on the Twenty-fourth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union shortly after the announcement of 
Ulbricht's resignation. According to the new First Secretary, the CPSU 
and the SED were "agreed that nothing had changed as regards the 
reactionary and aggressive character of imperialism and the Federal 
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1 Republic of Germany." An editorial in Neues Deutschland a few days 
later was consistent with Honecker's harsh theme in its condemnatiQn of, 
the current role of the FRG. According to the editorial, the FRG was,to 
"assume the old function of the German Reich since the end of World War, 
Two--that is to say, form the ,spearhead of the imperialist world system 
, '1' ,,2 aga1nst SOC1a 1sm. While such statements must be balanced with 
subsequent positive developments, they do serve to establish a pa~ter~ 
of continuity between the Ulbricht and Honecker regimes in terms of the 
East German conception of what the F~G is supposed to represent. In 
this regard, the similarities outnumber the differenc~s. 
In evaluating West German policy initiatives toward the GDR, 
Honecker's regime continued to pursue a ,critical attitude. Many West 
German offers were simply dismissed as "verbal compromises" lacking in 
any real substance. In the summer of 1971 ,when the Bonn government 
rescinded official directives on avoiding the use of the term "GDR," 
the East Germans responded by declaring that this was no more than a 
"feeble and illogical adjustment to the force of reality and a way of 
yielding to the pressure of public opinion. It does not ,indicate a 
change of po1icy.IIS Just as the East Germans frequently charged that 
the FRG wanted to believe the worst about the ,GDR, the GDR press seemed 
to insist on believing only the worst about West German intentions. 
According to GDR sources, the FRG had done nothing to improve relations 
1Neues Deutschland, May 4, 1971, p. 1. (Hereafter noted as ND~) 
2Ibid ., May 8, 1971, p. 1. 
J~~y 15, 1971, p. 2. 
l~ 
with East Ge~any. In fact, Bonn was said to be. engaging in an 
international diplomatic offensive against East Germany in order to 
block its membership in the United Nations and prevent other states 
from extending diplomati~ recognition to the GDR. 4 The officia~ East 
German opinion was that the FRG was continuing to adhere,to the sole 
representation doctrine and was engaging in an ideological crusade 
against the GDR. According to Neues Deutschland in 1972, there had 
been a recent increase in anti-Communist propaganda in the FRG which 
was massive and alarming. The campaign was declared to be especially 
dangerous in that it was now conducted by "differentiated ,and selective 
methods" rather than by the outdated, obvious, and less effective 
5 
approaches. 
Individuals who were associated with such policies were occasionally 
singled out for personal attacks by the East Germannews.media. As FRG 
Minister of Interior, Han-Dietrich Genscher was acc~ed of lacking 
respect for Bonn's treaties with the USSR and Poland when he questioned 
East German frontier measures. Genscher, according to tqe GDR press, 
failed to recognize the existing frontiers of Europe, including those of 
the GDR. 6 When members of the West German Federal Frontier Guard boarded 
an East German vessel in the Kiel Canal and took the captain into custody 
for several hours, the East German press portrayed the incident as one 
4Ibid ., October 16, 1971, pp. 1-2. 
SIbid., Feburary 27, 1972, p. 3. 
6Ibid ., January 4, 1972, p. 2. 
of maJor proportions. No one should be surprised, it declared, tha,t 
this "act ·of piracy" met with the public approval o~ Genscher who was 
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said to be on record as favoring "interference in.the internal a1;fairs 
of· the GDR.,,7 In a similar fashion, FRG Minister Egon Bahr has been 
attacked for his alleged wish to cause the GDR "to disappear." In 
commenting on this, th~ East German radio program, "V()ice of the GDR," 
charged that the Bahr.statement was,proof that the .FRG had no real 
intention of renouncing its "revanchist" policies. 8 West BeI:lin's mayor 
Klaus Scheutz was attacked in 1973 as one of "those people who maintain 
that West Berlin was best governed during the days of the cold.war." A 
Neues Deutschland editorial charged that Scheutz had no interest in 
normalization of relations with the GDR and was acting in a manner, 
inconsistent with the best interests of the West Berlin population. 9 
While Brandt himself was· generally accorded reasona~ly restrained 
tre~tment by the GDR press during this time, he has also been the 
subject of occasional severe critic~sm. When Brandt made what the 
East German press viewed as disparaging remarks about the attitude of 
the GDR officials in April, 1973, the .response was a~ East German attack 
in which it was charged that the Chancellor was hostile to the GDR and 
blinded by Social Democratic anticommunism. lO The new West German 
7Junge Welt (Berlin, GDR), January 12, 1972, p. 2. 
8BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 16, 1974, EE/4575/Al/l. 
(Hereafter noted as SWB.) 
9 ND, November 7, 1973, p. 1. 
10SWB, April 13, 1973, EE/4270/Al/2. 
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chancellor) ,Helmut Schmidt, has been the subject of n~erous German 
at~acks. His work as Defense Minister has attracted most of the 
criticism he received from the GDR. In that capa~ity, accqrding to 
Erich Honecker, Schmidt carried on the "infamcl:lS work begun by Strallss'~ 
and won the praise of .Nazi elements in West Germany.ll. 
Since Honecke~'s assumption of power in May, 1971, the GDR has 
continued to stress the military threat posed by West Germany and NATO. 
This theme is essentially a continu~tion of one which started in the 
first years after the partition of Germany and was played upon in 
varying degrees during the 1950s and 1960s. The basic idea of it is 
that the military power of the West is directed against the communist 
party states of Eastern Europe. The specter of a nuclear military force 
under the control of the Bonn government has been a basic element of 
this theme. As Neues Deutschland editorialized in 1973, 
In its military.policy the FRG is at present in theo.ry and 
practice pursuing the two-fold aim of increasing the conven-
tional strength of the Bundeswehr by arming itself and getting 
ahold.on nuclear weapons,by the presence of American forces 
in the FR.G.l2 
Any efforts at upgrading the technical quality of the West German 
military have been portrayed as a violation of the spirit of detente. 
In commenting on West German military modernization plans in 1972, 
"Voice of the GDR" asked rhetorically how such. plans could be 
11 ND, January 7, 1972, p. 2. 
12Ibid ., July 25, 1973, p. 1. 
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compatible with the West German treaties with the USSR and:Pola~d.l3 
Military exercises, such as are very common within the Warsaw Pact 
states, including th~ GDR, are also cited by the East German authorities 
as a contradiction of Bonn's ~vpressions of peaceful intentions toward 
the East. The NATO exercises in 1974 were heralded by Neues Deutschland 
as "proof of the unabated agressiveness" of NATO. According to the SED 
newspaper, fewer and fewer people in the ,west believe th,a t there, is a 
"threat from the East" as the "anticommunist fairy tales" assert, so 
the only reason for Western ,military maneuvers must be to prepare for 
aggression. 14 This image of the threat from the West is used as 
justification for East German military preparedness. In 1971, GDR 
Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, declared that peace in Europe ,had b,een 
preserved, not by a balance of power, but only by a clear and growing 
military superiority of the East. Hoffmann cited the ,alliance of the 
United States and the FRG as justification for continued efforts to 
guarantee the military superiority of the WTO forces, including those, 
of the GDR. 15 
The Honecker regime has continued to stress that West Berlin 
threatens the GDR. However, since early 1971, the rhetoric about the 
We~t Berlin threat has been considerably reduced ,from its previous level 
in terms of the intensity of East German attacks and charges. The basic 
13 SWB, January 19, 1972, EE/3892/Al/1. 
14 NO, May 7, 1974, p. 1. 
lS SWB , May 13, 1971, EE/3682/B/4. 
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complaint has been that West Germany.is attempting to extend its 
jurisdiction to West Berlin and govern West Berlin as though it were 
another Land of the FRG. TheGDR has repeatedly char~ed that West 
Germany is attempting to govern West Berlin through.extensions of. 
certain types of legislation to the city, by drafting residents into 
the Bundeswehr, and by establishing offices of the go~ernment 0; the, 
FRG in West Berlin. The West German plan, put forward by Genscher as 
Minister of Interior, to establish a branch of the Federa~ Environmental 
Protection Office in West Berlin aroused considerable displeasure in 
office GDR circles. In August, 1973, Neues Deutschland described this 
plan as "political environmental pollution" and a violation of the Four 
Power Agreement on Berlin. 16 This reaction was typical of the GDR 
response to West German efforts at perpetuating a political presence 
in West.Berlin. The same reaction has continually been accorded visits 
by West German officials to the city for performance of. official duties 
during the Honecker years. 
However, these years have also brought improvements in the 
political atmosphere surrounding the West Berlin issue. These 
developments surpass~d those of the preceding Ulbricht regime. A clear 
indication of such improvements appeared in a speech by Honecker in 
January, 1972 when he said that while he was aware of the aggressive 
character of the FRG, he was also taking account, "especially from 
the point of view of, foreign policy, of the positive aspect of the 
16 ND, August 31, 1973; p. 2. 
Brandt government.,,17 Ulbricht had been unwilling to make such 
concessions to the West German SPD. East Get:Illan awar~ness o,f the 
"positive aspect" of the Brandt government was reflected in a variety 
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of ways. The return of a West German soldier who had defected to the 
East, along with his army jeep~ by the East Germans to the West Ge~an 
authorities signified the change. 18 In the past, such an aotion would 
have been inconceivable. The reduction in the East-West German 
propaganda war in July, 1972, was additional evidence of East Germany's, 
recognition that the SPD government did possess some good chara~teristics. 
What this propaganda "ceasefire" amounted to WaS an.end to the display of 
posters at the Berlin Wall directed at GDR border guards and the 
termination of the East German "Soldatensender" propaganda brC?adcasts 
to Bundes~ehrsoldiers and the sending of communist propaganda magazines 
to Bundeswehr soldiers. 19 Honecker acknowledged the changed situation 
in October, 1973 when he announced that he could see a change from the 
cold war in the direction of detente. 20 The most important evidence, 
however, of this change in the political climate can be seen in the 
record of, proposals and negotiations during the first three years of 
the Honecker regime. 
l7 Ibid ., January 7, 1972, p. 2. 
l8SWB, May 9, 1972, EE/3984/Al/4. 
19Ibid ., July 14, 1972, EE/4040/Al/3. 
20 ND, October 27, 1973, p. 2. 
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I. NEGOTIATIONS SINCE 1971 
The most conspicuous,of the agreements d~ing the first three 
years of Honecker's control of the SED was the Quadripartite Agreement 
on .Berlin signed on September 3, 1971. The SED press was enthusiastic 
in its praise of the agreement, hailing it as "an important step towards 
detente in the heart of Europe." The SED asserted that its leadership 
had been "fully informed" at all times by the Soviet Union regarding 
progress on the agreement and had made a "constructive contribut:i,on" 
21 itself to the successful conclusion of the agreement. Expressing the 
USSR's appreciation of the GDR's role, CPSU Politburo member Piotr. 
She1est, speaking in East Berlin on th~ 22nd anniversary of the GDR 
the next.mon1;h, agreed that the GDR did in fact playa "great 
constructive ro1e.,,22 
The willingness of the GDR's leadership to support the ,USSR's 
efforts to achieve detente was demonstrated by the prompt conc1~sion 
of two agreements by East Germany with the Federal Republic and West 
Berlin on transit traffic to West Berlin. The agreement with West, 
Germany was signed on December 17, 1971 by Dr. Michael Kohl for the 
GDR. At the time of the signing, Dr. Kohl declared that the agreement 
was significant ·for more than its material contents because it was 
actually a "useful contribution to detente" which could help encourage 
2l Ibid ., August 27, 1971, p. 1. 
22 Ibid ., October 6, 1971, p. 3. 
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the ,further normalization of relations,between the GDR and the FRG. 23 
Three days later an agreement with West Berlin was s~gned, with S~ate 
Se~retary Guenter Kohrt acting on behalf of the GDR. Just. as Kohl 
expressed the hope that the agreement with West Germany would lead to. 
further measures to normalize relations, Kohrt declared his ,hope ,for 
t4e resolution of other issues in relations between West Berlin and the 
GDR. 24 It is significant that these agreements were concluded without 
official diplomatic recognition of the GDR by West Germany, a demand 
voiced by Ulbricht and,previously barring such progress. Honecker 
seemed.content in discussing the agreement with the F~G to remark that 
by signing an agreement with the GDR West Germany had acknowledged East 
Germany as a "sovereign state." Honecker also commented that the, 
agreements amounted to an acceptance of the principal East Ge~an 
argument on West Berlin, that the city is an independent political 
entity. The fact that Western demands for a Western controlled corridor 
through the GDR's territory had been dropped was cited by Honecker as a 
major victory for East Germany~ This, he argued, amounted to a further 
"de facto" recognition of the GDR. 25 
The desire for a further normalization of East Germany's ,relations 
with the ,FRG '<las satisfied by the successful conclusion of the Treaty on 
the Bases of Re1ations,between the GDR and ,the FRG. While the treaty 
23The Berlin Settlement (Bonn: Press and Information Office of, the 
FRG, 1972), p. 59. 
24Ibid ., p. 72. 
25ND , December 18, 1971, p. 2. 
was initialed on November 8, 1972, after a long political wrangle in 
West Germany, it did not come into force until June 21, 1973. On the 
occasion of the signing of the treaty, Dr. Michael.Kohl.declared that 
the GDR viewed the treaty as a.vehic1e for "bringing about; the 
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1 f h ld b d t d . ,,26 rep acement 0 t e co war y e ente an cooperat1on. As a logical 
continuation of this process, negotiations began on the establishment of 
permanent missions for the two Germanies in their. respective capitals. 
These negotiations bore.fruit in May, 1974 when permanent missions.were 
established in Bonn and·East Berlin. 27 The actual opening of the 
missions had been delayed for a short time as a result of the Guillaume 
spy case in West Germany. That the delay amounted to no more than a few 
days is in itself remarkable. In an earlier time, such an incident 
would have been sufficient to disrupt the entire proce$s of. normalization 
between the GDR and the FRG. 
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin contained a reference to the 
possible exchange of territory in the case of enclaves such as 
Steinstucken and other small areas. The first such exchange came.as a 
result of an agreement in July, 1972 between the GDR government .and the 
West Berlin Senate. Under the agreement, a small piece of land near 
Potsdamer Platz was transferred to West Berlin for the ,price of 
thirty-one million Deutsche Marks. 28 A much more.extensive territorial 
26Ibid ., June 2~, 1973, p. 1. 
27 Ibid ., May 3, 1974, p. 1. 
28 Ibid ., July 20, 1972, p. 4. 
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exchange was agreed to in February, 1974 involving land for~erly under 
the control of the .GDR Reichsbahn in the Anhalter region of West 
B 1 · 29 er ~n. 
Another important step in the process of .normalization occurred 
with the establishment of the Boundary Commission in January, 1973. 
The purpose of the commission was to review and supplement the 
demarcation of the East-West .German border, to prepare the necessary 
documents on the actual course of the bo~ndary and to r~gulate other 
30 problems .connected with the border. Shortly after the establishment 
of the Boundary Commission, Bonn and East Berlin began talks on a,public 
31 health agreement between the two states. The result of this series of 
talks which lasted for almost a year was a Health Services Agreement 
which was.signed in.East.Berlin on April 25, 1974. The need for such 
an agreement had been mentioned in the Treaty on the Bases of Re1atio~s 
32 between the FRG and the GDR. In September, 1973, the GDR-FRG Frontier 
Agreements were signed. One dealt with caring for damage at the frontie~ 
and the other concerned the maintenance and development of the frontier 
waterways and the water engineering insta11~tions along the frontier. 
As a result of these agreements, provis~ons were implemented for 
reciprocal information at short notice regarding events such as fires, 
29 SWB, February 23, 1974, EE/4534/Al/4. 
30ND , January 31, 1973, p. 2. 
31 Ibid ., May 24, 1973, p. 7. 
32Ibid ., April 26, 1974, p. 2. 
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gale damage, landslides, and epidemics. 33 Meanwhile, work continued on 
a possible post and telecommunications agreement, a cultural agreement, 
and a judicial assistance agreement between the GDR and the FRG and a 
va~iety of agreements between the GDR and West Berlin. One of the most, 
. \ . 
important of the latter is an accident assistance agreement on which 
talks began. in May, 19~3. This agreement would cover the rendering of 
prompt aid after accidents on the sector boundary in Berlin. 
As a means of improving contacts between the ,GDR and the FRG and 
West Berlin, negotiations continued in the area of telephone facilities, 
television programs~ and press agreements. In July, 1972, arrangments 
were made for increasing and improving telephone con~ections. As a 
result, thirty-two local exchanges in the Pots4am area could be re~ched 
from West Berlin by direct dialing. This measure was made possible as 
a result of an agreement between the FRG Post Office and the .GDR Postal 
Administration concluded in September, 1971. In the past, no call could 
be placed from West Berlin to the GDR without going through an 
34 
operator. In 1973 th~ prospect of an exchange of television programs 
between. the FRG and the GDR was raised by Max Walter Schultz, the 
vice-president of the GDR Authors' Union. Schultz expressed his desire 
to show "as much·as possible that will give a truly realistic picture of 
West German conditions--on the principle of reciprocity.,,35 SQ far, 
33 SWB, September 22, 1973, EE/4405/Al/2. 
34 ND, July 25, 1~72, p. 7. 
3~SWB, April 26, 1973, EE/4279/Al/lO. 
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however, there has been an absence of any higher official support for 
suchan exchange of television programs. The exchange of journalists 
between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin, in contrast, did develqp. 
By 1973, provisions,had been ,made for GDR journalis~s in Bonn and for 
FRG journalists in East Berlin. The German Press Agency (DPA) office 
in East Berlin, whi~h opened on September 25~ 19~3, was even equipped 
with a permanen~ teleprinter line connecting it with the DPA office in 
West Ber1in. 36 The extent to which human contacts between East and West 
had improved in Germany could be seen by the statistics on travel to the 
GDR in 1973. During the year, over 3,650,000 came from the ,Federal 
Republic and mo~e than 3,461,000 from West Berlin. 37 The figures for 
1972 are only slightly less than these but in 1971, before the. 
implementation of the transit agreement, only 3,000,000 residents of 
West ,Berlin and the Federal Republic entered the GDR. 38 Telephone 
contacts also increased during this time. While in 1970 there were 
only 700,000 calls from the .FRG and West Berlin to the GDR, in 1973 
~o 
the number,reacned 5.8 mi11ion.--
The prospects for better economic relations improved after 
Honecker.'s rise to the position of First Secretary. East Germany 
36 ND, September 26, 1973, p. 7. 
37 SWB, January 5, 1974, EE/4492/Al/6. 
38Ibid ., December 23, 1972, EE/4178/AI/6. 
39 Ibid ., April 20, 1974, EE/4579/AI/S. 
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insisted that it would not ,allow itself to b~com,e dependent on a 
capitalist economy but trade talks continued and ,Honecker',s first full 
year in control saw an increase of over 25 percent in the amount o.f West 
German imports into theGDR. This is in contrast to a slight decline in 
imports in 1971 compared with 1970. Imports from West Berlin, on the 
other hand, declined sharply in .1972. East German imports from West 
Berlin dropped by approximately 25 percent in 1972 compared with 1971.40 
Meanwhile, East German exports to West Berlin rose considerably. In 
1972 they amounted to better than 495 million marks compared to only 
347 million in 1971. Exports to West Germany declined during 1972, but 
only slight1y.4l In 1973 talks between West Berlin and East Germany 
regarding the possible construction of an oil pipeline from the ,GDR to 
West Berlin were begun. 42 It is possible that the SED leadership may 
envision a.situ~tion in which West Berlin might become oriented 
economically toward the GDR, thus increasing East Germany's ability to 
control the city. However, no posi1;ive results have yet com~ from the, 
talks and East Germany's full intentions regarding trade with West 
Germany and West Berlin remain unclear. Yet, the fact t~t economic 
talks have been in progress for sometime does signify a political 
change in East Germany, a change in the direction of increasing contacts 
with the FRG and West Berlin. 
40Statistical Pocket Book of the GDR (Berlin, GDR: Staatsverlag 
der DDR, 1973), pp. 92-93. 
41 Ibid ., pp. 90-91. 
42SWB, July 20, 1973, EE/4351/Al/S. 
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The extent of the change in GDR policy was signified in 1973 by a 
meeting which Honecker held. with the chairman of the .FRG Social 
De~ocratic Party, Herbert Wehner, and the chairman of the SPD's 
coalition partner, the .FDP.43 Given the traditionally hostile East 
German view of the Social Democrats, such a meeting, simply for an 
"exchange of. views" rather than in the face o~ some crisis, must.be 
viewed as significant. The fact that Honecker himself, rather than some 
lower-ranking SED official, participated in the meeting further increases, 
its significance. 
II. CONFRONTATIONS SINCE 1971 
EVen though the overall record is one of positive achi~vement, the 
Honecker period has not been without negative developments. The most 
prominent dispute of the Honecker regime with West Berlin and the 
Federal Republic has centered around the alleged abuse of the transit 
routes to West Berlin. The first indication of this issue c~e in 
April, 1972, following the temporary implementation of the transit 
agreement by the GDR, apparently in order to improve the prospects for 
West German ratification of the treaty with East Germany. After an 
estimated 300,000 West Berliners made use of the temporary facilities 
for visits to the .East, GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer charged that 
"rightist extremist and revanchist forces" had attempted to misuse the 
GDR's "generous gesture of , goodwill for evil purposes.,,44 An editorial 
43 ND, June 2, 1973, p. 2. 
44 Ibid ., April 6, 1972, p. 2. 
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in Neues Deutschland on August 10, 1973 signalled the beginning of an 
Eas'tr German campaign against the "abuse" of the transit routes, with the 
primary concern being the activities of commercial escape ass~stance 
organizations.operating from West Berlin and the FRG. According to ,the 
editorial, 
There are forces at work to undermine the Transit Agreement 
and this is being done from the ,territory of the FRG and West 
Berlin, whose citizens derive direct ,advalltage from the, 
Agreement. The Transit Agreement, wh~ch is being implemented 
by the GDR authorities in spirit and in letter, has recently 
been increasingly misused by profiteers. From the FRG and 
West Be~lin bands of criminals are at wor~ who, for fees of 
DM 40,000 toDM 80,000 smuggle peopl~ across the border--
people who hope for a life of luxury in the ,FRG or in West 
Berlin, for instance, scientists, doctors, and other 
specialists are being promised such a life by official 
quarters. 45 
The editorial went on to denounce the fact that such commercial services 
were able to freely advertise their services in newspapers in West 
Berlin and the FRG and that the activities of, such individuals were 
tolerated and possibly even assisted by Western officials. It concluded 
with a demand that the authorities in West Berlin and West Germany do 
their part to aid implementation of the Trans~t Agreement by taking 
a~tions against those responsible for the activitie~ in question. 
The NeuesDeutschland warning was followed by the implementation 
of much more rigid East German checks on traffic to and from West 
Berlin. The next,month the SED repeated its demand, for stricter 
controls to stop illegal crossings to the Federal Republic and West 
45Ibid ., August 10, 1973, p. 1. 
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Berlin and attacked the idea of "freedom of movement" as a,cqver used by 
those who simply want to escape prosecution for crimes against the GDR. 46 
Within a week, the East German news agency, ADN, reported that a number. 
of citizens of.West Berlin and West Germany had been. taken into custody 
for violation of the Transit Agreement. 47 More.arrests followed on a 
regular basis and on October 30, the GDR government began a much 
publicized trial of several of the "traders >in human lives'! in East 
Berlin. Western journalists were even invited to attend the proceedings, 
a very Wlique action in the GDR. During the course of the ,trial, th~ 
GDR charged that West Berlin and West German firms were actually paying 
the ,expenses for the escapes of individuals who were needed in their 
industries. Officials of West Berlin and the FRG were also said to be 
party to the operations of the "criminal sl!lugglers." Members of the 
United States Army stationed in West Berlin were also charged with 
o 0 to 48 parhc~pa ~on. By February, 1974 a.total of 150 We~t Berliners and 
West Germans had been arrested by GDR authoritie~ and charged as.escape 
helpers. Forty of this number had been sentenced, many of them for up 
o 0 49 Whol h t f W t to ten years ~mpr~sonment. ~ e t earres so. eS,ern escape 
helpers are used for maximum propaganda benefit,. the trials of GDR 
citizens who have attempted to escape are kept se~ret. Every effort 
46 Ibid ., September 21, 1973, p. 1. 
47 SWB, October 2, 1973, EE/44l3/Al/8. 
48 ND, November 1, 1973, p. 2. 
49 SWB, February 14, 1974, EE/4526/Al/2. 
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is made ,to avoid any ,publication of the ,details of escape efforts since 
this information might ,aid others who desire to attempt an escape 
1ater.50 It is also desirable that the organizations assisting in 
escapes not be permitted to learn from th~ir mistakes. 
Meanwhile, the number of escapes from the GDR to West.Berlin and 
the FRG for 1973 rose by 16 percent over the previous ,year, according 
to figures released by the West Berlin-based 13th August Working Group. 
The total number of escapes in 1973 was 6,450. The increase was 
considered a result, of escapes via the transit routes during the first 
half of the year, prior to the initiation of more stringent East German 
checks. However, the number of "frontier-breakers" was also up 
considerably, 49 percent over 1972, and that also contributeq to 
the increase. A1mos~ 1600 of the escapees were "frontier-breakers" 
h . d . t ft' d .. . d' 'd 1 51 w o,requ1re, no aSS1S ance, rom ou S1 e organ1zat1onsor 1n 1V1 ua s. 
A related controversy during this time centered around the matter, 
of currency violations by Western visitors to the GDR. Since 1964, 
visitors had been required to exchange a minimum of ten marks a day for 
overnight stays in the GDR and five marks a day for one-day visits to 
East Berlin. In November of 1973 the GDR authorities doubled these 
amounts and applied the new regulations to previously exempt old-age 
pensioners. The East German argument was that this action was necessary 
in order to discourage the illegal exchange of their currency which 
50Frankfurter Allgemeine, July 15, 1974, p. 5. 
51SWB , January 2, 1974, EE/4489/A1/1. 
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could be purchased in West Berlin or in the FRG at approximately 
one-third of its face value. Such exchanges, considered illegal by the 
GDR, were conducted openly at many Western banks and the .rates were 
regularly advertised.in the Western press as well as in the windows of 
banks. The East German leadership viewed such exchanges and the illegal 
importation of currency purchased in that manner as an effort ,to return 
to the situation that existed before the construction of the Wall in 
1961. These activities were said to represent "deliber~te damage" to 
the GDR and a "violation of its sovereign rights as well as interferenc~ 
. . d . ff' ,,52 ~n ~ts omest~c a a~rs. While the East Germans objected to the sale. 
of their currency in the .West as well as to its importation back to the 
GDR, they were in no position to enforce prohibitio~s against the 
former, so they concentrated on attempting to prevent trave1~rs from 
bringing Western purchased GDR marks into East Germany. Over a period 
of about one year, more than 500,000 such marks were confiscated at 
border crossing points. 53 The doubling of the mandatory minimum exchange 
for tourists was intended to remove the incentive fol;' bringing in such 
marks since it·was obviously impossible to confiscate more than a 
fraction of the amo~t coming in prior to the implementation of ,the 
new regulations. Th~ fact that the regulations were introduceq without .. 
warning and were also applied to old-age pensioners visiting relatives 
and friends in the ,GDR raised Western suspicions that the real intention 
52 
. ND, November 8, 1973, p. 1. 
53Ibid ., November 6, 1973, p. 2. 
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of this action was" to redu.ce: the number of visitors coming to the 
country. Whether such an intention motivate~ the action or not, ,it 
certainly did have that effect. A survey of three checkpoints into the 
GDR in Lower Saxony over,the weekend of November,30 to December 2 
demonstrated the effect of the new regulations. While the previous 
weekend had seen over 6,800 travellers cross into the East, only 1,300 
54 
made the journey that weekend. A survey of the number of automobiles 
using all crossings into East Germany,for the three days of the ,Christmas 
holiday demonstrated a similar result. While Christmas of 1972 brought, 
over 23,000 cars from West Germany and West Berlin, in 1973 only 12,600 
automobiles were counted on the same days~55 Numerous protests from the 
West and several meetings of representatives from the ,west Berlin Senate 
with East German authorities failed to produce a return to the old, 
regulations. However, by October, 1974 a compromise was finally reached 
in which the GpR agreed to require ~he exchange of only 6.5 DM fo~ 
one-day visits to East Berlin and"13 DM for longer visits to the GDR. 56 
The absence of any public Soviet support for the GDRls position may have 
b~en a decisive factor in the GDRls decision. 
Several other less important disputes involving the GDR and West 
Berlin arose during this time. In 1973 the GDR began to question 
arrangements whereby West Berlin pumped its sewage into the Teltow canal 
54SWB , December 13, 1973, EE/4475/Al/9. 
55New York Times, December 28, 1973, p. 5. 
56Berliner Morgenpost, October 27, 1974, p. 1. 
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for processing by the East Berlin purification plant. Th~ East Germans 
accused West Berlin of disregarding the. interests of the GOR and warned 
that "serious con,sequences may· stem from unilatel;'al action by West Berlin 
authorities. ,,57 West Berlin authorities denied charges that they were 
violating agreements with the GOR on the treatment of waste water, but, 
did agree to a series of·meetings.on th~. question. At.a meeting in 
January in East Berlin the .GOR demanded highe~ prices for the removal ,of 
waste water from West Berlin. 58 The West Berliners rejected the East 
Gerw~ndemandand the issue remained unsettled by late 1974. An 
additional dispute appeared in January when the East Germans demanded an. 
incr~ase in the price of.the lignite briquettes that they had been selling 
to West .. Berlin for the past twenty years . Citing WesterJ1, inflation as 
justification the GDR raised its prices ,on th~ briquettes from 79 marks 
per ton to 92 mark,s. Rather than meet the East .German demand, West 
Berlin simply halted its purchases:and prepared to endure the winter 
without the GOR'S briquettes.59 
In spite of these disputes, Honecker has continued to insist o~ the, 
feasibility of a complete normalization of relations between West Berlin 
and the GOR. Apparently such issues as discussed above are not intended 
to wreck the develQpment of detente over West Berlin. In an intervie~ 
with the ,Associated Press on May 3D, 1974, Honecker explained with regard 
to West Berlin, 
57BerlinerZeitung, August 7, 19Z3, p. 2. 
58 
. SWBj January.2S, 1974, EE/4509/Al/5. 
59Ibid ., January.lO, 1974, EE/4496/Al/l. 
If prob1e~s and difficulties arise at times' this should 
not be draJ)latized, considering the complex nature of things 
and the different interests which we take into account. As 
far as we are concerned we do not seek a "cooling off" 'b~t 
rather a warming up of·the international climate in the 
interests of peace and the peop1e. 60 
III. THE HONECKER POLICY AND THE USSR 
Completion of this brief review of the outlines of,Honecker's 
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policies pertaining to the West Berlin issue and related matters permits 
some. observations, and generalizations at this point. Wh~le the GDR' s 
domestic policy has not been radically altered since Ulbricht's 
resignation, the East German foreign policy has undergone a considerable 
change in emphasis since May, 1971. According to one prominent authoz:ity 
on.East,Get:Jllan political affairs, many of the positions taken by 
Ulbricht during his last years were viewed by the Sovie~ leadership as 
both irksome and disturbing. In an article in 1972, Peter C. Ludz 
ventured the ob~ervation regarding Ulbricht that 
. . . In a certain sense he was projec~ing himself as a 
potential rival of Moscow iti its claim to ideological 
1eader$hipj beyond that,.by stressing the GDR's independent 
achievements, he was obviously try~ng to strengthen its 
posi ti,?n and influence in, the international ,political 
arena. 1)1 
The emph~sis since Honecker's selection as a replacement for Ulbricht 
has been very different. Honecker has repeatedly stressed both the 
60"Interview granted by Erich Honecker to the US News Agency," 
Political Documents of the GDR, No.3, 1974, p. 9. 
61peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since U1b~icht," Problems 
of Communism, March-April, 1972, p. 57. 
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closeness of the GDR's positions. to those of the Soviet Un~on and. East 
Germany's . unflinch~ng sl,lpport of ·the USSR as the .leader of the "socialist 
co~unity of.nations." Honecker's recognition of a debt to the Soviet 
Unio~ permeates discussions of the development of the GDR. In May, 
1974.he declared that the successful development of·a socialist st~te 
in East Germany was possible only because its leadership "chose the. 
right side in the great c1ass.batt1es of our ' time, the .side of the 
Soviet Union and its battle-tested Leninist party. Discussing 
the position of the GDR today, Honecker was able to declare on May 12, 
1974, regarding his country's relationship with the .Soviet Union, 
Today relations between the GDR and the USSR have reached 
such a stage that.our close, cooperation penetrates practically 
every important sphere of social life ••.. We agree on all 
political, ideological, and theoretical basic questions of· 
social deve1opment. 63 
This absolute devotion to the guidance of the USSR is in sharp 
contrast with Ulbricht's talk about the independent.achievements of the 
GDR, East Germany's.unique road,to socialism, and his independent 
proposals. Ulbricht's New Year Message for 1968 in .. which he proposed, 
independently from the US.SR, that the .GDR and the FRG conclude a treaty 
on the renunciation of force and initiate talks on the .complete 
disarmament of both states illustrates the extent of Ulbricht's 
. d d 64 1n epen ence. Honecker has avoided such displays of what the USSR 
62ND , May 30, 1974, p. 2. 
63 Ibid . , May 13, 1974, p. 2. 
64 Ibid ., January 1, 1968, pp. 1-2. 
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would rightly consider arrogance. In his GDR-Sovie~ Friendship Day 
speech in May, 1974 Honecker made the SED's stand regarding the .Soviet 
Union's authoritative position amply c1ear.when he asserted that "every 
step we are taking today" is determined: by the faith that only through 
a firm alliance with t~e USSR could East Germany's efforts succeed. 
This alliance was described as the key to the .GDR's achievements in 
both. economic and foreign affairs. Even the West, Honecker insisted, 
was aware of this and, accordingly, was trying to "malign our alleged 
impairment of the sovereignty of our Republic." However, he continued, 
what the Western states fail to realize is that the East German alliance 
wi th the USSR is of a "different quality from . . . [alliances] . . . of 
capitalist countries." The East German-Soviet alliance, in Honecker's 
view, is based on a community of. ideology, social system, anq goals. 
The Soviet and GDR 1eaderships share what Honecker sees as a common 
objective, namely, the benefit of the working c1ass. 65 His.position is 
that such an alliance is both unique and unshakable. Enthusiastic 
reaffirmations. of this position have been liberally sprinkled through 
Honecker's policy statements during the years since his assumption of 
power. These statements illustrate th~ most important instance of 
discontinuity with the last years of. the Ulbricht regime. 
Wh~le Honecker's declarations of·East German fealty to the USSR 
must be considered the most obvious new trend in GDR foreign policy 
since 1971, the stress on Bloc cooperation clearly constitutes the 
65Ibid ., May 13, 1974, p. 2. 
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second most important pattern in.this period. In this respect, the 
Honecker statements more closely resemble those of.Ulbricht. The first 
concern regarding Bloc cooperation centers around the defense of the 
GDR. The· idea that cooperation with the Bloc provides a valuable 
protective shield for the GDR has repeatedly been made clear by East 
German leaders. Honecker forcefully expressed it in his report to the 
Eight.h SED Congress in June, 1971. In his speech Honecker explained 
that the alliance with the "conununity of. socialist states" was neces~ary. 
because 
• • • Through the collective defense alliance of the armed 
forces of the Warsaw Treaty, especially by the military shield, 
of the Soviet Army,peace and security for the people of the 
German Democratic Republic are.re1iab1y protected.66 
By way of further invoking Bloc support, the East German leadership has· 
gone. so far as to describe the defense of the GDR as the "test for the 
East" in facing up to Western imperialism. 67 
A second concern relating to cooperation with the Bloc invo1~es a 
social orientation toward the East. East Germany's. leadership is 
concerned about the development of social patterns that are congruent. 
with those of its allies to the East. In a speech to the SED's Central 
Committee in July, 1972 Politburo member Kurt Hager discussed the 
cultural policy of· the GDR. While explaining the need for a 
66Erich Honecker, Unter dem Banner des Internationalismus.(Under 
the Banner of Internationalism) (Berlin, GDR: Dietz Verlag, 1972), 
p.117. 
67ND, May 8, 1971, p. 1. 
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cultural policy embracing the entire Socialist community, Hager 
said, 
The Socialist culture of the GDR occupies a firm place in 
the cultural development of the Socialist countries. We 
consider it one of our most important cultural tasks actively 
to promote the mutual approach and fertilization of Socialist 
cultures. 68 
The East German government under both Honecker and Ulbricht, has 
encouraged such "fertilization" through provision of ample opportunities 
for contacts between its citizens and those of most of,the other East 
European communist party states. One of the most important opportunities 
has been travel. According to figures released by the GDR Travel Bureau 
near the end of 1973, almost one million East Germans availed themselves 
of the opportunity to visit the GDR's Warsaw Pact neighbors in 1973. 69 
The Tenth World Youth Festival which was held in East Berlin in the 
summer of 1973 was another important part in promoting East German 
contacts with ,those who shared the SED's official outlook. According 
to the SED, the festival "was a great manifestation of ,democratic and 
socialist culture and illustrated the living power of the ideas of 
internationalism. ,,70 
A third concern relating to the GDR's stress on Bloc cooperation 
is coordination of the foreign policies of the Warsaw Pact states. As 
previously mentioned, Honecker describes relations between the USSR 
68Kurt Hager, Socialist Cultural Policy (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im 
Bild, 1972), p. 53. 
69SWB , December 20, 1973, EE/4481/B/3. 
70ND, August 22, 1973, p. 4. 
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and the GDR as b~ing dictated by common· interests and ideology. The 
same is considered to be true of the USSR's relations with other East 
European states. Therefore, predictably, the East German. leadership 
denies that the Brezhnev Doctrine can properly be described as evidence 
of coercion within the Bloc. An example of such a denial was a 1973 
"Voice .of the GDR" broadcast in \V'hich East German Professor Joachim 
Raabe proclaimed the international duty of Communists to defend socialism 
as a principal determinant of the .behavior of Bloc members, th~ GDR 
included. 71 From this, one can easily infer the .necessity from the 
East.German view of·a coordination of Eastern policies, especially those 
regarding noncommunist states. Th4S, the SED's leaders have sought 
support. from their allies in the matter of West GermanY'$ relatio~s with 
West Berlin. Honecker and·his associates enjoyed considerable success 
in this matter in 1973 as evidenced by the lack of progress for a time 
in ta1~s between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic. Th~ dispute 
arose from Bonn's effort to secure the right to represent .not only West 
Berlin residents but also her institutions ,and associations abroad. The 
Czech leadership supported theGDR on this issue and branded the FRG's 
efforts a "gross provocation not only against the sovereignty of the GDR 
but also against the other socialist countries.,,72 The East Germans 
viewed this also as an effort to secure from the GDR's allies what the 
SED was unwilling to give and thus to play the East European states ,off 
7ISWB, Octo~~r 5, 1973, EE/4481/B/3. 
72Ibid ., August 21, 1973, EE/4378/A1/3. 
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against each other. Accordingly, they issued a call for Eastenl unity 
73 in the ,face of West German "pressure." 
TIle East German drive for a more effectiye coordination of , Bloc 
policies culminated with the call for an international Communist meeting. 
On May 22, 1974, after a meeting with the General Secretary of the U.S. 
Communist Party, Gus Hall, in East Berlin, Honecker noted that the 
tendency towards a detente was·now predominant in world developments and 
that the internatiQnal Dalance of power was increasingly altering in 
favor of the Soviet Union and its allies. Yet, he continued, the 
., , 
opponents of detente were still trying to revive the cold war· so, 
therefore, there was a need for "all the world's peace forces'.' to work 
harder in the joint struggle for "international detente, security, and 
peace." The positive achievements the world is enjoying today, Honecker 
insisted with Hall's concurrence, were largely a product of the program 
formulated at .. the 1969 international. meeting of Communist and workers! 
parties in Moscow. Accordingly, both Honecker and Hall concluded, th~ 
appropriate thing would be the convocation of·a newinternat~onal 
consultation by the same parties in order to develop a plan to secure 
the benefits of deten~e. As Honecker explained, 
The point now is. how to make the progress of detente 
irreversiDle, in defiance of all its adversaries. At the 
same time we are working for the further strengthening of 
the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement. 74 
73 ND, September 7, 1973, p. 1. 
74Ibid ., May 23, 1974, p. 1. 
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Only a series of bilateral and multilateral exchanges between all the 
parties would facilitate the development of such a program, according 
to the SED First Secretary. By taking the initiative in issuing such 
a call, the SED effectively demonstrated the extent of its enthusiasm 
for the cause of the USSR's authority in the world communist movement 
and did much to contribute to the belief that East Germany can once 
more be considered the Kremlin's most faithful ally. 
A final important SED concern relating to its position within the 
Bloc is shown by the stress placed on economic cooperation. Economic 
integration has been a major theme of the SED under both Ulbricht and 
Honecker. Planning in the Comecon states has been one manifestation 
of this policy and the current policy calls for emphasis on long-range 
and complex planning among the member nations. The GDR has been 
especially active in the development of mathematical models to guide 
Comecon planning. 75 The creation of joint enterprises and institutes 
has been an additional manifestation of the SED's economic policy. By 
1974 there were thirty-two such examples of "socialist integration in 
action" in East Germany. While most of these involved joint efforts of 
the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR, Rumania, Hungary, and 
1 · 1 . 76 Bu gar1a were a so actlve. 
East German attacks on Red China during the time of Honecker's 
control of the SED have further advanced the GDR's status as an 
75Wirtschaftswissenschaft, No.8, 1973, pp. 1176-1189. Quoted in 
ABSEES, Vol. V, No.1, 1974, pp. 155-156. 
76Horizont, No. 41, 1974, p. 9. 
en.thusiastic proponent of Soviet domination of the international 
cQmmwlist movement. East German officials and publications h~ve 
continually denounced China's international.activities in.general as 
well as the character of Peking's relations with Moscow. In August, 
1~7l, for example the East Berlin daily Berliner Zeitung criticized 
Chinese activitie~ in ~he Balkans, charging that such activities were 
being conducted t'lith the active support of the United States. The 
Chinese leadership, according to the account, was guilty of big power 
chauvinism .and was behaving ina manner hostile to ,the interests of 
peace. 77 East German, charges have concentrated on Chinese-American 
relations, especially since the improvement ,in these relations ,became 
ob~ious. As .the time for President Nixon's trip to China neared, the 
GDR attacks intensified. Not only was China depicted as, aiding ·the 
cause of ,imperialism, but, according to Neues,Deutschland, it had 
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actually begun "coordinated co~lusion with the chief force of reaction 
in ,the world .•.. " The result, t~e SED paper charged, could only be 
described as a "monstrous" situation in.which the .Chinese were seeking 
78 
"to anticipate every wish of the Nixon government." Speaking in, 
Leipzig on MarchIO, 1972, Honecker added to the charges by declaring 
that Peking shared responsibility for the increased American bombing 
attacks on North Vietnam because of its refusal to issue a strong 
d . f h . 79 con ernnat~on 0 t e act~on. In this respect, the Honecker policy 
77Berliner Zeitung, August 20, 1971, p. 1. 
78 ND, January 22, 1972, p. 3. 
79 Honecker, p. 308. 
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differs ,greatly from ~hat of Ulbricht who refused to join in the Bloc 
attacks on Red China during his last. years. 
Attacks on Red China ~ve occasionally been linked with criticism 
of West Germany. On October 11, 1972, a "Voice of the GDR" commentary 
charged that the improvement in West German~Chinese.relations signalled 
an alliance between Bonn and Peking for the purpose of permitting the 
FRG to secure Chinese.markets. China, for its part, was.depictedas 
attempting to join with forces. in th~ Federal Republic in or~er to 
disrupt the process of·detente. The FRG'sestablishrnent of relations. 
with China was· declared to be absolute proof of Chinese treachery.80 
Finally, Honecker's call.for a new international communist meeting 
was coupled with an attack on the Chinese. Declaring the need for 
fighting against distortions. of Marxism-Leninism, Honecker described 
Maoism as·the open enemy of the world communist movement and the 
nat~onal liberation movement. The Chinese, he continu~d, h~d made 
common cause with the most.reactionary forces intheir.efforts to 
81 
oppose the development of detente. Such a conference, should it come 
about, could once again. be used in the continuing Soviet effort to 
secure a formal condemnation of the Red Chinese, something the USSR has 
repeatedly failed to do. The. GDR's assistance.in this effort,would 
undoubtedly endear Honecker and his associates to the Kremlin. If a 
conference should materialize and meet with some success, it is 
SOSWB, October 13, 1972, EE/4117/A3/2. 
8lND, May 23, 1974, p. 1. 
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reasonable to conclude that the GDR would gain credit from the USSR, 
credit that it might hope to apply toward its more pressing international 
problems in the future. 
It requires little imagination to anticipate what use the GDR might 
wish to make of any credit it might build up in the Kremlin. Its 
ability to actually use the credit for the desired purpose could be 
anotller and more difficult matter. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable 
to conclude that the GDR's position is uncomfortable in an era of 
detente. The origins and development of the East German regime have 
contributed to a political heritage which makes acceptance of detente 
difficult for the SED leadership. In discussing the development of 
totalitarian systems, Friedrich A. Hayek, writing in 1944, commented 
that an enemy is an indispensable requisite of a totalitarian leader-
h . 82 s lp. While the traditional concept of totalitarianism has been 
subject to some skepticism in recent years, its applicability to the 
GDR regime of the 1950's is beyond question. The fact that the citizens 
of East Germany passed directly from the Hitler dictatorship into a 
Communist dictatorship makes the totalitarian concept especially 
applicable to their case. Their experience with constant harangues 
about enemies, internal and external, can be traced back to 1933. Under 
Hitler the enemy was the international Jew. With the creation of the 
Soviet Zone of Germany in 1945, the theme was continued with a new enemy, 
82Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1944), p. 139. 
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West~rn imperialism, which had b~en a frequent subject o~ Hitler's 
discourses as well. The personification of.the enemy.was West Germany 
mo~e than any oth~r state. The Communist regime in East. Germany b~came 
accustomed to tension from its very first years. Whi,le the emphasis on 
such.tension is not nearly as great under Honecker as it was under 
Ulbricht, it still remains. In the absence of a sense of , national 
identity~ the sense of confrontation.served a unifying purpose and 
helped to stabilize the regime. The SED found· secu~ity through 
confrontation and the need for confrontatiQn continues today. Detente 
has a potentially destabilizing effect by virtue of.the expectations 
that it arouses. It leads people to anticipate change after years of 
indoctrination that change would never,come. East Germany is.not alo~e 
in. the Bloc in its vulnerability to deten~e. Eyen the Soviet Union 
itself has had to face this uncertainty regarding the new policy. But, 
as Gerhard Wettig has written recently inOsteuropa, the .Soviet Union 
has sought to develop the ideological and institutional structures that 
could neutralize the politically psychological effect thai; could result, 
83 from detente and c09peration between.East and West. However, Ea~t· 
German vulnerability is much greater than that of the USSR. The SED's 
repeated reaffirmations of· the need for a c~osed frontier illustrate .. 
this~ The point was, effectively made in March, 1972 by the ,SED 
newspaper Leipziger Vo1kszeitung when it printed a cornmen1;~ry warning 
against illusions th~t the frontier. with the ,FRG could be opened.because 
83Gerhard Wettig, "Sowj et Politik zur Westeuropa" ("Soviet Policy 
Towards Western. Europe"), Osteuropa, No.· 7, 1974, pp. 852-8~3. 
of detente. The' suggestion of.open frontiers was ,described as "far 
removed from political reality.,,~4 Warning against ,ideological 
disarmament serve tne sa~e purpose. In a word, the enemy is.still. 
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there, according to the SED. The fact that the.SED so obvious~y feels 
a need for an enemy demonstrates the insecurity and even in~tabili~y of 
the regime. This is not to deny the existence of a yery real rival in 
the Federal Republic. The point is that the ho~til~ty and aggression 
that the SED attributes to its West ~erman rival ,are exaggerated. 
Security, however, as seen by the SED, requires such exaggeration and 
dictates that the SED oppose detente, as Ulbricht successfully did for 
sometime. The alliance with the USSR~ on the other hand, now calls for 
s~pport for detente ,in view of current Soviet policy. The USSR obvio~sly 
had its way and Honecker replaced Ulbricht. The GDR's policy became 
more favorable to detente and even included West Ger.many as an object 
of that policy. However, East Ge~many's instability remains and t4e SED 
can.be expect~d to offer its Soviet ally a considerable amount of very 
cautious advice on how to proceed with detente, especially where it 
concerns the FRG. 
Honecker, of course, lacks the seniority that Ulbricht enjoyed and. 
can certainly not wield the influence that his successor.must have been 
able to exercise in dealings with the Kremlin. Yet, it is ,possible that 
Honecker might try to use whatever credit he can gain with the Soviet 
leadership in order to e~ther sabotage or at least slow down detente. 
84SWB , March 8, 1972, EE/3934/AI/4. 
The. Soviet Union, however, can~generallr be expected to push the·GDR 
into line When it appears.on the verge of straying too far afield. 
Possibly, the enthusiastic support of detente being voiced,by the GDR 
in May, 1974, which contrasted with the much weaker s\lpport in April, 
may have resulted from Soviet press~re in the wake.of the Guillaume 
affair. As a result of ,the exposure of Brandt's close personal aide, 
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Gunte~ Guillaume, as an East Gei'1llan spy, it became known that the GDR's 
State Security Service had been sending considerable ,numbers of agents 
into the FRG since the early 1950's in an effort to infiltrate the West 
German government. Guillaume, who was only one of several such "plants" 
who had reached fairly important posts. in the Bonn government, had 
evidently been aiding the GDR's agents in an attempt to blackmail Brandt 
as a result of an affair he had with an East German.woman. 85 The 
Kremlin may have feared that detente in Germany could suffer as a result 
of the exposure of the GDRls intensive espionage efforts in the FRG 
unless Honecker adopted a particularly accommodating attitude ,in the 
wake of the affair. The Russians.may actua~ly have s~spected.that the 
East Germans were trying to sabotage detente by the activities of their 
Security Service. The question of.the increased minimum exchange quota 
for persons visiting the GDR illustrated the extent of the SED's shift. 
Until early in the spring of 1974, East Germany assumed an unco~promising 
stance on the issue, making its refusal to alter the rates very clear to 
West .Ber1in negotiators. However, in an interview on May 30, Honecker 
85Berliner Morgenpost, April 28, 1974, p. 37. 
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said that the requisite de9isions "will be taken by our side," clearly 
implying that the issue was.not closed after all as all GDR spokesmen 
had b t ' I' 86 Th' 1 d 'h h GDR' d een s ress~ng ear 1er. ~s, coup e w~t .t e s new an very 
optimistic comments· on detente, could be evidence of Soviet pressure on 
the East Ge~mans to prove their goodwill after t~e exposure of, the GDR's 
espionage efforts in the FRG. 
Does the selection of Honecker seem to have benefited the Soviet 
Union? As far as events up to this time are concerned, the answer.must. 
be an unqualified "yes." The East German press and the new.First 
Secretary have given strong public support to detente with West Germany 
and West Berlin. The GORIs support of Moscow's authority within the. 
world Communist movement, support which has been illustrate~ by 
Honecker's call for an international meeting, is further evi~ence of 
the wisdom of the USSR's support for Honecker. The changed emphasis 
in the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland provides further evidence of the 
wisdom of the Soviet move in 1971. Whereas under Ulbricht, the paper 
had become preoccupied with cataloging the sins of of West Germany and. 
devoted most of its foreign news coverage to stories about the .FRG, 
after Ulbricht Neues Deutschland began to stress news about the Soviet 
Union and to ignore the Federal Republic. The abs~nce of any claims of 
uniqueness for the East German path to Communism and initiation of 
polemics against Maoism must also please Moscow. The SED und~r Honecker 
has also improved relations with Yugoslavia, something which Ulbricht 
86UInterview: Granted by Erich Honecker to the US News Agency," p. 9. 
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had been reluctant to do in spite of , the USSR's rapproachment with Tito. 
As mentioned earlier, the GDR has become themost.faithful of Mowcow's 
allies once·again. The replacement of Ulbricht by Erich Honecker 
certainly helped make this development possi~le and thereby contributed 
to the strengthening of the USSR's East European position. 
Yet, the future remains open to some question. The disputes over 
the misuse of the transitrout~s and the sale of GDR currency in West 
Berlin and West German banks could easily be used to disrupt the .process 
of detente if the SED felt itself in a position to sabotage the USSR's 
policies toward the West. Disputes over. the GDR's handling of traffic 
to West Berlin were continuing through. the fall of 1974 as East German 
officials delayed transit traffic up to thirty hours. 87 Incidents such 
as this and the disputes over the price of lignite and the arrangement~ 
for sewage disposal could erupt into major confrontations given.the 
proper combination of circumstances. Disagreements over the German 
transl~tion of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin could also serve as 
a pretext for a confrontation between East and West over.Berlin. The 
issue of the nature of. the FRG'sties to West Berlin also could cause 
an.incident between the GDR and West.Germany. The exact nature of. those 
ties has yet to be df?termined. The English version of "ties" implied 
social tie~ as well as communication ties while the Russian word for 
"ties" implied only communication. Some Western scholars believe that 
the issue has been clarified to the extent.that the USSR will accept 
87Berliner Morgenpost, October 20, 1974, p. 1. 
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social as well as communication ties,88 however, it seems most likely 
that the issue will be resolved through,practice rather than further 
agreements or formal efforts at interpretation. The ab~ence of specific 
guidelines for establishing what shall be considered proper West Berlin-
FRG ties makes the prospects for disagreement particularly good. The 
controversy over alleged "agent-hunting:! by West Germany,could also 
provide fuel for future disputes with the GOR. The SED has already 
commented on the ability of this "contemptible campaign" to disturb the 
normalization of relations with the FRG. 89 Furthermore, a,change of, 
power in the Kremlin might enable ,Honecker to improve his status and 
the~eby his ability to veto those moves toward detente which could 
affect the GDR's policy toward West Berlin. In this event, the, SED 
might disrupt the movement toward detente. 
In sum, while the Soviet Union can take a considerable amount of 
satisfaction in developments since Honecket's election as First Secretary, 
the ,future iS,by no means secure. While the ,Soviet Union would likely 
desire a more stable and secure East German regime" the development of 
such a regime could encourage Honecker to become more independent. 
Ironically, the dependence that is a product of the GDRls instability 
also contributes to the maintenance of the GDR as a more malleable 
Soviet ally. In any event, the GDR could not indefinitely cripple 
88Gunther Doeker, Klaus Melsheimer, and Dieter Schroder, "Berlin 
and the Quadripartite Agreement of 1!;)71," American Journal.of 
International Law, Vol. 67, No.1, 1973, p. 59. 
89ND , May 2, 1974, p. 2. 
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Soviet efforts at maintaining detente "wi;th West ,Genn~ny and West Ber:lin. 
However, the East Germans ,could make the maintenance of So~iet policies 
toward the FRG and West Berlin much more difficult and costly in terms 
of ,concessions the Soviets might have to make toward East Germany. 
CHAPTER IV 
EAST GERMAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ITS EFFECT 
ON THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE 
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES 
A recent development in the field of international relations has 
been the effort to examine linkages betwe~n foreign and domestic. 
policies. Dealing primarily with Western democracies, work.in this area 
has been advanced in the last decade by Richard C. Snyder, Wolfram F. 
Hanrieder, James N. Rosenau and others. Such an examination for East 
Germany is· certain to be much more difficult than in the .case . of an open 
society. However, an examination of the linkages between domestic and 
fOl'eign policies in the GDR would surely aid in understanqing the 
presen1;: situation regarding the SED's policy to\~ard West .Berlin as .well . 
as possible future developments~ It should also c1al;'ify the question of 
the re1ationshiR between GDR domestic policies and the .West Berlin 
policy in terms of trends that may be common in both policies. In 
addition, it could facilitate a determination of the compatibility of 
the SED's policies on foreign and domestic matters. This chapter will 
be devoted to an effort to examine the pres.ent relationship between. 
domestic developments and foreign policy problems, specifically the West 
Berlin issue, in th~ GDR today, 
In his recent book, Between Two Ages, Zbigniew Brzezinski makes the 
observation that the foreign policy of.a Communist state, ci~ing the 
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Soviet example, is affected by the domestic needs of the Communist Party 
to demonstrate visible ,successes in order to enhance its prestige anq 
reinforce faith in its legitimacy. That is, a cqmmunist party rules by 
virtue of its monopoly of truth and is therefore required to prove ,that 
it retains legitimacy by bringing glory to the state,that it governs. 1 
In a similar context, other authors have discuss~d the funct,ion performed 
by the ~rxist-Leninist ideology in the area of foreign policy and 
concluded, as Vernon Aspaturian has, tha,t there is a direct ,ideological 
. t f' l' 2 I th t b k W If F H . d ~mpac on ore~gn po ~cy. n ano er recen 00, 0 ram • anr~e er 
discusses the impact of the domestic political system on West German 
foreign policy during the period up to 1970 and concludes that FRG 
foreign policy was., affected by both, internal and external influences. 3 
Considering political systems in general, Karl W. Deutsch has 
hypothesized that the crucial element in a consideration of the, 
relationship between foreign anq domestic policies is the "linkage 
group" which he describes as a "group with links to the domestic system 
and with some particular links to the international or foreign input." 
Such a group, Deutsch writes, becomes more susceptible ,to the inputs 
1Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: Viking Press, 
1970), pp. 77-84. 
Zvernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Policy in World Politics, edited by Roy C. Macridis (Englewood, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 165. 
3Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable ,Crisis (New Xork: Harper ,and 
ROW, 1970), p. 130. 
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fromabro~d if its ties to the domes~ic system are weakened,4 In short, 
th~re are numerous works affirming that there is an interaction between 
foreign policy and domes~ic policy. This mutually affective r~lationsbip 
seems to exist in botl:L communist and noncommunist states. This:chapter 
will attempt to demonstrate t4is proposition by.an examination of, 
first, the. current official GDR view on reunificatiqn of .the two 
Germanies a~d the SED's analysis of·recent history relating to a ,sense 
of E~st German nat~onal consciousness, second, th~ sort of society the 
SED envisions for the GDR, and, third, the ,methods which are being 
employed in an .. effort to accomplish the constructio~ of a. "sociali~t 
Ge:rmany." An evaluation of the consequences of the answers. to the above 
questions for East German foreign policy in gener~l and for the handl~ng 
of the West Berlin issue in particular will conclu4e the chapter .. 
While the crucial point drawn from the stucij.es mentioned above is 
that domesticpolitic~ in a communist state affect and are affected by 
foreign policy considerations, the fact that we are dealing with a 
German,speaking state should not be neglected. This circumstance·has 
had a perverse bearing on East.German po~itics in that. the SED has been 
faced with the proble~ of establishing a feeling that th~ GDR is a 
sepsrate German state and not simply a temporarily estranged appendage· 
of the Federal Republic. The communist leadership in East Berlin 
demonstrated i't;s awareness of the problem of creating a sense of 
4Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal B~havior of 
States," Approaches to Comparative and Internatiqnal Politics, edited 
by Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 
pp.12-13. 
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natio~al identity with the GDR by relying upon confrontat~on with the 
West in order to foster unity among i~s population. As Melvin Croan 
wrote in late 1971, 
Th~ regime has grown accustomed to tension under the 
present leadership, as it had under Ulbricht, and,probably 
still needs a degree of tension in,the absence·of,a durable. 
sense of national identity that it has not been able to 
manufacture in this relatively short period of time by 
methods that have been essentially those of compulsion. 5 
The question of the necessity for confrontation and the degree of 
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tension required, as well as the prospects for replacing confrontation 
as,a substitute for national·identi~y, represent importan~ concern~ in 
evaluating domestic affairs in East Germany today. The belief that the 
type of society the SED seeks for East Germany and the metho4s that are 
to be used to create such a society will affect the GORIs foreign policy 
is a basic assumption of the following analysis. 
II • ONE GERMANY OR TWO? 
A consideration of the question of the development of the GDR as a 
separate German state raises the issue of nation-bui~ding or natio~alism, 
something the SED cannot avoid in its effort·to delimit East Germany 
from the FRG. While there is no precise and acceptable definit~on of 
the term in qu~stion, Boyd C. Shafer has formulated a list of beliefs, 
that are associated with the idea of the nation., An examinatio~ of the 
beliefs he presents illustrates the problems facing the SED throughout 
5Melvin,Croan in Eastern Europe in the Seventies~ edited ,by Sy1ya 
Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and Peter C. Ludz (New York: Praeger, 1972), 
p. 245.' ' 
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the recent years. There seems to.be little serious question about,the 
definition of the territory encompassed by the GDR, the common. cultural 
char~cteristics of the ,nation, t4e common dominant social instit~tions, 
or the .10veor esteem for fellow nationals present in the GDR. Nor can 
it .be .denied that East Germany has a separa~e government. There is 
probably even a.be1ief in a common history, although the interpretation 
of that history might cause some controversy. The fact that this 
his.tory .is.a1so common to the Federal Republic is another. problem. 
However, the remaining be1iefs.enumerated by Shafer cannot be readily 
assumed. to have been present in the GDR during most of its history. A 
devotion to the GDR as an entity, a common pride in the achievements of 
the nation, a hostility to those groups· threatening the GDRls separate 
existence,. and a hope that the nation will have a. great and. glorious, 
future are all elements seen as lacking in East Germany at various times 
since the establishment of a separate state in the Sovie~ Zone. 6 While. 
these elements may not be so visibly scarce in the GDR today, th~y are 
still points.on which proof is frequently insufficient. In short, of 
the ten beliefs enumerated by Shafer, at least five are or have been 
in doubt in the East German case. In his analysis of nat~on-bui1ding, 
Ivo D. Duchacek stresses the importance of national spirit which is 
described as a "glorification of past achievements" in order to help 
overcome the lack of a sense of identity. The SED's efforts in this 
6Boyd C. Shafer, "Toward a Definition of Nationalism," in 
Nationalism and Inte.rnationa1 Progress, edited by Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 4-5. 
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regard will be considered shortly and demonstrate the regime's awareness 
of the importance of.history. Duchacek observes that the natio~alist 
emphasis on.past.g1ories and experiences is often ,mixed with intolerance. 
or a supercilious attitude toward other nations or races!7 This 
attitude has been.used with success by many leaders, Ne~u, for example, 
and: has contributed to development of a natio~al sp,irit. However, 
because of the GD~'s position as a member of the Soviet Bloc, such 
techniques are denied the East German-leadership. 
The importance attached to the concepts of nation-building and 
national spirit :;hould not be minimized. According to R .. M. MacIver, 
individuals realize themselves fully only as part of society. It is . 
to society that they owe their "existence, their nurture, the~r 
equipment, their habits, their thought-ways, their opportunities, 
their homes, their.al1." A developed state must consist of more than 
sec~e frontiers and a capital city, according to MacIver. It must be, 
in MacIver's words, "a greater unity to which they can devote themselves .. 
and which gives greater dignity, greater purpose, grea~er meaning to 
t~eir lives.,,8 The task for the SED has been more than one of , securing 
frontiers, developing the economy, and insuring the GDR's place within 
the Bloc. National consciousness, while difficult to measure, is 
clearly more than the sum total of the physical.attrihutes of,a state. 
7Iyo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 
Winston, 1971), pp. 54-55. 
8· R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Free Press, 
1965), pp. 305-306. 
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The· SED's nation-building problem has been complicated by the fact 
that East Germany was·. created as a result of the partition of the Third 
Reich. Not.on1y did the partition meet with the ,resistan~e of the GDR's 
popu1atiQn which resented being arbitrarily separated from friends and 
relatives in Western Germany, bU,t it also nec~ssitate4 a restructur~ng 
of a preexisting society. The typical underdeveloped nat~on f~ces,a 
problem of creating unity but the SED had to destroy a sense of unity 
between its part of Germany and the rest of the dismembered Reich. 
After the ,destruction of one sens~ of unity, the ,SED then had to provide 
an alternative national consciousness. In his study of.partition, 
Ray E. Johnston has raised several questions relating to,·;the·effects 
of.partition on the domestic patterns of a country. In so doing, he 
considers the relationship between partition and domestic ,changes, 
implying by his questions that th~ relationship may be direct in many 
cases.
9 Certainly, the GDR would seem to be such a c~se in vie~ of the 
necessary restructuring of society after 1945. This would illustrate 
the interaction between foreign and domestic po1icie~ in the East German 
case. 
The first question relating to nation-building for the SED in its 
efforts to create a sense of national identity was the issue of 
reunification. The intentions of the USSR in the first years after the 
conclusion of the war are difficult to determine and apparently the 
matter of reunification remained open for more than a decade. As 
9 Ray E. Johnston, "Partition as.a Political Instr~ent,"Journa1 of 
Il)ternationa1 Affairs, Vol. 27, No.2, 1973, pp. 170-172. 
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recently as 1957, the USSR officia~ly favored a plan for an alliance ,of 
the two German states in an independent, nonaligned confederation.10 As 
l,ong as tl:Le continued existence of the GDR as a separate s~ate .. remained: 
an unresolved,question, the SED's efforts to generate enthusiasm for 
identification with theGDR faced considerable difficulties. The 
erection of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent closing off of all major 
aven~es for escape from the GDR undoubtedly did much to convinGe the 
East German population tha~ they, must resign themselves to a ,permanent 
separate German state in the East. 
Official East Germ~n st8.tements today leave ,no d01.,lbt as to the 
permanent and separate character of the ,GDR. The official view was 
succinctly stated by Fritz Selbmann, a veteran Eas.t German communist, 
before theGDR Cultural ~eague Presidium Council in Janua~y, 1973. 
We believed and hoped . . . that fo~ years after 1945 the 
possibility existed of creating a great popular movement in. 
Germany which would enable us to preserve the unity o~ the 
nation. In the meantime, Germany has now been definitely 
split into two,states. ll 
The affirmation of a permanent, separate German state is reinforced in 
a variety of ways. The most obvious--and deadly--is by the maintenance 
of one of the ,world's most heavily guarded frontiers. However, in 
addition to this, and possibly of more lasting significance, are the 
Abgrenzung policy, a fervent emphasis on history, and a theoretical 
explanation of what makes a nation. 
lOB. Ponomaryov,editor, History of,Sov~et Foreign Policy 1945-1970 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp. 364··365. 
llNeue Deutsche.Literatur, No.6, 1973, pp. 7-8. 
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The' East "German th~oretical explanation of the basis of a state 
cQncedes that there ,are certain principles entering into the defin,ition 
of the nation. Suc~ considerations a~ culture, language, psychology, 
history, and,homogenous state territory are among these most frequently 
cited. However, while these tradi~ional elements are seen as of some 
importance, they are criticised as being too emotional and idealistic 
rathe~ than objective. The actual content and character of the ,nation 
is" accqrding to Alfr~d Kosing and Walter Sclunidt of the Institute for 
Social Sciences of the ,SED Centr~l Committee, determined primarily by 
the "prevailing economic foundations of the ,society, the class, 
relationships, and the historical actions of the classes. 
These, in ,their entirety, are said to h~ve the capability of integrating 
the .GDR population into a higher form,of national community. The people, 
according to this formulation, will be drawn together to form a stronger 
social unit and help prepare for a higher developmental phase of the, 
communist society. 
The East Germans do not attempt to deny the ,obvious ethnic 
similarities between themselves and the ,West Germans. They simply 
assert.that the ethnic elements of any nation are constantly changing 
and that the two Germanies are going in opposite directiol1s. A new 
socialist national ,consciousness is developing in the GDR which is 
changing the ethnic and sociopsychological components, of East German" 
l2Alfred Kosing and Walter Sclunidt, "Zur Herausbilding der 
socialistischen Nation in der DDR" (liOn the Cultural 'Policy of the 
Socialist Nation in the GDR"), Einheit, No.2, February, 1974, p. l8~. 
152 
natiol1al life through new economic, social, political, and i<;leological 
conditions. I3 The society,which is emerging, they say, will_have very 
little in.common with capitalist German society. Therefore, there can. 
be no future convergence of the GDR with the .FRG in spite of continui~g 
West German insistence on the unity of the entire German nation. Whil~ 
East and· West Germany have a,cornmon historical past, they no l~nger have 
a cornmon present or future. The unified German.nation is 'declared to be 
a relic of the historical past, rather than a hope for the future. 
While the stress in the past used tO,be on the possible unity of.the two 
stat~s after a proletarian revolution in the FRG, GD~ authorities today 
emphasize that even this should not be taken for granted. According to 
Kosing and Schmidt, 
The qu~stion of whether later, when the working class in 
theFRG, united with all workers, has achieved the 
transformation of society and the nation, a unified socialist 
nation can arise, will be decided by history if the necessary 
conditions for it have matured. 14 
This vie~ was.emp~sized even more authoritatively by the ~evisions in 
the .GDR Constitution in 1974. Whereas the Ulbricht,constitution, of 1968 
affirmed the unity of the nation under a future communist leadership and 
declared that the GDR was "a sociali~t state of the ,German nation," the 
new Honecker constitution simply designates the GDR as a "socialist 
15 
state.of workers and.farmers." 
l3Ibid ., pp. 183-185. 
14 Ibid ., p. 185. 
l5Neues Detttschiand; September 28, 1974, p. 3. (Hereafter noted 
as ND.) 
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The picture presented by the SED is one in which the GDR is being 
drawn further and further away from the world of the capitalist FRG and 
. 
integrated ever more closely \'I1i th the states of the Soviet Bloc. As 
Fritz Selbmann declared, East Germany and West Germany are "integrated 
16 into two completely opposing and antagonistic world systems." In the 
future, the GDR population will be experiencing an "increasing unity of 
thought, will, and action" with its Eastern allies and, consequently, 
will be well on its way to becoming part of an international community 
of socialist states and thus losing much of the separate identity that 
;t t d 17 
... possesses 0 aYe When this process is completed, the GDR will have 
converged with its socialist neighbors and any talk of convergence or 
reunification with West Germany will be obviously pointless. The 
culmination of this process will bring the creation of the national 
identity sought by the SED. The further development of mature socialism 
and its gradual transition to communism are said to increase the specific 
importance of the international "without crowding out or even displacing 
the national." The East German population will simply see itself and 
its state differently. New historical values will have been adopted 
which will "determine the thinking of men" and give the "socialist 
national consciousness of the GDR its international character. II18 
16Neue Deutsche Literatur, No.6, 1973, pp. 7-8. 
l7Kosing and Schmidt, pp. 186-187. 
18 . Ibid., pp. 186-188. 
I~ summary, as Politburo member Hermann Axen explained in June, 
1973, the 'charac~er of a nation is determined above ,all by its social 
or class content and the class content of the nation is determined by 
the political power,of the working class. 19 The traditional concer~s 
for language, culture, and a common.historical past are secondary and 
pale in comparison to these ideologically motivat~d considerations. 
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Accordingly, the GDR and the FRG are being drawn apart an4 the prospects 
for reunification are steadily diminishing. A logical concomitant of 
this assertion is the policy of Abgrenzung initiated by Walter Ulbricht 
as a means of effecting the .final demarcation of the two German states. 
However, while Ulbricht viewed this delimitation as end~ring only until 
the coming of a socialist revolution in the FRG, the Honecker regime, 
as indicated by the revisions in the GDR Constitution, may well regard 
it as eternal. 
The importance of the Abgrenzung or demarcation policy was clearly 
reflected in. Walter Ulbricht's announcement in January, 1971, that the 
"ever stronger State demarcation".between the GDR and the FRG would be 
the theme of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the SED in April of that 
20 year. An East German statement in April praised the policy of 
demarcation as an 
. Unmistakable rebuff to all speculation by West 
Germanmonopoly.rulers and their ideologies abou~ making 
the socialist economy of the GDR dependent on the monopoly-
capitalist economy of the FRG and linking them even more 
19Hermann Axen, The Development of the Socialist Nation in.the GDR 
(Dresden: Verll:lg Zeit im BUd, 1973), pp. 16-17. 
20ND , January 14, 1971, p. 1. 
• 
closely on the pretext of an alleged nonexistenc;e of.class 
differences. in the scientific-technical revolution and 
teaching about the "convergen~e" of the social system~.2l 
ISS 
After the conclusion of the Eighth SED Congress .. in th~ spring of 1971, 
Neues Deutschland editorialized that the antagonisms between socialism 
and imperialism were "unbridgeable." Therefore, it continued, objective. 
developments were. certain to lead the .FRG and the GDR even ,further apart 
so the demarcation between the two states "in all spheres of life should 
become more and more far-reaching.,,22 According to a resolution of the 
SED Congress, such a process was·. at that time taking place between the 
GDR d · . hb 23 an kts western nekg or. 
The precise ~eaning of this process.is difficult to determine, but 
it is possible to note.three distinct meanings that; have been imparted 
to the term Abgrenzung in practice. The first is related directly to 
the national question discussed above and concerns a process of 
separation of the GDR from the FRG by creating in, the GDR a society that 
differs radically from that of West Germany. This conception involves 
the creation of a gulf between the two states that is not physical but 
political and social.' In discussing this meaning of the Abgrenzung 
policy in 1973 the SED journal for Party life, Neuer Weg, declared that 
a "clear boundary between the socialist GDR and the capitalistic FRG" 
2l BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 28, 1971, EE/3669/Al/3. 
(Hereafter noted as SWB.) 
22ND, June 22, 1971, p. 1. 
23 Documents on the 8th Congress of the SED (Dresden: Verlag Zeit 
im Bild, 1971), p. 9 •. 
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ha~ been created by E~st Germany's socioeconomic.stru~tur~, policy, and 
ideology. Opposite value criteria and ideologies, the journal argued, 
had done. the most to cOl1tribute to the demarcation of the GDR from West 
Germany.24 The overall effort of the .SED to create a.socia1ist national 
culture in the GDR is predicated on the ass~mption of a need to separate. 
East Germany from the FRG in a meaningful, permanent manner. Progress 
in this endeavor was noted by a resolution of the .Eight,h SED Congress in 
1971. 25 
The second manifestation of the policy of Abgrenzung is an outgrowth, 
of the first. This is the intense ideological confrontation between 
socialism and capitalism. A basic assumption of this policy is the 
belief that the West is heightening the ideological struggle against 
the .Eastand t~t the attack.on the East is assuming a variety o~ new 
and subtle forms. This assumption is not seen as.contradicting the. 
process of normalization of relations between states with differing 
social systems. The. argument is simply that such normalization of. 
relations does not put an end to the contradictions which already 
existed between socialism and capitalism. These contradictions, we 
are told, are now sharpening because the capitalists, in a mood of 
desperation, are intensifying their ideological attacks in order to 
reverse the process of normalization which is said to be,contributing 
to the final destruction of many of the myths of the imperialists. 
24 Neuer Weg, Vol. 28, No. 22, 1973, p. 23. 
25 Documents of the 8th SED Congress, p. 21. 
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Thus, in order to make the process of normalization irreversible, the 
SED leadership says that it now places "the greatest value on the 
intensification of the political-ideological education of the ,members 
of the socialist society." Ideological work has become the "principal 
content.of our political activity, as the most important lever with 
which to raise our fighting strength.,,26 Western talk about the "free 
flow of, ideas" across, the GDR frontier is. denounced by East German 
authorities as evidence of the intensity of the'ideological assault 
against the GDR. A "Voice of the GDR" commentary in August, 197.2, 
dismissed the demand for a free flow of ideas as nothing less than an 
ff E G '1' t . 11' 27 e ort to spy on ast erman m~ ~ ary 1nsta at10ns. 
The importance attached to the controversy over the concept of the 
nation can be seen much more clearly in the context ofthis.intense 
ideological confrontation. Hermann Axen clarified the connection when 
he denounced the idea of a."national community" formed by the FRG and 
the GDRas a major element of the FRG's ideological war against East 
Germany. According to Axen, this dispute over the exact nature of,the 
nation was "much more t.han an a.cademic dispute." It is, he argued, a 
dispute about."fundamental political and.ideological questions.,,28 
Recent East German concern over the proper study of history, 
especially by its youth, is also a reflection of the SED's preoccupation 
26Horizont, Vol. 7, No.6, 1974, p. 2. 
27 SWB, August 22, 1972, EE/4072/Al/l. 
28Axen, pp. 23-24. 
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with an ideological confrontation. The creation of a "socialist 
historical consciousness" has been described as an. "important 
ideological task" and the only way in which an understanding of the way 
in which the "German monopolist bourgeoisie" .betrayed the German working 
people can be gained. Without such an understanding, ideological ,defeat 
is .seen as much more likely in the confrontatiQn with opposing 
ideologies. 29 Honecker used the 450th anniversary of the German 
Peasants' War as an occasion to stress the. importance of a class 
approach to the study of history. In discussing the eyents of the 
Peasants' War, th~ SED First Secretary stated that the ideological 
foundations of the GDR actually dated back to the revolutionary demands 
that were expressed during that war. 30 While the legitimacy of his 
statement is subject to question, he is clearly attempting to demonstrate 
continuity between the GDR and significant events in German history. 
The East German educational system is geared to accomplish the sort of 
instruction that will make the lessons of history clear to the GDR's 
youth. The primary emphasis is on teaching history from a c1ass.point 
of view in order to teach students regarding the place of their society 
'G h' 31 1n erman 1story. Under the integrated educational system of the 
29Helmut Meier, "Sozialistisches Geschischtsbewusstsein in Unserer 
Zeit" ("Socialist Historical Consciousness in Our Time"), Einheit, 
No.6, June, 1973, p. 711. 
30ND , November 10, 1973, p. 10. 
31Erhard Scherner, Kultur and Kunste in der DDR (Culture and Art, 
in the GDR) (Berlin, GDR: Staatssekretariat fur westdeutsche Fragen, 
1970), pp. 36-37. 
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GDR, students receive their first formal lessons in history in the fifth 
grade with one hour a week devoted to such instruction. In the sixth 
year this is increased to two hours per week and in the seventh year an 
additional hour of civics is added. This three hours a week of 
instruction in areas of either pure history of history-related subjects· 
is one of the largest concentrations of the week. Only poly technical 
training, mathematics, and German receive more time while the study of 
Russian receives equal time. 32 East German authorities do not attempt 
to deny the political orientation of their educational system. They 
proudly observe that their consciously political education demonstrates 
that they have drawn the proper lessons from history.33 
The third manifestation of the policy of Abgrenzung is the securing 
of the GDR frontier with West Germany and West Berlin. In discussing 
the concept of state sover:eignty, the GDRI S Professor Peter Alfons 
Steiniger explained that the principles of inviolability and territorial 
integrity were basic derivatives of that concept. According to Professor 
Steiniger, this meant that the frontiers were to be protected against 
both military assault and other forms of international intervention as 
well. He cited the example of Nazi intervention against Austria in 1938 
to illustrate how phrases such as "self-determination of the 
German nation," frequently used by Bonn officials, could be misused. 34 
32He1mut Klein and Wolfgang Reischock, Bildungfur heute und morgen 
(Education for Today and Tomorrow), Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1973), 
p. 18. 
33Yb "d 
... 1. ., pp. 33-34. 
34Horizont, Vol. 6, No. 38, 1973, p. 4. 
Neues Deutschland added "freedom of movement" tq the list of those 
concepts suoject to aouse in such a way as to ~io1ate the sovereignty 
of the GDR while avoiding the outright use of force. 35 While the 
escapee proo1em faced bY,the East German authorities in recent years 
is not nearly as great as in the past (some 6,450 escaped in 1973),36 
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it was evidently enough to c~use concern about the security of the ,GDR 
borders with West Berlin and West Germany. According to W~stern 
accounts, in early 1973 the GDR state, frontie~ with the ,FRG consisted, 
of a double oarbed wire fence with a length of 836 kilometers, a series 
of spring-gun installations stretching 79 kilometers, mine fields 
running for 750 ki1ometers.with an estimated 1.7 million mines, 540 
observation towers, 936 bunkers, 517 dogs, and 109 light barriers. 37 
Yet" the~e was evidently official dissatisfactio~ with these 
ins,tallations and the manner in which they were operated. Late in 
the summer of 1973 there ,was a major reorganization of the ,border troops, 
which brought greater centralization in command over the border units. 
The ,eleven bo~der brigades were placed under four operational commands 
with each under direction of a major general and with a lieutenant 
general in charge of the entire force. Twq separa~e units, those 
responsible for the oorders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, were not 
35 ND, September 21, 1973, p. 1. 
36 SWB, January 2, 1974, EE/4489/Al/l. 
37 ' Die Welt, February 14, 1973, p. 5. 
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included in the reorganization and remained independent. S8 Subsequently, 
work began on improving the border positions of the frontier troops. In 
January, 1974, extensive work was begun to demolish buildings near the 
frontier which restricted the guards' fields of fire. In several cases 
in Meck1~nburg entire villages on th~ border were dismantled. GDR 
demolition troops were reported at work throughout an entire 140 
kilometer section of the Mecklenburg frontier with the FRG removing any 
structures blocking fields of fire. 39 At the same time new construction 
work was begun on other parts of the GDR-FRG frontier and also on the 
frontier with West Berlin. Additional barriers were erected and new 
electronic monitoring devices were installed. New cement observation 
points .. were. added throughout the length of the zonal border in Lo~er 
Saxony and "forward command points"were built into many of the 
observation towers. Th~se "forward command points" are designed for 
placement at strategic points along the border in order to facilitate 
the employment of "alert troops" in preventing any illegal berder 
crossings. 40 This work was being continued in the border regions of 
Lower Saxony during the summer of 1974.and the GDR border units were 
concentrating on strengthening those sections of the border used. most 
frequently as escape routes ,during warm weather. Th~ frontier in Berlin 
38Informationen (Bonn: Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen), No. 18, September, 1973, p. 5. 
39Die Welt, January 28, 1974, p. 3. 
40Der Taggespiegel (West Berlin), February 24, 1974, p. 2. 
, . ~.' . 
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was being subjected to the most stringent precautions in several years 
to prevent escapes into West Berlin.4l 
The picture very clearly emerging from the~e developments is that 
the East German authorities are emphatically denying the possibility of 
any reunification with the West under forseeable circumstanGes. They 
are emphasizing a policy of demarcation from West Germany which involves 
the continued and intensified restructuring of GDR society along lines 
incompatible with West German society, an intense ideological 
confrontation with the West, and a strengthening of the East German 
borders with the FRG in order to guarantee the inviolability of· their 
frontiers by either enemy forces or their . own citizens .. Although 
Honecker announced that the process of demarcation from the West had 
ended once and for all with the admission of the GDR to the United 
Nations in Oc~ober, 1973,42 none of the specific policies or programs 
discussed above have been abandoned. Apparently their continuation is 
justified by East German efforts to consolidate what has bee~ gained 
in recent years. Certainly there is no sign of relaxation to date of 
this basic policy of·divergent development. 
III .. THE GDR'S SOCIALIST CULTURAL POLICY 
Since the SED has announced its intention to create a ,separate and 
fully developed state of its own, one must ask what type of society the 
4lDie Welt, May 16, 1974, p. 5. 
42 SWB, October 29, 1973, EE/4436/A1/1. 
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SED is seeking to build. The'issue here is less one of the funda~entals 
of the GDR's economy and political system than a·matter of.the t~ne or 
atmosphere of the nation. This is wha~ SED,Politburo member Kurt Hager 
has described as the GDR' s "socialist cultural policy.,,43 Of primary 
importance in the development of the East German cultural policy is ,the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Therefore, it is to the place and function 
of ideology that this inquiry is.first directed. 
In January, 1972, in an article in Neues Deutschland Erich Honecker. 
wrote of the process of develqpment of the GDR and observed that East 
Germany was only beginning to master .the scientific-technical revo1~tion. 
The level of scientific economic management, Honecker explained, was of. 
crucial importance to the East German economy. However, math, 
cybernetics, and operatiol1s research, he cautioned, "could not and must 
not replace the political economy of· socialism as the theoretical basis 
of economic.policy." Ideological work was described as the "center" of 
the SED's leadership activity. The .conflict .between socialism and 
imperialism was coming to a head precisely in the ideological ,field, 
Honecker declared, so especially close.attel1tion must be paid to work 
in that area. 44 This theme WaS continued in a "Voice of the GDR" 
commentary in 1973 which affirmed th~t no ideological coexistence was 
possible. The. ideological struggle was described as part of the class 
struggle and of growing, not.diminishing, importance. The commentary 
43 Kurt ,Hager, Socialist Cultural Policy (Dresden: Verlag Zeit 
im Bi1d, 1972), p. 8. 
44 ND, January 16, 1972, pp. 1-2. 
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asserted that the correct formulation was,not that peaceful coexisten~e 
is.also ideological coexistence but tha~ peaceful coexistence meant a 
s~rper ideologicqlConfrontatio~.45 The SED's theoretical j9urnal, 
Einneit, stressed the same theme when it.declared that .there had been 
no change in the "essence of imperialism" and that there was no prospect 
for "renunciation of force in the ideological s~ctor." Imperialism, 
a<;:cording to Einheit, was continuing an ideological struggle against 
socialism through such "secret and·devious means" as "cultural pressure" 
and demands for "freedom of· ideas and opinions." West Germany's Social 
Democrats were cited as among the principal villains guilty of.this sort· 
of .attack. The article concluded by stating that the chances for peace 
would improve as .the GDR succeeds in "anchoring socialist ideology in 
46 the ,consciousness of the people." 
The policy of the SED as resolved at the Eighth Party Congress was 
marked by two fundamental goals. The first was a continued rise of 
material cmd cultural standards of the GDR and the second was. the 
establishment of favorable external condition~ for the building of 
socialism in the GDR. In discussing these objectiv~s of. the foreign 
and domestic policies of the SED, Politburo member Kurt Hager .mainta~ned 
that their realization required cqncrete h~storical approaches and 
actions based on complete scientific, ideological knowledge. The tapks 
of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, as outlined by Hager, were so. 
45 SWB, January 16, 1973, E~/4l95/Al/3. 
46Heinz Geggel, "Keine ideologische Wafferruhe" ("No Ideological 
Ceasefire"L Einheit, No.1, January, 1973, pp. 8-9. 
165 
exten~ive that no aspect.of East'Ge~ansociety coulc;l remain untouched 
by ideological considerations. Reliance o~ "unprincipled pragmatism" 
was· specifically condemned as an unacceptable approach to social and 
economic development. The'only valid guide, Hager repeatedly stressed, 
was ideology. Mastery of , the scientific-technical re'l(ol~tion and·the 
development of .the natural sciences were both described as philosophi-
ca11y dependent. Only th:rough a proper understanding of philosophy, he 
insisted, would the formation and all-round develqpment of socialist 
1·· b ·bl 47 persona ~t~es e poss~ e. The carrying out of this work has 
frequently been described as the "principal concern of party activity 
and party leadership.,,48 The 1973 Party elections were seen by the 
SED's leadership as an opportunity to increase the inten~ity of 
ideologica~ work. The electio~s wer,e to be used for "further improving 
political and ideological indoctrination and making it more effective. '.,' 
"Lenin's working style" was set as the norm to which a11 i,'arty members 
should strive to conform in carrying out.the ideological tasks t~at were 
necessary for meeting the goals of ' the Eighth Party Congress. Only 
after the ~horough "socialist indoctrination of all workers"could the 
84,000 party group organizers and the.73,OOO leaderships of the basic 
organizations and department party organizations, feel that they had met 
their obligations in the 1973 campaign.49 
47ND, April.17, 1974, pp. 5-6. 
48Horst Dohlus, "Die LeninscQ.en Normen in Leben unserer Partei" 
("Leninist Norms in the Life of our Party"), Einheit, No. 10, October, 
1973, p. 1178. ' 
49 Ibid ., pp. 1179-1180. 
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The development of a sense of East ,German statehood is dependent on 
the work of the SED in the implementation of the ideological tas~s set 
for the party, according to Hager and others in the SED hierarchy. The 
successful implementation of the SED's goals is seen as requiring an 
especiallY h~gh standard for individual members. Politburo member Erich 
Mueckenberger dealt with this need in an article in NeuerWeg in 
Septem~er, 1973. According to Mueckenberger, the implementation of the, 
Eighth SED Congress's resolution regarding the building of a developed 
socialist society makes ,new and greater demands ,on the party. 
Accordingly, the Central Control Commission of ,the SED, of which 
Mueckenberger is chairma~, must increase its efforts to rid the party 
of "unworthy elements." While insisting that the work of the Control 
Commission had brought the SED more unity and resolution than ever 
before, he warned that "residues of the old capitalist society continue 
to affect ideas and action, even of party members." In addition, there 
are some. party members who are simply unable to "keep pace with the new 
h 11 f · ,,50 c a enges ac~ng us .... Therefore, the party leaderships 
thrqughout the country must be alert for identification of those members 
whose behavior "offends against the unity, purity, and resolution of the 
party, thereby crippling its fighting strength." The "ruthless" exposure" 
of these elements is necessary, Mueckerbenger explained, because the 
enemy in the class war was continuing to work for the same goals as in 
the past but with "greater steal~h and refinement." In so doing, the 
50Neuer Weg, No. 18, 1973, pp. 818-819. 
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enemy "appea~s to those whose politi~a1 and ideological attitude is not 
qui te firm, who. harbor doubts and hesi ta tiol).s . " Therefore, only by 
calling tl:? account "all those who damage the prestige of th.e party" will 
the SED be able to tighten it~ ranks even more strongly and increase its 
figh~ing strength in the effort to fully implement the GDR's cultural 
and'politica1 goa1s. 51 This "purge" co~ld well represent an effort by 
Honecker to strengthe~ his position within the SED since it c~mes:on the 
heels of a previous "purge" or exchange of party documents, as the SED 
called it, in 1970. 52 
Since the GDR is in the process of building what it proc1~ims as a· 
developed socialist society, it is appropriate to examine the contours, 
of this society in order.to see how it advances the goal of creating a 
sense of national consciousness. The SED's conception of a developed 
socialist society centers around an irlsistence on total involvement of 
its population in the affairs of the state. Suc,h involvement, it 
believes,. will aid its citizens in self-identification with the goals 
of the regime and thus contribute to a greater national consciousness. 
"Every further development of social democracy," according to deputy 
chairman of the GDR State Council Friedrich Ebert, "must start with the 
inevitably growing leadership role of the .working class and its party."S3 
51 Ibid ., pp. 819-822. 
52ND, April 29, 1970i p. 1. 
53Friedrich Ebert,' "Stadt u;nq Demokratie unserer socialistischen 
Gessellschaft" ("State Democracy in ou~ Socialist Society"), Einheit, 
No.4, April, 1974, p. 397. 
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The social composition of representatives in all popularly elected 
bodies is supposed to correspond to the actual social composition of. 
the GORIS population. The unrestricted sovereignty of the working 
people, which is the key to the development of a-sense of natio~al 
consciousness, is said by Ebert to be implemented by the participation 
of citizens in both the management and the planning of all decis~ve 
s~ate and social concerns and,also by the exercise of an increasingly 
broad based popular control. Three Dlillion GOR cit:tzens are said to 
be participating responsibly in the exercise of power. in East Germany. 
This participa~ion takes the form of membership in committees and study 
groups of representative bodies, in commissions of the National Front, 
in a variety of.activist groups, and numerous other committees. Citizens 
of,the GOR are described bY,Ebert as more ready to participate now. than 
ever, before. Not only po 1i tical, but also e~onomic decis:i,.on makin~ is 
affected by the masses of East·German citizenry. Ebert asserts that 
85 percent of all workers. and employees in state owned industries 
participated in discussions regarding th.e economic plan which was 
adopted for 1974. The discussion of draft laws prior to their formal 
adoption is described,as another. way in which social democracy is being 
implemented and strengthened. The drafts are formally submitted for 
discussion by the East German population before becoming law. The 
recently' passed GOR Youth Law is estimated to have been discussed by 
5.4 million citizens in more than 240,000 open meetings. Some 4,800 
s\1ggestions regarding the dr~ft of this law were,submittecl by 
organizations' and individuals. Ebert gives nq figures for the number 
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of changes made following the submission of these suggestions, but the 
, , h h h 54 presumpt10n 1S t at t ere were c anges. 
The strength of the popular representative bodies is to be a major 
factor in the development of a sense of national consciousness in the 
GDR's socialist democracy. The strength of these organs, according to 
Ebert, depends upon how well they "succeed in achieving constantly 
closer relations with the working people and relying upon this in their 
t ' , 't' ,,55 en 1re management act1v1 les. If the population is to feel that it 
is truly a part of the decision-making process, such closeness is a 
necessity. In a speech in December, 1973, to the staffs conce~ned with 
constitutional and legal problems of East German local government, Ebert 
admitted that the maintenance of such relations is not easy. "The link 
between citizens, state organs, and representatives is frequently rather 
tenuous," he said. A method of overcoming this problem was tried in 
LeipZig where constituency activist groups were established in order to 
collaborate with the citizens to determine emerging problems and submit 
suggestions to the state organs for dealing with such problems. The 
constituency activist groups included representatives from local 
government, the National Front, the Peoples' Police, local enterprises, 
schools, and cultural faci1ities. 56 Another method of creating closer 
ties with the population discussed by Ebert was the use Of voters' 
54 Ibid ., pp. 397-398. 55Ibid ., pp. 400-401. 
56Neue Justiz, Vol. 28, No.1, January, 1974, pp. 1-6. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 857, March 19, 1973, p. 27. 
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mandates or, ,in effect, referenda. Yet, the mandates, Ebert cautioned, 
must respond to the interests of a broad stra~a of people and be related 
to e~onomic~lly feasible measures. 57 Newspapers were described as 
a~other important l~nk in the ,maintenance of close contact with the 
people. Ebert ,faulted newspapers, however, for failing to have 
established a "genuine partne~ship" with the staffs of state organs. 
Th~ reports of meetings, he said, failed to show th~ way in wh~ch the 
decisions made in meetings reflect the will of the ,workers and consisted 
of northing more tha~ reports of the speeches. 58 
While official discussions of the nature and meaning of the 
cultural policies assume a particularly humanistic ,tone, rigid 
ideological contro~ is never ,relaxed and the party's position is 
carefully preserved. The population must be encouraged to identify 
with the goals of the regime and to feel tha~ its will directs policy, 
but the mechanisms for "popular control" must neVer be allowed to 
overshadow the party. Lest the SED's position be seriously threatened 
and in order to avoid any misconceptions about the nature of the world, 
west of the GDR frontier, a much less "positive" side to the explanation 
of the GDR's developed socialist society is retained. In discussing the 
theory of state and law, Professor Wolfgang Weichelt, director of the 
Institute for Theory of ,State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the 
GD~, me~tioned opinions which see the role of ' the state as detached from 
th~ concrete processes and laws of socioeconomic, developm,ent. Those who 
57 Ibid. I p. 35. 58Ibid ., p. 36. 
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hold such positions, he concluded, will either think too highly of.the 
state or will denigrate the importance of the state. While I!J.eftist" 
theories associated.with Trotsky are mO$t commonly thought of in this 
connection, . Professor Weiche1t insisted that "leftist" and "rightist" 
are actually now in union against socialism. Distin~tio~s between the~e 
two forms of revisionism have been ob1iterated.as the two join in a 
struggle against socialism and communism "on the basis of.anticommunism, 
anti-Soviet;ism, and nationalism." If the continued development of 
socialist democracy is to be.assured, he declared, all variants of 
revisionism must be vigilantly opposed. 59 
The concern over threats to the .GDR's program of nation building 
extends far beyond the theoretic~l issues raised by Professor Weiche1t. 
The East German authorities see themselves ,as the object of an intensive 
psychological warfare campaign by the West wtih the .Federa1 Republic and 
West Be~lin acting as principal agents in the ,campaign. The presence of 
a large number of Western television and radio transmitters in the fifty 
kilometer strip along tho FRG-GDR frontier is cited as an example of the, 
determination to direct hostile psychological influences against East 
Ger.many. The goal of Western, and especially West.German, imperialism 
in.this.effort is seen as twofold: first, to denigrate the leading role 
of the SED in East Germany, and, second, to harm. the organs of state. 
power in the GDR, particularly the National People's Army (NVA). GDR 
officials believe that the FRG seeks to separate the East German 
59 Staat und,Recht, Vol. 23, No.4, 1974, pp. 571-579. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 923, June 28, 1974, p. 47. 
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government and the SED·from the citizenry of,the GDR. Colonel Doctor. 
Dieter Langer of the NVA notes that while there are West Ge~anmi1itary 
organs for conducting psycho1ogica1.warf~re against the GDR during 
periods of tension or in wartim~, the electronic lnass media of the FRG 
and West Berlin are responsible for the peacet~me psycho1ogica1.missions. 
This inc1,udes West Germany's Deutsch1andfunk and the West Berlin Radio 
in the American Section (RoIAS) as well as others in. the FRG and Western. 
Europe. 60 Radio Luxembourg has also been singled out as one of the 
"most,ingenuous forms of Western psychological warfare." According to 
a West German report, East German authorities feel that when a western 
hit song gains afootho1d in·a Communist mind, it helps drive out. 
something else. They charge that ,Radio Luxembourg has four goals in 
its programming: first, to .restrain the initiative of workers in 
socialist countries; second, weakening belief in the superiority of a. 
socialist order; third, undermining the authority of the communist 
parties; and fourth, combating socialist internationa1ism. 61 
The SED's belief that western music posed a threat to their nation 
building efforts was demonstrated by the 1973 "Order on Discotheque 
Programs" issued by the Ministry of Culture, The order noted that there 
was a heavy responsibility on.the disc jockey for the management of 
these programs so he must be required to have "an adequate, basic, 
socioscientific knowledge.". In order to avoid any cultural harm, the 
60 Vo1ksarmee, No. 17, 1974, p. 6. 
61Die Welt, March 19, 1973, p. 3. 
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order. stipulated that only recordings made in East Germany or other CMEA 
countries may be played in discotheque programs. All recor4ings and 
reproducing equipment owned by sqcial establishments as eating places 
which conduct discotheque programs are requireq to be registered with 
the Cu1tur~1 Department of the local district council. Violation of 
any. of· these provisions may bring a penalty of a.fineof up to one 
thousand marks. 62 Meanwhile, the NVA's Political Main Administration 
. . , 
issued a call to GDR soldiers. to examine their ,attitude toward "enemy 
broadcasting." Noting tha1; western "hot music" is intended,to lull 
"our vigilance," it asked soldiers to prevent Western ideological 
inroads with the GDR by refusing to.listen to Western radio stations. 63 
In January, 1974, the GDR Peop1e's.Po1ice were called upon by the 
Ministry of Interior to be alert for "hostile subversive activities" 
against the GDR. The process of detente will be aided and protection 
of the GDR improved as public or4er is strengthened and· as ideological 
work with members of the People's Police itself is increased, according 
to the Ministry of Interior. 64 Later in 1974, according to a West 
German report, the GDR authorities introduced an informant system in 
order to better control contacts between East Germans and Westerners. 
While many East German citizens have already been asked to pledge tha~ 
62 Gesetzb1att.der DDR, Part I, No. 38, August 27, 1973, pp. 401-404. 
In Translations on E.astern Europe, No. 792, October 10, 197.3, pp. 38-42. 
63IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), February 21, 1973, p. 2. 
64 Ibid ., January 9, 1974, p. 1. 
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they will renounce any Western contacts, the new system required citizens 
to report any contacts. with Westerners. They must report whom they have 
been in contact with, the type.of contact, and how the contact came 
about as well as the contents of.the cQnversation or letter. In some 
cases, citizens ,are required to present any Western mail they receive 
to officials before opening it. 65 
The tone of'the East German cultural policy was further amplified 
in directives relating to m~li~ary affairs. In September, 1973, the GDR 
Ministry of·Defense called upon cOmmanding officers ~o intensify 
political indoctrinatio~ in order to help repel western influences among 
the soldiers. This intensified iQeological indoctrination campaign was 
justified by the Minis~ry's.claim that the class enemy of the GDR is 
increasing its ideological pressure ,and attempting to misinform.and lead 
East Germans astray by slandering the policies of the .SED and its allied 
. 66 A h . ff b . d' h part1es. t t e same t1me, e orts are e1ng rna e to 1mprove t e 
military posture ,of the GDR. Early in 1973 a program was initiated.to 
aq.apt.the cadres of the NVA to the "requirements of,armed con:flict with 
an imperialist aggressor." According to.Lt. Gen. Otto Pech, this 
improvement in the .cadres, as well as an increase in their.number, is 
necessary to increase the combat readiness of the NVA. 67 In a similar 
fasion, the NVA has placed higher demands on its soldiers physical 
65Die Welt, May 29, 1974, p. 3. 
66 IWE Tagesdienst (West Be~lin), September 24, 1973, pp. 1-3 •. 
67Ibid ., Fe~ruary 21, 1973, p. 2. 
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capacities. In order to improve. the combat readiness of the individual 
soldier, the minimum requirements o~ the so-called event te~t, which. 
serves as the criterion for cqmbat fitness, were substantiallyraised. 68 
Additiona~ evidence of the GD~'s militant stance is presented by the 
. , ' 
expanded East German civil defense system. The objective of this 
effort, which was begun in 1973 and justified by the Defense Ministry 
as a contribution to the increC(lsed "defense readiness" of the GDR, is 
to guarantee all citizenssomepro~ective accommodations,in ca~e of war. 
The program calls for both state an,d private contributioJ?s in the 
construction of shelter~.69 The militancy of the SED's outlook in its 
nation-building efforts was most succinctly expressed in a recent issue 
of Armeerundschau. In justifying official hostil~ty toward the West, 
it asserted, "Our love, of socialism reflects our hatred against its, 
enemies.,,70 
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CULTURAL PROGRESS 
While the general tone of. the SED's cultural policy can be seen 
from the analysis above, the question of how this policy is impl~mented 
remains to be considered. East Germany's leadership considers the. 
implementation of a socialist cultural policy to b~ an indivisible 
component of the ideo1ogica1,work necessary for the deve1qpment of, 
68Ibid~, November 23, 1973, p. 2. 
69Ibid ., November 2, 197,3, p. 1. 
70 Armeerundschau, No.1, January, 1974, p. 3. 
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a national consciousness in the ,GDR. Accordingly, it sees workrel,ating 
to .the cultural policy as being too important. and exten~ive to be the 
responsibility of cultural organizations, or artists,' and writers' 
associations by themselves. In terms of party responsibility, it is not 
possible to limit efforts to one or two particular agencies. As Rudi 
Raupach, sociologist and deputy depa~tment chief in the ,SED Centr~l 
Committee has written, 
Since s~cialist culture permeates all areas of our society, 
and cultural-esthetic education and artistic creation are 
closely linked with political, ideological, economic, and 
scientific tasks, the encour~gement of the ,development of 
socialist culture become imperative for the leadership 
functio~s of every basic organization. 71 
The basic organizations, in tUrn, may look to any of,a var~ety of 
institutions or organizations for assistance with regard to pa~ticular 
aspects of the ,cultural policy. Together, they are working toward what 
the SED authorities term "cultural progress." Such progress, accol'4ing 
to Raupach, 
. Is reflected particularly in a greater receptivity 
for the problems of our socialist' society, in increasing 
social and cultural activity, in the growing need for 
invol ving art ami literature in one's daily life, in a 
subsequent greater appreciation of art, and in a rising 
desire for personal participation in art and culture. 72 
There is, however, no implication that this is art and cult~re simply 
for their own sake. Rather, there is a very practical consideration 
here, namely, that the "furthel; improvement of productivity needs people 
71Rudi Raupach, "Initiat;or der Kultu~arbeit" ("rnitiator of 
Cultural Work"), Einheit, Vol. 29, No.3, 1974, pp. 334-335. 
72Ibid ., p. 336. 
177 
who have been shaped by socialist conditions to be creative, cultured, 
and socia1ist.,,73 In addition to this, there is,the further considera-
tion that cultura~ activit~es c~n play an important part in the 
ideological struggle. Thus, it be~omes increasingly importantth~t the 
party work for cultural progress both in and through as many channels 
as possible. East German.cu1tura1 efforts, therefore, will now be 
considered as they relate to a,cult~ra1 offensive in the ideological 
struggle, to youth, to literature, art, and music, and to the churches. 
In 1973 the GDR Ministry for Advanced and Technical School Education 
expressed an interest in the ,expansion of cooperation with western 
nations,in areas relating to its jurisdiction. An improvement .in the 
quality of , educational teaching standards played.a secondary role in 
East German motivations, according to statements of the Ministry. 
Central importance was placed on making a contribution to the foreign 
policy program of the 24th Communist Party of the Soviet U~ion Congress 
and the Eighth SED Congress as well as the ideological offensive of, 
socialism. While the improvement in the class-conscious indoctrination 
of students sought by the Ministry might be ,viewed as a direct 
contribution to education, greater stress was placed on strengthening 
the international position of the GDR and of socia1ism. 74 This example 
is illustrative of.the basic East German orientation toward anything 
which might be considered even indirectly as a cultural exchange. A 
73Ibid ., p. 335. 
74IWE Tagesdienst" May 9, 1973, pp. 1-2. 
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publication of the .GDR Institute ,of Politics and Economy (IPW), outlined 
the official SED attitude toward cultural exchanges. According to the 
IPW'spublication"an increase in "spiritual-cultural and information 
exchange" with Western countries is desirable but must be harmonized 
with the ,fact that the ideological struggle between socialism and 
capitalism is intensifying. Such harmony is not difficult to obtain 
because the presence of "socialist scientists, artists, and works of 
art.in capitalist countries is tantamount to the presence of socialist 
ideology.,,75 According to the IPW, this presence has two favorable 
effects. First, it reduces anticommunist prejudices and allows people 
in capitalist countries to see socialism as a "humanist so~ial order, 
as it truly exists." Second, the socialist cultural initiative is a 
means of ideological struggle in that it spreads the ,spirit of detente 
over the whole world and promotes cultural international relations in 
such a way that it benefits the strengthening of peace. 
Such harmony is only possible if the cultural exchange is viewed 
in accordance with certain criterion. The desirable criterion, in the 
SED's conception, is the freedom granted to Marxism-Leninism in a 
country. The greater that freedom the greater one ,may consider freedom 
of thought in that country and, with it, the ,opportun~tie~ for cultural 
exchanges. According to the ,IPW report, 
Consequently, the Marxist-Leninist also gauge the state 
of development in spiritual freedom in the possibilities 
7SIPW-Berichte, No. II, November, 1973, pp. 23-32. In Translations 
on Eastern Europe, No. 840, January 17, 1974, p. 39. 
existing for propagati~g the ideology of the working cla~s 
in.the capitalist countries. 76 
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If it is not possible for a cultural exchange to aid the social~st view, 
then a cultural exchange is not po~sible. 
In order to assure the achievement.of harmony between cultural 
exchanges and the ideological struggle which is seen as an outgrowth 
of present-day foreign policy conditions, the East Ge~mans posit certain 
content qualifications for eva~uating cl:lltural exchanges, If the 
eX<,:hange involves the transmission of information or. ideas deemed 
harmful to the cause of "peace" it must not take place. All exchanges 
must have the effect of strengthening those causes considered worthy by 
the socialist nations~ The IPW's report concl~des.that 
Such.an objective for the exchange of spiritual~cultural 
values implies, of course, that no freedom of dissemination 
will be granted tO,spiritual product~ whose content is hostile 
to peace, is nationalistic, racist, contemptuous of humans, 
and is counterrevolutionary.77 
Responding to those.who might object to .this restriction, . the IPW 
article, asserts that the thing which is actually cj.eplorable is not the 
struggle against such views, but rather the existence of those views. 
People who insist on the "freedom of opinion" are depicted as simply 
seeking to stop the victorious advance of ,the ideas .of socialism and 
to put t4e ideology of.imperialism on the offensive once again. For 
Marxist-Leninists to accede to such demands~ we are told, would be to 
76Ibid~, p. 40. 
77Ibid ., p. 42. 
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yield to an appeal for ideological coexistence" something which is 
clearly out of the question. Such "subversive activity" will never be 
legalized, according to the ,IPW's analysis. 78 
While cultural exchanges, under these circumstances, are seen as 
very desirable by E~st German autho~ities, the GD~ has not hesitated to 
place preconditions on even such obviously one-sided exchanges. Before 
" th~ GDR will agree to ~ny exchange of ,cultural information the Western 
states involved must accept certain principles as ,well as East Gel.'I1lan 
interpretations of those principles. 
Those principles mainly are the sovereign equality of,the 
states and respect for the rights inherent in the ',sovereignty; 
the refraining from the ,threat or ,use of force; inviolability 
of the borders; territorial integrity of the states;, peaceful 
arbitration of controversies; and noninterf~rence in internal 
affairs. 79 
The. possibility has also been raised that, the ,GDR might insist that We~t 
Germany, before entering into a cultural agreement with the GDR, hand 
over to t~e EastGe~mans certain works of art and other valuab~e items 
presently held by the FRG Prussian Cultural Property Foundation on. the 
grounds that the GDR is, as Erich Honecker has said, "the state 
embodiment of the best tr~ditions of German history.II80 With regard 
to the West Germans, t~e SED has been, in effect, insisting on the GDR's 
right to sole represe~tation of both German states in cultural matte~s. 
The unwillingness of the ,Bonn government to yield to this demand has 
meant that virtually all cultur~l contacts between the .FRG and the GDR 
78 Ib 'd 46 47 1 ~, pp. - . 79 Ibid ., p. 44. 
80Frankfurter Allgemeine, January 17, 1974, p. 20. 
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have been thw~rted. West Germany's refusal to yield to the GDR's demands 
in the cultural negotiations between the two states has undQubt~dly led 
the SED to cqncll,lde that broad. cultural exchanges at this time would not 
aid the GDR's ideological struggle. 
The importance of the .GDR's youth in terms of the cultural policy 
of East Ge~ny is such that references to the proper education and 
upbringing of the nation's youth repeatedlY appear in party writings 
and officials' speeches. Considerable energy is alsQ devoted to the 
study of youth by East German sociologists. Th~ir concern for issues 
relating to the ,SED's cultural policy is reflected in the major research 
questions: first, problems of the development and consolidation of the 
socialist consciousness of youth, incl~ding the processes of the 
formation of ,socialist attitudes; second, problems of ' the d~velopment 
and management of socialist youth teams, especially in youth organiza-
tions; thi~d, problems ,of deve~oping intellectual, cultural, sports, 
,.-
and,tourists interests in youth with particular consideration given to 
cultural and tourist facilities and the influence of ,the mass media; 
and fourth, problems of the ,efficiency of the integrated youth 
organization within the system of planning and management of work with 
young people. 8l The attent;ion ?evoted to the ,recently passed Youth Act 
is yet another indication of the tremendous importance placed on the 
proper political and sociological development of the nation's youth in 
81Gunther Bohring, "Youth Research in the GDR, " 'Sociological , 
Research in the GDR, e~ited by the Scientific Council for Sociological 
Research (Berlin, GDR:' Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschafter, 1970), 
p. 106. 
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order to advance the ,social development of the GDR. Th~ official 
efforts to guarantee that the ,youth adopt proper attitude~ are, started 
at the earliest.age possible. Children of preschool age are expected, 
according to the Ministry of, Public Education, to receive from their 
parents the information that will enable them to d~stinguish between 
friend and enemy. Parents are urged to tell the~r children if ,they see 
GDR soldiers that the troops guard the~r borders against enemies so the 
children can play in peace. In order to protect children from Western 
influence, p~rents are admonished not to allow children to listen to 
W t d " l' . 82 I d . h es ern ra ~o or te ev~s~on programs~ n so o~ng, t e,parents are 
considered to be m~king a contributiqn to the early formation of proper 
socialist attitudes in young people. 
The Tenth World Festival of Youth and Students, whi~h was held in 
East Berlin in 1973, gave the GDR a chance to display its youth to the 
world. On this occasion Erich Honecker boasted that, thanks·to their 
socialist training, every third young worker is an innovator who 
demonstrates his initiative in ,the economic affairs of his country. The 
Free German Youth (FD~) organization, he said, shows that the great 
majority of the ,East German yo~th possess political maturity. This is 
possible because in the GDR "girls and boys start early to participate 
in social life." This early start aids in developing socialist 
personalities and in training youth to recognize its "social 
obliga tions," Honecker explained. 83 The GDR' s' youth was active during 
82 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), February 2, 1974, p. 1. 
83 Neuer Wag, No. 14, July, 1973, pp. 628-630. 
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th~ Festival not only in arranging parades and demonstx:ations, but also 
in enforcing public order and security. FDJ groups were given extensive 
training prior to the Festival by the People's Police to enable them to 
influence "endangered youths" who were not ,properly educated ,in a 
socialis~ outlook and to ens~e the maintenance of order at all Festival 
meeting places. 84 . The FDJ evidently fulfilled its security responsibi1i-
ties well ,at th~ Festival because, several month~. later GDR authorities 
began a program to give the FDJ public order groups increased assignments 
to protect youth from "harmful influences. ,,85 
The emphasis on youth in the,GDR has lead to a concern that the 
educational system fulfill ideological and cultural responsibilities 
specified by the SED. The 1974 Youth Act specified some of the ,goals 
in its declaration in Article '47whic;h states" 
It shall be the concern and 1;he task of young people to 
adopt a cultured way of life, to use their leisure time in 
a meaningful way, to engage in cultural and artistic, 
activities and to take a creative ,part, in the development 
of culture and.art. 86 
Further specifics were given in the Act on the ,Integra~ed Educational 
System of the GDR which inc1~ded an en~eration of educational 
objectives,and responsibilities at each level. In discussing social 
science lessons at the ,secondary state, the Act illustrates ,the extent 
84 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), AprilS, 1973, pp. 1.2. 
85 Ibid ., April 22, 1974, pp. 1-2. 
86Youth in the Socialist State: Youth Act of the GDR (Berlin, GDR: 
Panorama DDR, 1974), p. 43. 
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of the responsibilities of the ,public schools in the GDR. It states i~ 
Article lQ that, 
Th~ pupils shall ,be led to recognize the historic role and 
natio~a1 duty of the German Democratic Republic. They shall 
come to the conclusion that the future belongs to socialism 
in the whole:ofGermany.87 
To insure that yOl;lng people spend their leisure time in,"a'purpos~fu1 
way" the Act introduces the concept of a "who1e-day",schoQ1 education. 
This concept, which is to be applied to an increasing number of pupils, 
involv:es a ,close connection betwee:n formal .inst~uct~on and 
extracurricular education. Students are called upon to perform 
"socially useful work'.' and to develop "pleasure in work." Holidays 
are to be used by students to "strengthen thei.r .physique and health 
in the .community of happy and self-radiant young people.". Organized 
games and excursions are to be utilized in fulfilling this objective. 
Socialist enterprises and scientific institutions are required under 
the .Act to entrust young people invol~ed in the ."who1e-day" educational 
system.withuseful and interesting work. Organizations such as the FDJ 
and its younger partner, the Ernst Thae1mann Pioneers, are to.be 
responsible for assuming leadership of many of the activit~es associated 
with this educational innovation. 88 This approach is supported by GDR 
educational journals which stress the importance of showing the "unity" 
between school and life. According to a recent article in Deutsche 
87Act on the Integrated Socialist Educational System of the .GDR 
(Berlin, GDR: Staatsver1ag der DJ?R, 1972), p. 31. 
88Ibid ., pp. 32-33. 
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Lehrerzeitung, schools are supposed to implement the instructions of the 
SED calling for an increased congruity between the teachings ~n 
educational institutions and the demands of life in the GDR. 
Accordingly, schools are working to stress politically relevant themes 
and to demonstrate the inadequacies and misconceptions of imperialist 
'd 1 89 1 eo ogy. 
An additional and especially significant aspect of the educational 
process in the GDR is the premilitary training which is justified by the 
assertion that the only revolution worth anything is the one that knows 
. 
how to defend itself. Honecker has described defense preparedness as a 
basic requirement for the guarantee of the socialist gains of his nation 
and, at the same time, for the consistent continuation of the 
international detente pOlicy made possible only by the strength of 
'1' 90 SOC1a 1sm. For defense preparedness to be complete, the SED feels 
that the youth must understand their military class mission. Therefore, 
the FDJ, along with the Society for Sports and Technology (GST) , has 
been called upon to prepare the nation's youth for military service in 
political, physical, and premilitary terms. A basic part of the FDJ's 
responsibility involves meeting future requirements of the East German 
military. Only by the inculcation of proper attitudes toward military 
service, the SED believes, can the young people of the GDR be adequately 
89Deutsche Lehrerzeituns, No. 17, April, 1974, p. 4. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 913, June 10, 1974, pp. 10-13. 
90ND, November 1, 1973, p. 1. 
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prepared. Th~ FDJ's success in this respect has regently been not~d in 
an Ea~t GeJ;1llan youth publication. 
Being a soldier for socialism and being a mercenary for 
monopoly capitalism are two things th~t have nothing in 
common with eacb other. The youth of the .GDR is fully aware 
of this fact. 91 . 
Having developed an appreciation for the honor of serving in the GDR 
military, the FDJ and tQe other youth organizations then proceed.to 
impart a knowledge of military techniques to.young students. Th~ GST 
organizes students into. companies where military topics such as the use 
of hand grenades, creeping and crawling, and map reading are taught. 
Students participate in a variety of sports which have a close 
relationship to mil~tary activities, including sport shoot~ng a~d 
communications. sports. According to Volksarmee, "defense sport has 
become a co~ponent part·of a mea~ingful and interesting way of.using 
free time.,,92 In add:ition to teaching young people the .basic military 
skills, the GST prides itself on the dis,cipline imp~ted to thos~ who 
t participate in its activities;. discipline which will enable. them to 
d f d . 1· . t·t .. h f 93 e en SOCla l~m agalns 1 s eneffiles ln t e uture. In the .spring 
of 1974, according to Western reports, the GDR was undertaking yet a 
further increase .in premilitary training and.military education. "Xoung 
soldier" working groups were being organized in school.to impart military 
9lJunge Generation, No.2, February, 1974, pp. 5~-63. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 878, Aprll S, 1974, p. 10. 
92 yolksarmee" No.7, Febrl,lary, 1974, p. II. 
93 Armeerundschau, No.9, September, 1972, pp. 79-80. 
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and political knowledge to students outside of the obligatory premi1itary 
training programs already in the ,school curricu1~. Target ranges were 
even set up in-the basements of ,many EastGer~n schools so students 
could practice marksmanship without haying to go to one of" the ~arnps 
normally used for such activities. 94 
In evaluating th~ efforts to'incu1cate proper socialist attitudes 
and.a love of the ,"socialist fatherland" in the young people of the GDR, 
the SED ',s theoretical journa1.observed that there is a necessary 
connection betwe~n the internal strengthening of ,each socialist country 
and the increase in its world political effectiveness. Thanks to the 
government's educational programs, the journal concluded, the GDR has 
been strengthened internally since the overwhelming majo~ity of its 
youthis associating itself increasingly firmly with sqcialism in ,the 
GDR and is developing patriotic and internationalistic ways of thi~king 
and acting. Therefore, the authors assert, not only is the international 
effectiveness of the GDR now greater, but th~ development of EastGe~many 
as a socialist nation completely independent from the FRG has been 
enhanced. 95 
While literature has been mentioned in another context, it is , 
important to cqnsider this topic separately as a veh~c1e,for social 
94 IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), April 10, 1974, p. 2. 
95Horst Adam and He1mut,Zapf, "SoziaUstischer Patriotismus und, 
Pro1etarischer Internationalismus in der ideologischen E~ziehung d~r 
Jugend" ("Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian Internationalism in the 
Ideological Upbringing of Youth"), Einheit., No.6, June, 1~73, 
pp. 678-680. 
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development. Lenin wrote in a draft resolution on proletarian culture 
that literary and artistic works "should be imbued with the spirit of 
the class struggle being waged by the proletariat.,,96 This statement, 
which came during a controversy in the Soviet Union in 1920, was neither 
the first nor the last in a long line of pronouncements regarding the 
proper role of literature, art, and music in a socialist society. 
Krushchev published an entire volume entitled The Great Mission of 
Literature and Art in 1964 in an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
guide to the evaluation of cultural contributions in the USSR. East 
Germany is no different from the Soviet Union in its concern that 
writers and artists have a "socialist" outlook in their contributions. 
The popular East German magazine Sonntag spelled OUt the cultural-
political needs of the GDR by listing 
. . The convincing artistic presentation of figures of 
workers and of the struggle and life of the working class as 
the history-forming power of social progress, of its battles 
and victories, its historic greatness, defeats, and 
experiences; the artistic presentation of true socialism, 
. the crystallization of new standards of morality, • 
and tB; consciousness formation toward a "social entity." 
In order to promote the arts and the development of a favorable climate 
for new accomplishments, Sonntag called for a public discussion of the 
nature of social responsibility and the functions of the arts in a 
developed socialist society. This was seen as necessary if the ,arts 
96V• I. Lenin, Selected Works, Volume Three (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1967), p. 476. 
97 Sonntag, January 6, 1974, p. S. 
were to aid in shaping the working class into a core. for further 
progress in,the arts. What was not said, but was clearly implied, 
however, was that art was conceived df as, something to be enjoyed by 
the masses ra~her than by a se1ect.few. The references in the 1974 
Youth Law to the cultu~a1 enrichment of youth further support the 
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position that East ·German art is primarily for the masses. In surveying 
these cultural-political needs, Werner Neube~t, eqitor-in-chief of Neue 
I 
Deutsche Literatur, enthusiastically asserts that "for the first time in 
our historical experience in our GDR, literature is in the position to 
realistically participate in a real task.,,98 Neubert, too, is concerned 
tha~ lit~rature be responsive to its social responsibility and maintain 
a high level of class content. 
Yet, not all East German ,writers fulfill their social obligations, 
judging from a variety of comments appearing in the ,GDR press. Such 
shortcomings were discuss~d in the official SED newspaper, Neues 
Deutschland, in an article in 1973. The problem with many literary 
works, we are told, is that the worker is unable to establish a 
connection between himself. and the figures in the story. The chara~ters 
simply do not raise the questions over which the .worker himself muses. 
They do not .dress in the same fashion as he dresses. No do, they speak 
as he speaks. The reader is irritated, according to Neues Deutschland, 
because figures are placed before him which are petty bourgeois, 
irrelevant or antisocial, or merely reflections of the author rather 
98Neue Deutsche Literatur, No. 11, November, 1973, pp. 3-4. 
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than figures from the ,life of the average East German citizen. Such a 
situation is described as "an impoverishment of literature against which 
;) 
we must defend ourselves. ,,99 In order to mount this defense, 
writers are called upon to resist "nondialectical" tendencies and to 
write in sucha way as to bestow confidence on his contemporaries. 
Literature is.also subj~ct to the ,SED's ideological,alert. The 
official view is that there is a ,close connection between literature and 
art and political-ideological questions. Therefore, literature,is 
expected to share in responsibility for effecting a clear-cut 
delimitation from imperialism. Hence, literature is placed in service 
to the Abgrenzung policy. The SED believes ,that writers have an 
obligation to support the Abgrenzung policy through the~r literary 
contributions. Failure to do this is generally considered the result 
of inadequate knowledge of the basic problems of Marxism-Leninism. 
Writers are to be subjected tO,the restrictions of ideology in,that 
they are not al~owed to d~viate beyond ideologically-inspired guidelines. 
Political the,mes are not an option, b~t a necessity in literature. The 
rule governing literary and artistic freedom is summarized in the 
Marxist observation that even in the details of art "there iS,no 
ideological freedom~ Artistic problems are ideological problems, since 
art is a form of ideology. ,,100 In assisting the writers, in fulfilling 
their ideological obligations, literary critics are called upon to make 
99 ND, June 10/11, 1973, p. 4. 
100Ibid., July 6, 1973, p. 4. 
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a more thorough analysis. 101 The lack of a literary history of the GDR 
is viewe9 as a,serious shortcoming by the SED because it has given West 
German~ an opportunity to offer the only broadly based criticisms a~d 
histories of East German literary efforts. According toWester~ reports, 
the ,East German cu~tural bureaucrats are ,concerned lest the~r own 
literary criticisms b~ infecte~ by what is seen as a continuation of the 
ideological ,struggle in thli', field of literary history. East German 
critics are being encouraged to conduct their own analyses in complete 
independence ,of ,any West German contributions. 102 
Few events illustrate the ,concern of the ,SED to stress the cultural 
heritage of the GDR more than the commemoration of Beethoven's 200th, 
birthday. In addressing the ,Council of State on the occasion of the 
beginning of, the cer-emonies in East Germany honoring Beethoven, Willi 
Stoph set the ,tone when he declared that Beethoven's music 
Radiates power impulses for the people who were 
striving to throw off the shackles of feudalist-absolutist 
oppression. In Beethoven's powerful music they found their 
own ideas, sentiments ,and concepts of a better, a more human 
world confirmed in a new and unique way.l03 
Stoph claimed tha1; Beethoven hact finally found his "tru~ homestead" in 
the GDR. It is in Ea~t Ge~any, according ~o him, where Beethoven's 
ideas have come to life. The power of Beethoven's music was dramatically 
101Ibid., January 31, 1973, p. 4. 
102Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin), December 20, 1973, p. 4. 
103Beethoven Commemoration of the GDR (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im 
Bild, 1970), p. 8. 
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illustrated, we ,are told, during World War, Two when it was "played ,in the 
USSR during the ,days of Hitler's attacks on Russia. In the same s~nse, 
Beethoven's "music is said to have inspired the ,building of, an 
antifascist, democratic order in the GDR. Today, the ideologies of 
imperialism and anticommunism are being combated, not on~y in the 
traditional ways, but also by making use of artistic means, such as 
Beethoven's music. Stoph concluded that tl).e celebrations of, Be etho,v en 's 
bi~th in the GDR have made it clear that his music is firmly rooted in 
the hearts of East Germans, that it ,has found a firm place in the 
intellectual and cultural life of , the country, and that, in reality, 
Beethoven's music is more a part of the GDR's cultur~l he~itage than 
of West GermanY's.104 In th,e same fashion, other cultural figures such 
as Heinrich ,Heine are cited as having influenced the development of the 
GDR. His thoughts, in turn, are said to be embodied in the, East German 
105 political and social systems. Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, and Herder 
are desc~ibed as ":representatives of the ,progressive bqurgeoisie who 
worked for the liberation of man from the fetters of feudalism" in their 
tim~. Th~ir beliefs and aspirations ,have been realized, we are told, in 
the development of the "present-day reality of ,the German Democratic 
R b1 ' ,,106 Th SED f th t 't d 1 epu I.C. • • • e pre ers to stress a I. raws on a ong 
104Ibid ., pp. 13-15. 
lOSLutz Dietze and Vladimir Gorodnov, editors, Through the Eyes of 
Friends (Dresden;, Verlag Zeit im BUd, 19~4), p. 33. ' 
l06Herbert Arnt, Horst Dorrer e~ a1, Introd,ucing the GDR (Dresden: 
Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1973), pp. 18-19. 
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history of such progressive individuals as well as the one hundred year 
history of the German 1abor.movement,in the development of its 
traditions. What transpired since 1945 is presented simply as the 
cU.lmination of a. process which was start~d long ago. 
Organized religion is another subject of considerable impartancein 
East Ge~many's cultural policy. Its importance stems from the fact that 
not only does organized religion exert such influence as to make it an 
important potential ally in the development of any society, but it also 
represents a potential threat to the communist regime. For the most 
part, the SED's policy over the years has been to neutralize by any 
means possible the influence which the ,churches might utilize to oppose 
official policies. Yet the approach has not been phrased completely in 
negative terms. It is possible to discern official efforts to.make the 
church an ally of the .regi~e, especially in recent years. Albert Norden 
sounded a relat~vely positive note at the 13th Congress of.the GDR 
Christian Democratic Union in Erfurt when he referred to the 
contributions which the churches could make to the cause.of peace and 
re~inded his listeners that some farsighted.Christians had grasped. the 
dangers of imperialism even before the ,1917.revolution in Russia. 107 
However, the, despairing observation about the "social impotence" of GDR 
Christians by Bishop Fraenkel of Goerlitz probably best surnrn~rizes the 
actual position of East German churches today. lOS Other East German 
I07Albert Norden, Active Partners for Mankind's Noblest Cause 
(Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1972), pp. 5-6. 
lO~Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 6, 1974, p. 2. 
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church leaders have confirmed Bishop Fraenkel's view by the account they 
give of the minority situation of Christians in the GDR. Dr. Albrecht 
Schoenherr of the Berlin Ecumenical Institute estimates that the 
percentage of Christians in East Germany runs as low as 10 percent now 
in many areas. Even more indicative of the position of the churches in 
his view is the fact that religious instruction and other church 
functions are rapidly dwindling everywhere. I09 Such ceremonies as 
church marriages and christenings are on the decline in East Germany, 
as admitted even by East German publications. 110 
Though Ulbrichtis policy toward the churches softened when he 
undertook to transform the ,GDR into a permanent state, his successors 
have formulated no specific policy o~ approach toward the church. 
Unlike Ulbricht, they have failed to maintain any significant contnct 
with the churches. The n~st conspicuous form of pressure against the 
churches has consisted of discrimination against those associated 
closely with it. Young citizens who participate in the church are 
denied admission to the secondary schools leading to higher education 
and to universities. Christians are also denied the right to become 
teachers. The occupational outlook in other professions for Christians 
varies from district to district. However, it is only in the educational 
t h f ' d' 1 d 1 . l' eh' t' III sec or t at one 1n s 1ronc a ru es aga1nst emp oy1ng r1S 1ans. 
l09Mitteilungsbiatt des Bundes der Evangelischen Kirchen in der 
DDR, February 1, 1974, pp. 2-5. In Translations on Eastern Europe, 
No. 884, April 17, 1974, pp. 56-57. 
110Democratic German Report, Vol. XXI, No. 14, July 26, 1972. p. 119. 
IllFrankfurter Allgemeine, October 27, 1973, p. 24. 
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As for the ,church organizations themselves, they run into problems only 
when they stray into subjects that are political in nature. Again, as 
reflected in much of the 1iteratur~, ed~cat~onal matters ,seem to be, 
particularly sensitive and,the GDR press has responded,very.sharply to 
statements by church officials ,deploring the "hate education" being 
given to East German youths. As Neue Zeit, ~he Christia~ Democra~ic 
Union's official paper, observed, 
Whoever ',today deplores a, "hate eQucat;ion" of youth, in our 
schools, and thereby considers ,it necessary to criticize the 
quite deliberate partisan feel and action toward,imperia~ism 
and anticommunism inherent in our,youth, disqualifies himself 
as a theologian. He opposes party engagement in the ,struggle 
against exploitation ',' • and racism. ll2 
The dispute over churcb boundaries and the partial reso~ution of 
this, issue by the Vatican has been one of the ,most notab1,e episodes 
invo1 ving the East, German Catholics and GDR officials. Until 1973, 
the jurisdiction of the bishops of Fulda, Wuerzurg, Paderhqrn, 
Hi1desheim, and Osnabrueck extended into the GDR by vi~tue of the fact 
that the GDR-FRG frontier cut through their,church districts. As a 
result, East ,German Catholics were under the church authority of bishops 
who lived in the FRG. In 1973 the ,Vatican appointed separate bishops 
for the East German regions, but refused to designate the separation as 
permanent. Rather, it insisted that the final resolution would have tq 
" . ' 'I' 
wait until later, after the ,possibilities of reunification of the 
dioces~s can be thoroughly examined. East German officials respond~d 
by charging that ,the Vatic~n had yielded to "tbe notorious opponents. 
112Neue Zeit, February 16, 1974, p. 9. 
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of detente in the .FRG and in West Berlin.,,1l3 Meanwhile, the official 
approach to the GDR Catholic Church consists largely of appe~ls to the 
leadership of the Church to "use its means and possibilities to support 
the peace efforts of the government of the. GDR.,,114 The SED is 
concerned, of course, about establishing relations. with the Va~ican 
and, ra~her than destroy these.prospects, it prefers to attempt,to co~x 
Catholics into using their Church as a vehicle in the SED's construction 
of a developed socialist ,society. 
GDR Protestants have been subjected.to a policy which had as its 
goal the delimitation of the Eastern Evangelical Church from its Western 
counterpart. The Evangelical Church of Germany (EKO) in the FRG is 
accused of being integrated into the power structure of the Federal 
Republic and of b~ing used as a tool of capitalism. Several years ago 
the GDR church leader Dean Dietrich Scheidung dema~ded a "resolute 
separa~ion from the EKD" for the Protestant churc~es of the GDR. 115 
By 1972, the separation was yirtually complete as the SED's Abgre~zung 
policy was applied to the Protestant church. llq Otherwise, while some 
of the restrictio~s on church meetings, such as registration with the 
People's Police for any meeting other thal) those on Sunday, have be.en 
113 Begegnung, September, 1973, pp. 4-6. In Translations on Eastern 
Europe, No. 814, November 21, 1973, p. 21. 
114Neue Zeit, March 2, 197~, p. 3. 
11SIbid~, February 28, 1969, pp. 1-2. 
l16sWB , March 28, 1972, EE/395l/B/4. 
relaxed; the GDR officials have concentrated on limiting church 
influence on young people. Discrimination aga~nstChristia~ youths, 
while, varying in intensity from district to district, is being 
continued. 11 7 
East German Jews have,been the subject of less official concern. 
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Their small number--approximately 800 persons in the GDR belong to the 
Jewish religiouscommunity--probab1y accounts for this. They receive 
a special state welfare as a resu~t of being recognize~ victim~ of 
fascism and they are allowed to publish their own newspaper. 1l8 Xet, 
the SED apparently intends to keep its small Jewish population isolat~d 
from West German Jewry, as evidenced by its ban on the ,FRG Jewish 
weekly, Allgemeine Judische Wochenzeitung. Contacts with oth~r foreign 
J "h l"k" t d 119 ew~s groups are ~ eW1se no, encourage. 
Th~ official East German attitude toward organized religion was 
probably best summarized by the statement that "the socialist state does 
not ne~d the encouragement of the churc~es .. ,,120 However, the SED 
would clearly prefer to have any support that it might re~eive since 
this would further strengthen ~he internal situation in the ,GDR. Church 
assistance in achieving cultural goals and develqping a sense of national 
identity could be most valuable. Meanwhile, the official policy is 
117Frankfurter A1l$emeine, June 5, 1974, p. 1. 
118 Begegnung, Febr~ry, 1974, pp. 7-9. In Translations on Eastern 
Europe, No. 887, April 23, 1974, pp. 24-25. 
119Die Welt, August 14, 1973, p. 2. 
120Begegnung; No.4: April, 1974, pp. 1-2. In Translations on 
Eastern Europe, No. 921, June 26, 1974, p. 16. 
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directed toward isolating East German religious communities from those 
in the West.and preventing the ,churches from developing independent 
power bases from which they might challenge the regime. At the same 
tim~ it tries to enhance the prestige of the GDR by claiming the leader 
of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther, as part of the ,historical 
heritage of .East Germany. On the occasion of the 450th anniversary of 
the Reformation, the GDR Christian Democratic Union, speaking on.beha1f 
of the regime, boasted of the "friendly cooperation" between Christians 
and Marxists in the GDR and of the Marxist strains present. in the 
teachings of Martin Luther. 12l 
While the survey above indicates that the SED has enjoyed 
considerable success in working toward the deve1opment.of a natio~al 
culture and a sense of national identity, contemporary literature, 
indicates that a number of problems remain. The persistence of these 
problems is clearly disturbing to the East·Ge~n leadership. The 
major problem areas are the inability to eliminate criminal behavior, 
shortcomings in the training of youth, and the lack of thorough 
ideological work. Lack of success in the~r elimination obviously 
hinders the nation building efforts of the SED. 
The problem of criminality was discussed by GDR Prosecutor General, 
Dr. Josef Streit, in a recent article in Neue Justiz. While giving no 
figures on the crime rate--such figures are never released now--Streit 
12lSecretariat of the Christian Democratic Union, Gedenkstatten des 
ganzen Volkes (Remembrance Places of All People) (Dresden: Verlag Zeit 
im Bild, 1970), pp. 3-4. 
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expressed displeasure with the development of crime prevention in the 
GDR and indicated that crime had actually incre~sed. In the process of 
~ncreasing the ,material prosperity of.East.Germany, Streit a~it~ed, a 
certain cont~adiction had arisen in. that the desire .of the individual 
to satisfy his material needs "does not always coincide with a high 
moral sense or with a high degree of awareness and of respons~bility 
toward the ,collective and society." In order to correct this situation, 
Streit called for greater efforts to explain the "political content of 
the law." In a more direct sense, the public prosecutor's office was 
called upon to increase its supervision of society. In short, he 
explained, both educational and coercive measures must be increased if 
socialist legality is to be safeguarded.122 The failure to consolidate 
socialist legality has also been reflected in a campaign by the People's 
Police in 1974 to intensify its measures for the protection of the.GDR 
economy. This campaign was inspired by the frequency of destruction 
andarson in industry, the building trade, agriculture, commerce and 
transportation. In addition, there had been a considerable increase 
123 in thefts of socialist property. The announcement of a campaign 
against alcoholism in late 1974 was yet another indication of an 
increase in East German social prob1ems. 124 
122Neue Justiz, May 2, 1974, pp. 285-286. In Translations. on 
Eastern Europe, No. 920, June 25, 1974, pp. 38-40. 
123IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), January 25, 1974, p. 2. 
124ND, Novemqer 14, 1974, p. 4. 
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Shortcomings in the training of,GDR youth are evident in ,both, 
educational and attit~dina1 concerns. Wester~ reports indicate that, 
o~ficials of the People's police are concerned tha~ some young people 
have "no firm socialist class viewpoint, no clear socialist ideology 
and • . . demonstrate kinds of behavior which con~radict our socialist 
mox:ality and ethics." Rowdy behavior and the ,imitation of W~stern 
life-styles are· considered evidence of this problem. 125 Political 
indifference among the ,Young Pioneers is yet another reflection of 
shortcomings in this area. The fact that few children come to meetings. 
with political topics and many refuse to be ,active workers in the 
, 26 
organization is viewed as a serious,problem.- There are also reports 
that East German young people are not receiving a proper education in, 
"socialist history." The factua~ knowledge of ,many young people is said 
to be limited to a few particularly impressive events. Therefore, they 
do not understand the total historical picture and, as a result, this 
"makes it hard for them to think thr()ugh historical processes 
independently. ,,127 
The lack of thorough ideological work affects several aspects of 
East German society. Party journals frequently note the need for 
greater and more effective ideological undertakings in economic policy. 
l251WE Ta2esdienst (West Berlin), April 22, 1974, pp. 1-2. 
l261bid., April 8, 1974, p. 1. 
l27Rolf Doehring, "Unsere Jugend und die Anspruche an die 
geschichts-ideologische Arbeit" ("Our Youth and the Claims on Historical 
Ideological Work"), Einheit, No. 10, October, 1973, p. 1211. 
" . 
The'managerial cadre have b~en criticized because of the "too general 
and ve,rbal economic propagandall and their, lack ,of qualification in 
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leading political-ideological discussions. Furthermore, they have been, 
scolded for failing to maintain a unity between ideological educatio~ 
and training and th~ acquisition of-economic and specialized professional 
knowledge. 128 The SED has also ,cited the ,military services for their 
deficiencies in ideological work. Cr~ticism has been voiced in military 
party circles of,the political behavior of SED members in th~ NVA who 
are supposed to ensure that ideological tasks are fulfilled. The policy 
of Abgrenzung has been accompanied by an intensification of the stress, 
.\ 
placed on the political training of NVA officers. 129 Further failures 
have been noted in the NVA relati,ng to discipline and order. !fa more 
"militant" atmosphere prevailed, according to,Volksarmee, these 
deficiences could be overcome. 130 
V. NATION BUILDING AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE GDR 
Having reviewed East Germany's nation-building efforts, what may 
one conclude that it means for the conduct of the GDR's foreign policy? 
What is the impact generally and mor~ specifically in relation to the , 
West Berlin problem? While all statements,make the importance of 
l28Klaus Gaebler and Heinz Puder, "Wel tanscha).lung und Oekonomie" 
("World View and Economy"), Einheit, No.6, June, 1973, pp. 701·704. 
l29Dale Roy Herspring, East German Civil-Military Relations, 
(New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 165-166. 
1 30Volksarmee , No. 12, Marc~, 1973, p. 1. 
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ideology very clear, it is not easy to determine ideological dictates 
which apply directly to the ,West Berlin question, or, for tha~ matter, 
to most other foreign policy matters facing the ,GDR. Yet, it is 
possible to draw some conclusions from the above analysis of efforts 
to mold and direct East German society. 
The linkage group which makes the relationship between foreign and 
domestic policies felt is, in this case, obviously the SEQ. Th~ party 
is charged wi~h supervision of the domestic situation in East Ge~ny 
andat th~ same time is one of . several parties that comprise an 
international system under the leadership of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. The SED receives input, one may reasonably assume, from 
both the internal and the external environments. Th~ exter~al 
environment, of course, is dominated by the Soviet Union since the USSR 
is clearly the dominant member of the bloc of communist party states. 
The SED must consider the demands of both systems, the national system, 
of the GDR and the international system of· the Soviet Bloc. 
The SED has made its recognition of the relationship between its 
foreign and domestic policies explicit in its pronouncements that the 
international effectiveness of the GDR improves as the development of 
East Germany as a socialist nation completely independent from the FRG 
is enhanced. 13I The SED's nation building efforts are thus viewed as 
a complement to the GDR's foreign policy undertakings. At the same 
time, however, it always points out that what advances the international 
131 Adam and Zapf, pp. 678-680. 
standing of the GDR also enhances the internal develQpment of East 
Germany. Therefore, th~ relationship between foreign and domestic 
policy flows in bQth directions. Each aids th~ other. At no point 
is one explicitly subordinated to the .othe~. 
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Th~ primary link between the foreign and domestic ,policies, in 
terms of creating needs and demands tha~ have mutual consequences for 
both, is the GDR's principal ally, the Soviet ,Union. The alliance with 
the Soviet Un~on requires the development of the East German society 
along lines compatible with the USSR's internal characteristics. It 
also requires with equal force that the GDR conduct a foreign policy 
supportive of the Soviet foreign policy. Recent discussions about a 
nuified, coordinated foreign policy for the Soviet Bloc illustrate this 
particular need. 
An additional . link of partic~lar importance is the Abgrenzung 
policy of the SED. It has both foreign and d9mestic aspects. Its 
foreign PQlicy aspects are seen in the SED's campa:i.gn of asserting 
the unique character of the GDR in re+ation to the FRG. Th.e physical 
expression of this demarcation from West Germany.is the reinforcements 
of the .GDR-FRG frontier and the work of the GDR-FRG frontier commission. 
This aspect has also required the SED to strive to enlist the aid of its 
allies in sUEPorting the East German demands on the Federal Republic, 
especially those. relative to West Berlin. The domestic aspect of the 
Abgrenzung policy has been reflected in numerous ways, such as the 
effort to enlist literature in the service of Abgrenzung. The SE,D 
has repeatedly issued calls for thecul tural and ideological demarcation 
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of the GDR from West Germany. An aim of, this policy has been to make it. 
very clear that reunification with the. Federal Republic is completely 
out. Demarcation has been proceeding in every possible area which could 
affect a union between the GDR and the ,FRG. Such ~ctions as the rupture 
of the church organizations emphasize the effort to create a society in 
the GDR totally different from that existing in the FRG. As this policy 
proceeds, of course, the isolation of West Be~lin from its physical 
environment is solidified. The absence of any hope for reunification 
means that the West Berlin problem will persist until some other 
solution is found a~d no other one offers such a comfortable prospect 
for West Berlin. 
While there is no evidence of a demand for a hostile military 
confrontation with West Germany or West Berlin--there is a total absence 
of statem~nts of the necessity of·armed conflict--an ideological struggle 
has been declared by the SED to be in progress as a.direct consequence 
of the foreign policy situation existing between socialism and 
capitalism. Events in the FRG and West Berlin will be viewed and 
evaluated in ideological terms. Weaknesses and problems will be focused 
upon as evidence of the decline of capitalism and the emergence of 
socialism as the dominant world system. 
Yet, military improvements in the GDR, new civil defense programs, 
and the emphasis on the military class mission of youth demonstrate the 
desire to be ready for military confrontation. The eff~ct of the~e 
policies is to make any future East German military threats more 
credible. Such an increase in the credibility of those threats might 
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add to their likelihood. If that happened, the positiot;l of West Berlin 
might worsen considerably since.it could easily become the subject of 
more frequent East German demands. 
Talk of psychological war against the GDR alleged to be emana.ting 
from West Germany and West Berlin shows the willingness of the East 
Germans to initiate a crisis if proper circumstances exist. Principal 
among those circumstances, of course, would be the consent of .the USSR. 
The prospect for a psychological .victory for East Ge~ny would increase 
the prospects for a crisis in view of. the persistent ne~d to demonstrate 
success and thereby the superiority of their system. This l'iould 
certainly help fulfill an important ideological mission for the SED 
which has stressed the importance of ideological work in domestic 
affairs. Again one sees the ease with which West Berlin's problems 
could.be exploited. 
By placing its concept of the nation under the rubric of proletarian 
internationalism, the GDR is binding itself ever more closely to the 
Soviet Union and its allies. While widening the ,gulf between East and 
West Germany this also limits the freedom and independence of the SED 
in foreign affairs. The effort to .develop asocial in the GDR whi~h 
is compatible with t!l:at of the East European communist party states is 
likely to continue to be reflected in a foreign policy mirroring those 
of its allies. Ideology, of course, does not remove the need for 
Western, especially West Ge~an, technology in both the .GDR and the 
other members of the Soviet Bloc. The GDR shares this need and, as 
Peter C. Ludz has observed, does not object to a special relationship 
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existing between itself and the FRG in terms of economic cooperation. 132 
Accordingly, East Ge~n freedom of action is limited ,and the prospects 
for pressure directed against West Berlin are decreased a~ a result of 
this factor. 
In spite of all that has been done, the GDR still has not completely 
realized its objectives in social development. Stress is repeatedly on 
the ,fact that the SED is presently building a developed socialist 
society. The assertion that such a society has already been constructed 
is not made. Therefore, one can conclude that the ideal of complete 
identity with the ,GDR among the population, the total sense of socialist 
patriotism, has yet to be achieved. Therefore, in the absence of , a 
total devotion to the GDR as an entity, tension is still ne,eded to 
compensate for an incomplete national consciousness. West Berlin, whose 
extended position means that it is always vulnel'able, provides the most 
convenient opportunity for creating tension that might provide, if only 
temporarily or occasionally, a degree of unity among an East Ge~man 
population believing itself threatened. Continued official reminders 
that a psychological war is being waged against the GDR from the 
territory of West Berlin is only one step from an assertio~ that 
imperialism is planning a military adventure against the GDR on West 
Berlin's territory. Accordingly, social needs perceived by the SED 
may well be reflected in confrontations with the West over the issue 
of West Berlin. In this respect, the ,West Berlin problem will continue 
l32Frankfurter Allgemeine, October 3, 1974, p. 10. 
to be a vivid illustration of the re~ationship between the SED's 
domestic needs and its foreign policy. 
207 
CHAPTER V 
THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE GDR'S WEST BERLIN POLICY: 
THE GDR AS A JUNIOR ALLY OR A SATELLITE? 
In an effort. to more closely evaluate the ,extent of independence 
enjoyed by the German Democratic Republic in the formation of its foreign 
policy, this chapter will examine the public attitude of the Soviet 
Union, as expressed in major party and state publications, toward the 
West Berlin problem. Obviously, it is impossibl~ to determine exactly 
what the USSR's role is in such matters because of the relatively closed 
nature of both the Soviet and the East German policymaking process. 
One cannot and should not rule out the possibility of considerable 
behind-the~scenes pressure by the USSR and maneuvering by the GDR. Nor 
can one determine precisely the manner in which the participants relate 
to each other. While certain assumptions are possible under normal 
circumstances, it is only during times of major public ruptures in the 
Communist alliance system that we learn more than what is indicated in 
speeches, communiques, and newspapers. Such public disputes are rare 
and the East German-Soviet relationship has been punctua~ed by none of 
them. Therefore, we must rely on public communications in order to make 
an evaluation of what the .USSR has sought with regard to the.East German 
policy on West Berlin. 
Up to this point, the West Berlin issue has been examined in terms 
of its handling during the last years of the Ulbricht regime and the 
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first of the Honecker period., East German nation-building policy has 
been reviewed in order to evaluate the possible impact of domestic 
affairs on the. SED's foreign policy. This chapter will endeavor to 
consider Soviet desires relative to the West Berlin issue, as well as 
related concerns, and, hopefully, in this manner permit a more.direct 
analysis of the evolution of the GDR's status from satellite to junior 
ally of the Soviet Union. 
I. SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS DURING ULBRICHT'S LAST YEARS 
The conception of East Germany as something more than a totally 
subservient satellite of the USSR has been gaining since the mid-1960's. 
In 1966, I1se Spittmann wrote of the changed relationship between the 
GDR and the USSR and commented that the "SED is no longer a vassal but 
t . " ,,1 a par ner ~n a J01nt venture. This belief continued to grow up until 
the time of Ulbricht's removal as First Secretary in 1971. In evaluating 
Ulbricht's achievements, Melvin Croan declared shortly after his removal 
that developments clearly and uncontroverted1y demonstrated the degree 
to which the former First Secretary had "outgrown his erstwhile status 
of Soviet viceroy in Germany.,,2 
The process which led to this situation is a long and involved one 
which cannot be separated from events of the Soviet Union's foreign and 
domestic policies. Ulbricht benefited from developments affecting 
1I1se Spittmann, "Soviet Union and DDR," Survey, No. 61, Fall, 1966, 
p. 165. 
2Me1 vin Croan, "After Ulbricht: The End of an Era?", Ibid., 
No. 79, Spring, 1971, p. 78. 
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primarily and most directly the USSR, but ultimately was sacrified in 
order ,to help meet the requirements of Soviet policy. One of the first 
events aiding the creation of a more independent GDR, if only in terms 
of subsequent East German rhetoric, was the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 
which, according to lIse Spittmann, e~ab1ed the GDR to take credit for 
its own successes. While, in her analysis, the East Ge~man reaction to 
the fall of Khrushchev was ambiguous, it did demonstrate an awareness of 
the absence of a unified leadership in the Kremlin. 3 Accordingly, the 
fall of Khrushchev is said to mark a turning point in the ,relationship 
between the GDR and the USSR. Khrushchev's ,efforts tq effect a West 
German-Soviet deten~e with the exclusion of the GDR undoubtedly 
contributed to the East German desire to adopt an attitude of greater 
independence. Likewise, the statements by Khrushchev's son-in-law, 
Adzhubey, while visiting in the West that Ulbricht was suffering from 
cancer and would not live long would not haye endeared the Khrushchey 
regime to Ulbricht.4 After Khrushchev's removal, Ulbricht publicly 
criticised the Soviet Union for its shortcomings in agricultural policy 
and chided the USSR for not correcting these mistakes ear1ier. 5 For 
the remainder of the decade, Ulbricht persisted in his boasts of the 
independent accomplishments of the SED. Even on the occasion of the 
3Spittmann, p. 171. 
4Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1967), 
p. 389. 
5 Neues Deutschland, November 5, 1964, p. 1. (Hereafter noted as 
ND.) 
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International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969, as 
Ulbricht was calling for greater unity wi,thin the ,Bloc, he also reminded 
his listeners.that socialism has been.built in the GDR due.to the 
creative applications of Marxism-Leninism to "the concrei:e conditions 
of our.country" by the SED itself. The value o~ the .alliance with the 
CPSU was men~ioned only briefly and secondarily in Ulbricht's report on 
develqpments in theGDR. 6 
An additional important development which facilitated the evolution 
of the GDR from satellite toa junior ally was the initiation of the new 
economic system, planning for which had begun in June, 1963. 7 With the 
GDR-USSR Treaty of Friendship of 1964 the SED had the needed reassurance 
that the USSR, while supporting the SED's economic reforms, was also as 
8 
committed as ever to the defense of East Ge~many. The prestige that 
East Germany enjoyed in economic affairs clearly added to the influence 
of the GDR with the Soviet Union as well as other members of ~he Soviet 
alliance system. The importance of the GDR economy to the Soviet Union 
could be seen by the sharp increase in Soviet imports from East Germany 
after 1965. By 1971 this trade had increased by 47 percent ov~r the 
1965 figures. 9 The sophisticated nature of East German products and 
6International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (Prague: 
Pe~ce and Socialism Publishers; 1969), pp. 224-226. 
7 Otto Reinhold, editor, Seht, welche Kraft I (See, What Strength) 
(Berlin, GDR:. Dietz Verlag, 1971), p. 170. 
8Ibid ., p. 172. 
9Statistical Pocket Book of theGDR, 1973 (Berlin, GDR:. 
Staatsverlag, 1973), p. 91. 
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the reputation that they enjoyed in the .Westadded further to the status 
of the GDR within the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance. As the need for commodities of this sort increased in the 
USSR and elsewhere. in Eastern Europe, Ulbri~ht had reason to take 
considerable pride in the accomplishments of the SED. The growing 
popularity of the annual Leipzig Trade Fair gave further testimony each 
year to the wisdom of the SED's economic programs. At the same time, 
Ulbricht undoubtedly felt that his political stature must also benefit 
from his economic achievem~nts. 
With the modification of the West German Ostpolitik by the Erhard 
government, the spectre of East European d~fections from Soviet tutelage 
grew in the .late 1960's. It is reasonable to assume that the .stock of 
Ulbricht, who was continuing to stress his l~yalty to the Kremlin, rose 
during this time. The entry by Rumania into formal relations with the 
Fede~~l Republic in 1967 demonstrated the potency of the West German 
Ostpolitik as practiced by Erhard's successor, Kiesinger, and presented 
the FRG as a potential threat to the hegemony of the USSR in Eastern 
Europe. While the FRG has been pursuing a more conciliatory policy 
toward East Europe for several years, it had achieved no significant 
successes until 1967. Simultaneous disruptions of the ,alliance by 
pro-Chinese Albania further underscored the need for some new basis 
for unity in the Soviet alliance. In response to this need, the Soviet 
Union abandoned proposals for an all-European security conference and 
began a strident anti-German campaign in order to, as Melvin Croan.has 
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observed, "arrest fissiparous tendencies in Eastern Europe." The 
congruity between the Soviet and East German attitudes on this point 
was remarkable. Both Brezhnev and Ulbricht, speaking at the 
International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969 
heaped scorn upon those "right wing Social Democratic leaders" who 
were attempting to disrupt the unity of the international communist 
11 
movement. The Kremlin's concern for preservation of its authority 
in Eastern Europe prompted it to attack West Germany and Red China, 
while the East Germans' fears of isolation as well as its everpresent 
need for tension inspired the SED to also pursue an intensified 
anti-West German campaign. Regardless of divergences in their 
motivations, both the USSR and the GDR shared a common purpose at 
the time of the Czechoslovakian developments in 1968. 
The year of the Czechoslovakian intervention is especially 
important in tracing the evolution of the GDR's status. While estimates 
of Ulbricht's influence in persuading the USSR to launch the invasion 
vary, few would deny that it was the GDR which spearheaded the press 
campaign against Dubcek's "revisionism." The SED press and East German 
officials were the first to raise alarm at Czech experiments, pointing 
not only to the extreme dangers of revisionism but also to the , 
subversive influence of West Germany. Early in the spring, the SED's 
Kurt Hager referred in ominous tones to the FRG's interest in Czech 
10 Croan, p. 79. 
llInternational Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, 
pp. 164 and 222. 
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developments and to Bonn's efforts to "soften up the socialist countries 
from within.,,12 Neues Deutschland editorialized the SED's warnings that 
all of the socialist states would suffer as a resuit of the 
Czec;hoslovakian experiments. l3 The intolerance and aggressiveness of 
the East German press surpa.ssed that of the Soviet Union and its other 
allies long before the August invasion. In the aftermath of the 
invasion, numerous observers expressed the ,belief that the action meant 
that Ulbr~cht's influence in the Kremlin had been a major factor and 
that a "fusion" had taken place in which the Soviet and East,Ge~an, 
"imperialism" were united for the first time. l4 
Whether the invasion was, in fact, undertaken due to Ulbricht's 
influence or not, it did mark a victory for the SED's First Secretary. 
The fact,that the USSR responded according to his publicly stated wishes 
certainly gave him the appearance of enjoying the special confidence of 
the Soviet leaders in Bloc questions. It also underscored most 
dramatically the importance of the conception of the West German menace 
in East Europe, a ,conception which Ulbricht had preached for years. 
Ulbricht began to speak more frequently of the special role being played 
by the GDR in the Soviet alliance and even cited the East German 
experience as a model which could be followed by other states wishing 
12BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 29, 1968, EE/2733/Cl/7. 
(Hereafter noted as SWB.) 
13ND, May 12, 1968, p. 1. 
14Francois Fejto, "Moscow and Its Allies," Problems of Connnunism, 
Vol. XVII, No.6, 1968, p. 37. 
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to achieve economic efficiency and political stability. 15 Ulbricht 
emphasized his "special relationship" with tqe USSR in a number of ways. 
Most significant was his willingness to make independent proposals 
regarding matters of European security, such as agreements on the 
reunification of force .16 Ulbricht's long lectures on "the secret 
of our success" in the GDR provided another indication of how he saw 
himself in the Bloc. He would repeatedly speak at length on how a 
nation could develop itself. in working for victory over capitalism. 
how it could achieve a developed socialist society, and the techniques 
to be used in improving labor productivity. At the same time, it has 
proceeded to give advice to nations of the Third World, particularly 
the Arab nations. To them and to the rest of the world, it has also 
offered the benefits of the technology developed by the GDR. Ulbricht 
pointed to East Germany's unique "socialist architecture" as evidence 
of the many technological advances made in the GDR. 17 In sum, even if 
Ulbricht did not enjoy a special relationship with the Soviet Union, he 
certainly behaved as though he felt himself to be very much a special 
individual. 
Soviet actions in 1969 should have convinced Ulbricht that he did 
not, in fact, enjoy a special relationship with the .Kremlin. Event;s 
very quickly indicated that Ulbricht lacked the stature that enabled 
15 ND, October 25, 1968, p. 1. 
16Ibid ., January I, 1968, p. 3. 
l7 Ibid ., June II, 1969, pp. 1-2. 
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him to veto Sqviet policy when he desired to do so. The negative tone 
assumed by the USSR toward West Germany prior to the Czech invasion was 
quickly replaced by a.renewal of efforts to achieve a relaxation of 
tensions between the ,two states in 1969. In the summer of that year the. 
Soviet government .called for steps to ease the West Berlin situation 
while minimizing the crisis which had arisen in February and March over 
the use of West Berlin for a session of the FRG Bundestag. The immediate 
result was agreement on an exchange of views by representatives of the 
Four Powers in Berlin which commenced in March, 1970.18 After the, 
Bundestag elections in September, 1969, the Soviet Union formally 
recognized that changes had taken place in West Germany's political 
situation by tendering a proposal on talks on the renunciation of force 
with Bonn. The talks ,began before the end of 1969 and were concluded 
on August 12, 1970 with the signing of the Soviet-West German treaty 
on the renunciation of force. 19 
However, Ulbricht refused to yield to the USSR's obvious calls for 
a reversal of the rigid policy toward the FRG still being followed. by the 
GDR. While Soviet accounts simply spoke of the ,necessity of goodwill on 
the part of the West Berlin authorities for improving the West Berlin 
situation, Ulbricht maintained a series of demands as a prerequisite 
for alleviation of the situation. While the USSR called for "the, 
establishment of equal international relations" betwe~n the GDR and 
l8B. Ponamaryov, Historr of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 540. 
19Ibid ., p. 541. 
217 
the FRG as a prerequisite for an improvement in the larger "German 
problem.,,20 Ulbricht maintained a ,much harsher approach. He continued 
to demand full diplomatic recognition as the price for improving 
relations and added an additio~al demand in January, 1970, when he 
insisted that Bonn would have to withdraw from NATO if it seriously 
wanted an improvement. 2l The fact that the Stoph-Brandt talks in March 
and May were set against the background of a consistently hostile East 
German tone toward the FRG indicated that Ulbricht, in spite of Soviet 
wishes to the contrary, was still essentially opposed to detente. 
In this manner, Ulbricht was succeeding in isolating the ,GDR from 
its own allies, the very thing he had feared that the FRG would 
accomplish. Evidence of this was seen at the Warsaw Pact Political 
Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow in December, 1969. The 
communique of that meeting called for bilateral negotiations with West 
Germany without pledging to work for diplomatic recognition of the GDR 
by the Bonn government, an obvious departure from Ulb~icht's formula. 22 
Ulbricht's defiance was exemplified by charges that NATO and the FRG 
were "as aggressive as ever" and that the policies of the West had not 
changed at all. 23 This approach served to underscore the extent of his 
20Ibid ., pp. 539-542. 
21ND, January 20, 1970, p. 3. 
22Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 20, No. 44, December 28, 
1969, p. 21. (Hereafter noted as CDSP.) 
23ND, December 12, 1969, p. 1. 
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self-imposed alienation from the USSR and his other allies. It might be 
supposed tha~ the realization of this was dawning on Ulbricht when he 
consented to the Stoph-Brandt meetings early in 1970. The fact that he 
agreed to the meetings in spite of his openly critical attitude of 
detente indicates that the degree of Soviet pressure must have been 
considerable. Yet, Ulbricht's independence was such that complete 
capitul~tion was impossible. 
The remainder of Ulbricht's tenure saw a pattern of alternating 
defiance of the Kremlin on the one hand and acquiesence to Soviet wishes 
on the other. It might be argued that he .would resist until he felt 
that the Kremlin was losing patience and then would make some effort 
to show that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet policy. His 
speech to the Central Committee following the Stoph-Brandt meetings 
illustrates this. At this time Ulbricht dropped the demand for 
diplomatic recognition by the FRG, a significant departure from previous 
statements. 24 He continued his more moderate tone the following month 
at the 13th Workers' Conference of the .Baltic Sea Countries in Rostock 
when he asserted that: "a certain measure of recognition of realities." 
was apparent in the new Brandt government. Just six months earlier he 
had been arguing that there had been no change at all in the nature of 
imperialism and had included West Germany as one of the ,major 
imperialists. While his praise at Rostock was also coupled with a 
denunciation of "right-wing" and "neo-fascist" tendencies in the FRG, 
24 Ibid ., June 16, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
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his only demands were that Bonn ratify a treaty with the, USSR on 
renunciation of force and that the .GDR be regarded by the FRG "as a 
subject in internatio~al law." He stopped short of a demand for 
diplomatic recognition by simply stressing the GDR's demand for "what 
the Federal Republic itself practices and demands in its own relations 
with other countries.,,25 
While the conclusion of the Moscow-Bonn treaty in August, 1970 was 
greeted by the GDR as a favorable development, there are indications 
that it failed to achieve what the SED hoped for. The fact that the 
treaty did not elicit guara1)tees. from the ,FRG on those issues of central 
concern to the SED meant tha~ it had not altered the East German 
bargaining position at all. The .USSR made no demands for a settlement 
of unresolved issues of the German question, so the SED was forced to 
read into the treaty those points which it had sought. While the 
negotiations on the treaty brought a pledge from West Germany to agree 
to an upgrading of the GDR's international status through its admission 
to the United Nations and other international organizations, it was 
clear tha~ the FRG meant this only as a reward for a favorable East 
German response to West German initiatives for alleviating the. 
inter-German situation, including the Berlin situation. In short, the 
West Germans were offering as a reward what Ulbricht regarded as a 
. h 26 r1g t. 
2S Ibid ., July 17, 1970, p. 1. 
26E. H. Albert, "Bonn's Moscow Treaty and Its Implications," 
International Affairs (London), April, 1971, pp. 319-323. 
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The SED made up for the~e shortcomings by analyzing the ,treaty in 
its own more favorable t~rms. The statement by the GDR Council of 
Ministers issued two days after the ,conclusion of the treaty gave the 
SED an opportunity to air its own interpretation of the treaty. "The 
heart of the treaty," according to the statement, "h the recognition 
of the terr:itorial status quo in Europe .••• " The border betwe~n the 
GDR and the FRG was mentioned as one of the most important aspects of 
the results of the ,Second World War affected by the treaty. The 
statement continued this theme by declaring, 
Th~ treaty between the USSR and the FRG stipulates in a 
form binding in international law the inviolability of the 
state border between the FRG and ,the GDR and the ,unlimited 
respect for the territorial integrity also of the ,GDR. With 
that, the normalization of relations between 'the GDR and the 
FRG on a basis of equality has become a task the solution of 
which is now in the ,realm of possibility.27 
The statement, went on to assert that, for these reasons, it was now 
"necessary to establish normal diplomatic relations" betwe~n the GDR 
and the FRG. It also argued that now there was no longer any reason 
for any third state to continue to avoid establishing diplomatic 
relations with the GDR or for the GDR to be denied admission to any 
international organization. 
The failure of the Soviet press to repeat the complete text of the. 
East Ge~~an statement, thus failing to air what amounted to a renewal 
of old demands by Ulbricht, indicated that the GDR was once again 
isolating itself from its allies and pursuing a policy counter to the 
27ND, August 15, 1970, p. 1. 
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wishes of the USSR. The commuliique of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting 
later in August gave further credence to,the assertion that the GDR was 
once more out of step. It spoke of the overall concerns for achievement 
of detente in Europe and the convening of a security conference, but 
made no mention at all of the East German demands issued in the statemept 
on ,the treaty.28 The continuation of the Four. Power talks on Berlin 
raised the further possibility of another Soviet "betrayal" of East 
German interests. By this time, there was a strong possibility that the 
USSR might agree to a statement affirming the continuation of at least 
some sort of ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Repeated 
warning appeared in the GDR press about the creation by Bonn politicians 
of a "West Berlin myth" which would deny that all of Berlin was part of 
29 East Germany. These warnings illustrated the SED's fears but 
apparently had no effect on the Soviet negotiators who were in the 
process of doing exactly what Ulbricht wa~ attempting to prevent. 
Robert Bleimann has posited the ,existence of two factions in the 
SED Politburo at this time, divided according to their orientations 
toward Soviet pressure on the GDR. The central issue in this dispute 
was, according to Bleimann, how to upgrade the international position 
of the GDR. Honecker, Verner, and.Stoph are said to have favored the 
Soviet position that recognition of ,the GDR would be achieved only by 
supporting the process of normalization sought by the .USSR. The USSR, 
28 CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 36, October 6, 1970, p. 10. 
29Berliner Zeitung, March 25, 1970, p. 3. 
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in turn, would protect the sovereign rights of the GDR. This faction 
also favored the forging of closer ties with the Soviet Union. 30 Walter 
Ulbrich~ is described as the leader of the other faction which took a 
more skeptical view of the USSR's guarantee. Bleimann explains that, 
Ulbricht resented the revision in the ,Warsaw Pact's demands in which 
the GDR's needs.had been given a lower priority.3l Ulbricht expressed 
this resentment in the fall of 1970 by publicly criticizing the USSR 
for alleged shortcomings in the area of "joint consultation" betwe~n 
the East European states 32 and by failing to appear at the 10th Congress 
of the Hungarian Communist Party which was, as is the usual practice, 
attended b~ all major communist leaders. 33 Bleimann hypothe~izes tha~ 
the 10th Hungarian Congress was to have been an informal ,meeting of the. 
heads of the East European communist states to examine the detente 
policy of the Soviet Bloc. Ulbricht's ,absence is thus interpreted as 
an expression of his disapproval of detente. 34 
Brezhnev's speech to the Hungarian Congress demonstrates the 
Soviet Union's efforts to refuse to allow Ulbricht to exercise a veto 
over detente. Responding to Ulbricht's fears of a Soviet "sellout" of 
East German interests, Brezhnev argued that the Moscow-Bonn treaty and 
30Robert Bleimann, "Ostpolitik and the GDR," Survey, Vol. 18, 
No.3, Summer, 1972, p. 4Z. 
3l lbid ., p. 44. 
32 ND, November 15, 1970, p. 3. 
33Ibid ., November 22, 1970, p. 1. 
34 Bl eimann, p. 45. 
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the Polish-FRG treaty were "based on a-clear recognition of.the actual 
state of , affairs in Europe ..•. " Accordingly, he insisted, the 
treaties create "good preconditions" for improving detente while at the 
same time safeguarding "the legitimate interests of the German Democratic 
Republic ..•• ,,35 The same theme was stressed in a Pravda editorial 
earlier which had attacked the Red Chinese for charging that the 
Moscow-Bonn treaty was a betrayal of the interests of the GDR. Pravda 
charged the Red Chinese with seeking to aid the ,"neo-fascists" in the 
FRG. 36 These statements clearly show that the USSR was aware of 
Ulbricht's reluctance to support Soviet policy and was making efforts 
to overcome that opposition. Brezhnev continued to apply pressure in 
his speech at the Armenian Jubilee on November 30, 1970. In his speech 
he linked a settlement of the West Berlin problem with an improvement 
in detente for all of Europe. Brezhnev declared that the USSR believed 
normalization of the West Berlin situation was possible and that all 
such a normalization required was, not the acceptance of Ulbricht's 
demands, but simply that the 
. . . Interested patties display goodwill and work out 
decisions that will meet the wishes of the West Berlin 
population and will take into account the legitimate interests 
and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic. 37 
35 22, 1970, 6. CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 47, December p. 
36Ibid . , Vol. 22, No. 38, October 20, 1970, p. 8. 
37 Ibid., Vol. 22, No. 48, December 29, 1970, p. 4. 
The meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in 
Berlin in the ,first week of December served as an additional warning 
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to ,the GDR that Ulbricht's intransigence would not be allowed to disrupt 
Soviet policy. The communique of the meeting, while expressing support 
for the "peace-loving policy" of the GDR and stating that "without the 
participation of the ,GDR it is impossible to build the edifice of 
lasting peace in this area," went on to r~affirm the Soviet Union's 
views on all major issues. Ignoring Ulbricht's demands for the 
fulfillment of additional prerequisites by the ,FRG prior to the further 
advancement of detente in Europe, the ,communique asserted that 
"sufficient preconditions had been created" and that the ,process of 
1 " ld t' 38 norma lzatlon cou now con lnue. 
In his speech at the 14th session of ,the Central Committee of the, 
. , 
SED the following week, Ulbricht issued a further challenge to the USSR, 
clearly demonstrating his unwillingness to yield ,to Soviet pressures. 
First, he emphasized that the WTO,Po1iticai Consultative Committee 
meeting had declared its "solidarity" with the policy of the GDR and, 
in so doi~g, placed considerably more stress on that endorsement than 
the three sentences in the communique would seem to have justified. 
The diplomatic recognitio~ of the GDR by the FRG was described as a 
"vital requirement of the times," as Ulbricht quoted very selectively 
from the communique. He continued by denigrating the concessions,made 
by Bonn, declaring that "nobody • • • pays anybody anything • • . if a 
38 Ibid ., Vol. 22, No. 49, January S, 1971, pp. 2-3. 
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state aQandons in whole or in part positions that have always b.een 
unrealistic or illegitimate." In discussing the West Berlin problem, 
Ulbricht spoke, of a settlement tak~ng into c~nsideration the "needs of 
the population of We~t Berlin" rather than the "wishes" as Brezhnev 
had. He then proceeded to specify the'needs of West Berlin's population 
as he saw them, stressing the ,need ,for an end to "illegal state 
intervention" by Bonn in West Berlin's affairs. He concluded with his 
most significant challenge, an offer to enter into talks with the FRG 
to settle those very questions being discussed at that time by the 
Soviet Union and the major Western powers in Berlin. Ulbricht implied 
that once the GDR and t~e FRG succeeded in working out maj,or problems, 
such as transit from the FRG to West Berlin, the need for the USSR and 
the other powers in Berlin to negotiate a settlement would be eliminated. 
In effect, Ulbricht was replacing the competence of the USSR for the, 
Berlin question with that of the GDR. 39 Meanwhile, Paul Verner's report 
to the Central Committee stressed the leading role of.the USSR in 
resolving the major issues between the GDR, the FRG, and West Berlin, 
clearly illustrating the rift in the Politburo spoken of by Robert 
Bleimann. Verner made no reference to those points made by Ulbricht 
in his speech nor did he discuss any major independent initia~ive by 
the GDR on international questions. 40 
A pattern of pressure and counterpressure betwe~n the USSR and 
Ulbricht emerges from an analysis of events since 1968. The influence 
39 ND, December 10, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
40Ibid ., p. 3. 
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of Walter Ulbricht seemed to reach a zenith with the Czech invasion of 
1968. It might be supposed that,as a result the ,SED's First Se~retary 
developed an overconfident attitude regarding his importance to the 
Soviet Union and the Bloc. In the three years ,that followed the Czech 
invasion, Ulbricht attempted to exercise a veto over major Soviet policy 
decisions affecting Germany and, consequently, demonstrated that he , 
could be a rather awkward ally for the USSR. Apparently, the man who 
had headed what was once the USSR's most subservient satellite was 
endeavoring to assume an independent position within ~he Bloc, at least 
in certain policy areas. In attempting to analyze this development, one 
West German observer of GDR affairs, Peter Jochen Winters, speculated 
that, in fact, Ulbricht was and "remained a German nationalist to the 
end of ,his days." According to Winters, Ulbricht, as a German 
nationalist, "did his best to keep his distance from the Soviet Union 
and tried to preserve for the GDR at least a modicum of independence.,,4l 
Whether the Winters analysis is accurate or not, the GDR had evolved 
from sa te11 i te, to junior ally, and then, in the ,Ulbricht formulation, , 
to equal partn'er of the USSR. While these developments followed a, 
period in which the Soviet Union was apparently loosening its rigid 
control over the East European nations,42 the GDR had clearly tried 
to achieve more than the USSR could tolerate. This was also more than 
Ulbricht could survive when he lost the flexibility that had previously 
41Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 30, 1974, p. 10. 
42Zbigniew Brzezinski, The ,Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), pp. 433-434. 
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enabled him to almost unerringly anticipate shifts in Kremlin policy and 
immediately accommodate the GDR's positions to those of the USSR. By 
contrast, Honecker demonstrated that he possessed the flexibility that 
made him valuable to the Kremlin. While Honecker's early statements led 
many to assume that he was among those resisting detente--for example, 
his apparent opposition to East-W~st German rapprochement in early 
43 1970 --by the time the USSR's determination became obvious, Honecker 
had become a part of the faction in the SED Politburo supporting the 
Soviet position. By the fall of 1970, Honecker had become especially 
vocal in his support for an East German policy of even closer ties with 
the Soviet Union.44 In addition, Honecker had also been on record 
previously for his enthusi~stic support of the Soviet positions on Red 
China and had been noted for his frequent attacks on the ,Chinese 
leadership, attacks which were much more numerous than those of the 
more reluctant U1bricht.45 Seen in the light of the USSR's concern 
for maintaining the GDR as a cooperative, responsive ally, Honecker's 
selection to replace Ulbricht appears to be a highly logical decision 
on the part of the Soviet Union. 
43 ND, February 22, 1970, p. 3. 
44 Ibid ., October 24, 1970, p. 4. 
45Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Euro e 
(New York: Macmi11~an Company, 1972 , pp. 207-208. 
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II. SOVIET INFLUENCE SINCE 1971 
Soviet influence on East German foreign policy since.the promotion 
of Erich Honecker has apparently been much stronger. The Honecker period 
has been characterized by a return to t~e previous East Ge~man attitude 
of quick responsiveness to Soviet suggestions. This has been.a tim~ in 
which the reliability of the SED as a partner of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Un~on has increased considerably. 
The Soviet Union's expectatj,ons were spelled out \'1i th some 
specificity on a variety of occasions. The main Soviet theme was 
sounded in an article in World Marxist Review which has been quoted 
extensively by· various East German publications. The author, CPSU 
Central Committee Secretary Konstantin Katushev, stressed the necessity 
of unity for socialist victories in international affairs today. He 
begins by citing evidence of a change in the international situation 
"in favor of detente and the peaceful coexistence of states with 
different social systems." This change, he insists, did not come about 
because of any alterations of the nature of imperialism, but because of 
the "coordinated foreign policy of the socialist countries .... " 
Unity under the leadership of the CPSU is described as an absolute 
necessity for the victories being enjoyed for socialism. The Soviet 
Union, Katushev writes, has a "special responsibility" by virtue ·of its 
position as the biggest and most powerful of the socialist countries. 
Accordingly, all actions must be .taken in unison with theUSSR. 46 
46Konstantin Katushev, '~oward Closer Unity of the Socialist 
World," World Marxist Review, Vol. 16, No.8, August, 1973, pp. 4-5. 
229 
Brezhnev made.a similar point in his speech at the 8th SED Congress in 
June, 1971, just one month after Ulbricht's removal. According to 
Brezhnev, the greater the unity of the socialist states, 
The more stable will the foundations of universal 
peace and security be and the more firmly will the peoples 
advance towards freedom and independence. . . . We consider 
it our duty to do everything we can to strengthen this 
alliance.47 
The Soviet First Secretary also noted that CPSU foreign policy programs 
were enjoying the active support of the Central Committee of the SED and 
declared that his was simply furthe~ striking proof of the unity of the 
foreign policy aims of the Warsaw Treaty s,\:ates. Report~ of Brezhnev's 
speech to the Congress indicate that each of the statements stressing 
some aspect of Eastern unity was met with either "stormy, prolo~ged 
applause" or at least "prolonged applause." These personal reactions 
themselves, assuming the accuracy of the newspaper accounts, testify to 
the East Germans' sensitivity to the Soviet leader's message. His 
emphatic assurances that the negotiations on West Berlin were being 
conducted with "due considera.tion for the lawful interests and sovereign, 
rights of the GDR" also indicate the CBSU's awareness of East German 
fears that the Soviet Union might not fully protect the ,GDR's concerns 
in the talks. 48 By linking this reassurance with calls for greater 
unity, Brezhnev clearly intended to express the USSR's view that no 
independent actions on the part of the ,SED were necessary to advance 
theGDR's interests on the Berlin question. 
47ND , June 16, 1971, pp. 1-2. 
48 Ibid ., pp. 2-3. 
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The Soviet conceptio~ of the increased necessity for unity on 
foreign policy questions was coupled with an ideological justification. 
A Soviet authority wrote in 1971 ,that the "nature of the epoch" was 
determining changes in international relations in such a fashion that 
th~ need for coordination was now greater tha~ ever. Increased 
coordination was described as dictated by ideological necessity, not 
the whims of the CPSU. 49 Furthermore, the Soviet authority continued, 
the imperialists were the principal opponents of a.coordinated foreign 
policy for the socialist states and were seeking to create the impression 
that such a policy involved a violation of the sovereignty of the East 
European states or an abuse of.their legitimate rights. Th~ best 
interests of the WTO states,. he insisted, required a rejection of. these 
views. He concluded with an observation reflecting once again the 
USSR's awareness of previous East German unwillingness to smoothly and 
completely coordinate all aspects of their foreign policy witll. that, of 
the USSR. While the overwhelming majority of the countries were 
coordinating their policies, not all countries of the socialist 
community were willing to do so. 
Experience shows, however, that the country which 
underestimates the importance of coordinating its foreign 
policy actually weakens the effectiveness of its own policy 
and finds itself in a position of international isolation. so 
49Sh . Sanakoyev, "Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and 
Effectiveness," International Affairs (Moscow), No.6, 1971, p. 8. 
sOIbid., pp. 13-14. 
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Though only China was specifically named in this connection. there can 
be little doubt that the warning. coming almost at the very time 
Ulbricht was being removed, was intended for the GDR as well as other 
East European states. 
The SED has demonstrated its responsiveness to Soviet concerns in 
a number of ways since 1971. One has been the renewed emphasis on the 
importance of foreign policy in the overall development of socialist 
societies. Official East German publications have placed considerable 
stress on the necessity for the creation of the proper conditions for 
the internal development of their society. Such external conditions 
can be achieved, in the SED's view. only through the pursuit of a 
coordinated socialist foreign policy. One East German author recently 
explained that such a policy 
. . • Has to an increasing extent become a basic condition 
for the full utilization of the advantages of the socialist 
society in the socialist countries. The importance of foreign 
policy in the uniform social strategy and tactics of the 
communist parties of the socialist countries is growing. 51 
This has been coupled with ever increasing praise for the Soviet 
Union from the highest SED officials. Most notable have been the 
frequent verbal bouquets offered by SED chief Erich Honecker who has 
regularly praised the USSR for its "consistent, farsighted. and flexible 
policy" which has aided peace. international security. and world 
. I' 52 ' Th . H k d . h h E soc1a 15m. e v1ew onec e~ avances lS t at peace on t european 
51Werner Hanish and Hartwig Busse. "Peaceful Coexistence: 
Principle of GDR Foreign Policy." German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII. 
No. I, 1974, p. 14. 
52 ND. June 7, 1972, p. 1. 
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contine~t has been preserved, more than anything else, by the power and 
strength of the Sovie~ Union. The occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
the founding of the USSR in 1972 gave the GDR an especially good 
opportunity to make the .SED's devotion to the USSR visible to its own 
citizens and all who passed through the GDR. Bright red banners and 
billboards proclaiming this event and the GDR's enthusiastic support 
of the USSR could be seen on almost every street in East Berlin as well 
as in the smaller towns and along the .railways. This was in sharp 
contrast to the much less conspicuous and less frequently seen 
proclamations in neighboring Poland. Praise for the USSR itself has 
been equaled only by the innumerable instances of official praise for 
the GDR's alliance with the Soviet Union, such as that of Gerald Gotting, 
president of the Volkskammer, in a recent article stressing the "true 
and dutable friendship" of the USSR and East Germany.53 Oskar Fischer, 
Acting GDR Foreign Minister, has also spoken of the considerable value 
of this alliance and the "daily consultation with our Soviet friends" 
on all foreign policy matters. 54 East German soldiers are even called 
upon to pledge their allegiance to the alliance with .the Soviet Army in 
their soldiers' oath. 55 
53Gerald Gotting, "Growing International Reputation of the GDR," 
German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, No.1, 1974, pp. 4-5. 
54RBI-Journal (Berlin, GDR), No.3, 1974, p. 5. 
55Handbuch Militarisches Grundwissen (Handbook of Basic Military 
Knowledge) (Berlin, GDR: Militarverlag der DDR, 1972), p. 25. 
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The greater responsiveness of the SED to Soviet pressures has also 
been demonstrated by the calls for increased Bloc cooperation which have 
become an almost daily element of official rhetoric. East German 
accounts emphasize that there are now new bases for the cooperatio~ of 
the states ,of the socialist community. The field of foreign-political 
coordination is said to be particularly affected by this development. 
The official view is that historical experience shows that the ,increased 
coordination of the foreign policies of the socialist states is an 
"inevitable process" which has resulted from the internationalist 
character of socialism and the existence of several independent and 
sovereign states which are linked by a bond of common interests. 56 
Erich Honecker has praised the system of meetings between the heads 
of the communist parties of East Europe as one important means of 
consolidating the unity of the community of socialist states.57 Since 
his elevation as First Secretary, Honecker has been among the most 
enthusiastic of the E~st European leaders working for increased 
consultation and coordination among the Bloc states. An additional 
element of Honecker's theme has been an intensified stress on the 
belief that tne USSR must be recognized as the authoritative vqice 
in East Europe on all major issues. While Ulbricht also recognized 
the USSR's authoritative position, he seemed to be seeking to make 
exceptions to Soviet authority on certain issues, especially those 
56Anton Latzo, "Foreign-Political Coordination in the Interests of 
Socialism and Peace," German Foreign Policy, Vol. XIII, No.2, 1974, 
pp. 170-171. 
57ND, December 10, 1973, p. 1. 
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relating to detente and the ,West Berlin question. Honecker makes no 
effort to except certain areas from Soviet authority and has been 
optimistic about the results of the GDR's renewed efforts at policy 
coordination. SED spokesmen have boasted ,that cooperation with both 
the Soviet Union and the other socialist states has been strengthened 
d d d . 58 an eep,ene l.n recent years. 
The handling of the crisis over the opening of a branch of the FRG 
Epvironmental office in West Berlin in 1974 demonstrates the change in 
the relationship between the USSR and the GDR. Observers of East German 
affairs felt that the GDR's conduct during the last serious crisis over 
West Berlin, that arising as a result of ,the FRG's decision to elect a 
new president in West Berlin in 1969, illustrated the lack of cooperation 
between the ,SED and the Soviet Union. At that time, according to an 
analysis by Melvin Croan, the SED precipitated a crisis on its ownwhi1~ 
the USSR attempted to play the dispute down and acted as a mediator 
rather than a participant aiding the GDR in its confrontation with the 
West. 59 The 1974 crisis illustrated the unity of the GDR and the Soviet 
Union. East German objections to the branch office are couched in terms 
of a violation of ~heQuadripartite Agreement on West Berlin60 while the 
Soviet Union has made public its support of the SED's position and its 
intention to support the implementation of appropriate measures to 
58G t . 3 o tl.ng, p. . 
59 Croan, pp. 80-81. 
60Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin, GDR: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs), Vol. 14, August 2, 1974, p. 167. 
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counter the West Germanmoves. 6l In contrast to.their conduct during 
the 1969 crisis, in this incident the East Germans.have been especially 
careful to place their demands within the context of a Soviet-approved 
policy, the full implementation of the Berlin agreement as interpreted 
by the Soviet Union. The fact that Moscow has given full support to the 
GDR and voiced similar objectio~ to the establishment of the .branch of 
the FRG Environment Office in West Berlin clearly indicates that the 
CPSU does not see the ~risis as an East German attempt to impede detente. 
The Soviet press placed the blame in this controversy squarely on the 
FRG Ministry of Interior and branded the decision as "devoid of any 
practical business sense" and "in complete contradiction to the letter 
and spirit of the quadripartite agreement on West,Berlin.,,62 The 
conformity of the Soviet and the East German responses demonstrates the 
coordination of foreign policy spoken of so frequently by both nations. 
This might also be considered evidence of what the SED refers to as the 
"new element in the worldwide struggle betwe~n socialism and 
imperialism." This new element is described by the East Germans as a 
result of the socialist states having reached a "new, higher stage of 
their common foreign policy.,,63 
Spokesmen for the SED and the GDR government never tire of 
pointing out the benefits of a common foreign policy for the WTO 
6lNew York Times, July 21, 1974, p. 3. 
62 CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 27, July 31, 1974, pp. 21-22. 
63paul Markowski, "Common Foreign Policy of the Socialist Community 
of States," German Foreign Paliey, Vol. XU, No.5, 1973, p. 501. 
states. Since Honecker's elevation as First Secretary the SED has 
repeatedly emphasized the advantages that the GDR enjoys as a result 
of the USSR-East German alliance. Speaking of this in 1974, an East 
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German commentary advanced the view that East Germany's "position within 
international politics has fundamentally changed within the last year." 
This change, it insists, came about thanks largely to the efforts of the 
Soviet Union. 64 The SED sees this change as one which helps create the 
internal and external conditions for shaping the "evolved socialist 
society in the GDR." Hanisch and Busse, writing in German Foreign 
Policy, expressed the East German view ofa link between foreign and 
domestic policies. 
. . . Socialist foreign policy has to an increasing extent 
become a basic condition for the full utilization of the 
advantages of the socialist society in the ,socialist countries. 
The importance of foreign policy in the uniform social 
strategy and tactics of the .communist parties of the socialist 
countries is growing. 65 
Furthermore, East German authorities explain, the basic condition for 
full international equality of the GDR is its alliance with the Soviet 
Union. Without this alliance, East Germany would still suffer from the 
discrimination said to have been practiced by the West in its relations. 
with the GDR, discrimination which caused many difficulties and forced 
the .GDR to make additional expenditures for defense. As a result, 
during this time the GDR was at a disadvantage in protecting its 
64ND, April 27, 1974, p. 9. 
65Hanisch and Busse, p. 14. 
interests vis-a-vis the capitalist countries as well as within the 
U · d N' 66 nlte atlons. The USS~'s assistance is considered the .decisive 
factor in helping East Germany advance beyond its previous status. 
In December, 1973, Honecker went so far as to attribute not only the 
above improvements but "every success of socialism in the GDR" to its 
alliance with the USSR. 67 On the occasion of the.twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the GDR, Kurt Hager declared that "without the ,Soviet 
Union's all-round comradely aid, the very existence and evolution of 
our republic would have been impossib1e.,,68 While Ulbricht never 
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questioned the value of the .GDR-Soviet alliance and heaped considerable 
prais~ upon that alliance, he never lavished the .excessive praise on 
the .al1iance seen during the Honecker years. 
The East German stance on the treaties negotiated by the USSR, 
especially the one on West Berlin, further illustrates the SED's 
increased responsiveness. In September, 1971, Pravda spelled out its 
view of the meaning of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin. 
First, it declared the agreement to be "an effective foundation" for 
the normalization and improvement ,of the West Ber.lin situation. Second, 
it stressed that the agreement excludes West Berlin from the ,territory 
of the FRG. And, third, it pointed out that the agreement meant that 
66Wexner Hanisch, "The GDR and Its International Relations," Geman 
Foreign Policy, Vol. XII, No.6, 1973, pp. 632~633. 
67ND , December 10, 1973, p. 1. 
68 Kurt Hager, "Werte und Errungenschaften unseres Lebens" ("Values 
and Achievements of our Life"), Einheit, No. 9/10, September/October, 
1974, p. 1072. 
there would be a curtailment of West Ge~man "poli tical acti vi ties" in 
West Ber1in. 69 At almost the same time as it was making its yiew of 
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the West .Berlin agreement public, Pravda was also able to report on the' 
"complete \lJ1.ity of opinion" between the USSR and the GDR on "questions 
of West Berlin.,,70 The SED has further demonstrated its responsive 
attitude by giving credit for the agreement, without reservation, solely 
to the Soviet Union. 71 Also, while Honecker attributes certain 
constructive contributions in the process of deten~e to the GDR, he is 
careful to phrase his claims in terms of.the SED's close adherence to 
the foreign policy program outlined by the .24th Congress of the CPSU. 72 
East German accounts are also careful to point out that the negotiations 
which it has been carrying out with the FRG on such matters as a postal 
and communications agreement, a health agreement, and on mutual legal 
aid are being conducted pursuant to .the Berlin Agreement concluded by 
the Soviet Union with the Western powers. 73 In other words, the GDR 
sees itself acting to put the finishing touches on what is described as 
the settlement of the German question, but, only in connection with 
provisions already determined by the Soviet Union. There is no talk 
of independent East German proposals as was very much the case during 
69 CDSP, Vol. XXIII, No. 36, October 5, 1971, p. 22. 
70Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 35, September 28, 1971, p. 21. 
71 ND, June 7, 1972, p. 1. 
72Ibid ., p. 2. 
73Hanisch, p. 645. 
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the Ulbricht. regime when the GDR offered initiatives for the preparation 
of an all-European security conference. 74 Honecker has worked carefully 
within the framework of Soviet initiative and, as a result, has won the 
praise of the Soviet Union for the GDR's "businesslike approach and 
goodwill.,,7S The fact that the SED, as Honecker himself has stated, 
views the actions of the USSR as having closed the German question, 76 
certainly no small achievement, is additional ~estimony of East 
Germany's responsive attitude. Finally, the appreciation of the SED, 
which declared that the agreement on West Berlin showed how "our. 
republic's vital interests are ensured precisely in th~ course of 
cooperation between the GDR and the USSR," was noted with approval 
in Pravda following the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreenlent. 77 
The S~D has exhibited its increased loyalty to the Soviet Union by 
acting as a major spokesman against Chinese revisionism, once more 
echoing the Kremlin's current view on the activities of the Red Chinese. 
Not only have the allegedly disruptive actions of Peking in the 
int~rnational arena been condemned, but Honecker has also warned against 
Chinese interference in German affairs. In December, 1973, he spoke of 
ominous indications of a potential union between certain elements in the 
FRG government and the Red Chinese who are said to share a common desire 
74Dieter Vogl, "The Warsaw Treaty States and the European Security 
Conference," German Foreign Policy, Vol. X, No.1, 1971, p. 27. 
7SCDSP , Vol. XXIII, No. 50, January 11, 1972, p. 22. 
76 ND, December 10, 1973, p. 1. 
77CDSP , Vol. XXIII, No. 40, November 2, 1971, p. 23. 
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78 to distupt the process of detente in Central Europe. The sharply 
critic~l attitude assumed by the SED in recent years toward the Red 
Chinese contrasts with the more restrained tone of the last Ulbricht 
years, a tone which did not always fully reflect the inten~ity of Soviet 
feeling with regard to Peking. Ulbricht's speech at the 1969 
International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties illustrated .the 
GDR's restraint. While Brezhnev spoke at some length on the Chinese 
problem,79 Ulbricht devoted most of his speech to an attack on the West 
German Social Democrats. Only three paragraphs of his speech dealt with 
the Red Chinese. While Ulbricht noted that the "aggressive armed raids" 
on the Soviet-Chinese border had "angered" the GDR and that the Chinese 
leadership had "officially completed its departure from Marxism-
Leninism," he also spoke of the Chinese Communists as people "with whom 
we feel closely bound up" and invited them to "resume cooperation" with 
h h M . t L . . . 80 t e ot er arX1S - enlnlst partles. 
Finally, the .SED has altered its attitude toward the West German 
Social Democrats during the time since Honecker's elevation and, in so 
doing, has further accommodated its position to that of the Kremlin. 
The establishment of an SPD government in the FRG was greeted in the. 
GDR as an event of little significance initially. Neues Deutschland 
suggested that the Hmuch vaunted 'accommodation' shown by the. Federal 
78ND, December 10, 1973, p. 1. 
79Internationa1 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, 
pp. 156-160. 
80Ibid ., pp. 229-230. 
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Republic" in the first months after Brandt's election as Chancellor was, 
in reality, nothing more than a "flood of more or less beautiful words. 
The SED also suggested that. the ,SPD, instead of wanting to 
recognize "realities," desired a "restoration of the state of affairs 
that existed before August 13, 1961.,,82 As First Secretary, Honecker 
has done much to reverse the negative tone set by Ulbricht with regard 
to the SPD. The change became apparent with Honecker's statement in 
November, 1971, following a visit to East Berlin by Brezhnev. Upon 
Brezhnev's departure, Honecker noted the "constructiv~ approach" of 
the Brandt government in dealing with the settlement of "unresolved 
questions" and stated the GDR's intention of giving a favorable response 
83 to the Brandt approach. The reversal was further shown by an 
interview Honecker gave to the director of the East Ger,man news agency 
and the editor of Neues Deutschland in 1972. In response to a question 
as to what he might expect from a West German government under the 
leadership of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, Honecker made 
his preference for an SPD government explicit. He explained that the 
CDU had demonstrated its negative attitude toward the GDR for the twenty 
years it had controlled the government in the past and that it would be 
likely to resume such a po licy should the CDU I S Barzel become Chancellor. 
A defeat of the SPD and a victory for the CDU would, in Honecker's 
81 ND, March 7, 1970, p. 1. 
82 Ibid ., March 17, 1970, pp. 1-2. 
83Ibid ., November 7, 1971, p. 1. 
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opinion, bring an end to the process of detente, a process to which the. 
GDR was fully committed by this time. 84 The reversal of the traditional 
East German view of the Social Democrats as being worse than the more 
conservative parties must be seen as an event of considerable 
significance and an additional expression of the GDR's willingness to 
cooperate more fully with the USSR than during Ulbricht's last years. 
While there is no reason to believe that Ulbricht was completely 
unresponsive to Soviet wishes during his last years, it is apparent that 
he had become less responsive than desired on certain specific issues 
and that he attempted to exercise a veto over Soviet policy in some 
respects. By contrast, Honecker has returned the GDR to a pattern 
of more complete and full compliance with Soviet dictates. In short, 
while Ulbricht was responsive, Honecker has been more responsive. This 
is not to suggest that the GDR has reverted to the servile status that 
it had during the years it was the .Soviet Zone of Germany. A return to 
such situation does not seem desirable even for the Soviet Union. 
However, recent developments do suggest a greater awareness on the part 
of the Honecker leadership that East Germany cannot become an independent 
force within the Bloc. Honecker's policies indicate an awareness of the 
futility of attempting to oppose the Soviet Union on major policies, 
especially one such as detente which seems to form a central element of 
Soviet strategy in world affairs today. The current leadership realizes 
that the GDR can be an effective power in Europe only as it acts more 
84Ibid ., April 26, 1972, p. 1. 
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closely than ever within the WTO and in concert with the Soviet Union. 
Honecker, unlike his predecessor, displays no pretensions of being an 
equal partne~ with the .Soviet Union. 
III. DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF THE USSR ON EAST GERMANY 
The Soviet Union has consistently issued calls for its allies to 
follow as closely as possible the example set by the Soviet Union not 
only in foreign policy but also in domestic affairs. While this emphasis 
on the necessity for unity does not represent a return to the Stalinist 
policy of institutio~al and ideological uniformity of the.postwar 
85 0 dOl 0 01 years, 1t oes 1nvo ve S1m1 ar concerns. Essentially the same ends 
are sought but different means are employed for their attainment today. 
The USSR utilizes what it refers to as "collective analysis" of the 
experiences of all socialist countries rather than just that of the 
Soviet Union. Ideally, the communist parties of the Bloc states are 
supposed to arrive at common policies during frequent meetings at which 
coordination is discussed. The implication is that these policies are 
supposed to be formulated after joint consultation, not simply on the 
basis of Soviet dictates as would have been the case during Stalin's 
time. One Soviet author recently addressed himself to this issue and 
explained that 
Coordination of the political activity of countries of the 
socialist community is determined by practical necessity and 
ensues from the community of their international and national 
85Brzezinski, pp. 67-83. 
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interests ...• It serves as .another example of the 86 
untena,bility of concepts of different "models of socialism." 
Soviet sources call for the elaboration of a common line among all 
socialist countries in economic, political, and ideological affairs. 
Multilateral and bilateral talks as well as the meetings of the WTO 
Political Consultative Committee are described as the.principal means 
of achieving the .desired common line. 
East German domestic policies during the period since 1968 do not 
reveal any serious divergence from the policies supported by the .Soviet 
Union. Both Ulbricht and Honecker have demonstrated attitudes 
remarkably similar to those of the .Kremlin's leadership relating to the. 
domestic development of the GDR. Most accounts see this congruity of 
outlooks on domestic affairs, especially cultural questions, as 
characteristic throughout East Germany's history.87 The most notable 
variation in East German dumestic policy from that of the USSR is the 
SED's economic policy. Even in the period prior to the Czech 
disturbances the East German leadership, according to typical Western 
analyses, was seeking a certain amount of economic freedom through its 
reforms, commonly referred to as the New Economic System (NES).88 
However, even in this departure from what might be considered orthodoxy, 
the SED's efforts were facilitated by the Soviet Union itself, hardly 
an indication that East Berlin was exhibiting independence from Moscow. 89 
86V. Dolgin, "Unity of Goals and Action," 
(Moscow), No.7, July, 1974, p. 5. 
International Affairs 
87S . 170 pl.ttman, p. . 88 Ibid ., pp. 174-176. 
89 Croan, p. 83. 
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Yet, even this has been abandoned within recent years and a process of 
economic recentralization has begun in the GDR, which makes its economic 
system indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union and most other 
East European communist states.90 This development does not seem related 
to the shift of power from Ulbricht to Honecker, but rather to increasing 
dissatisfaction with the ,results of the system since 1970 and 1971. 
Honecker, unlike Ulbricht, has demonstrated a sensitivity to the 
USSR's calls for unity in the internal development of the Bloc states 
and an awareness of the necessity for linki,ng domestic policies with 
foreign policy in order to facilitate the development of an "evolved 
socialist society" in the GDR. 91 Furthermore, according to Honecker, 
just as the improvement of the GDR's international position, which has 
corne about due to the efforts of the USSR, has strengthened the internal 
development of the GDR, the continued domestic development of East 
Germany along the lines favored by the ,Soviet Union has a favorable 
impact on the world power ratio. 92 In other words, favorable domestic 
developments aid favorable international development which, in turn, 
aid the former, thus suggesting that the relationship between foreign 
and domestic policy is reciprocal. And, according to the ,SED's First 
Secretary, it is ,only through coordination with the USSR in both areas 
that the GDR can achieve success. SED Politburo member Kurt Hager has 
90Michael Keren, "The New Economic System in the GDR: An 
Obituary," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXIV, No.4, April, 1973, p. 5~4. 
91ND, May 29, 1973, p. 1. 
92Ibid ., April 27, 1974, p. 9. 
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explained that coordination with the Soviet Union is particularly 
important in the area of philosophical question. He has described 
cooperation on these issues as being of.primary importance in building 
the type of socialis~ personality essential for the successful 
construction of a socialist society in the GDR. 93 In May, 1974, 
Professor Doctor Heinrich Vogel of Rostock University echoed Hager's 
views and observed that the cooperation of the philosophers of the USSR 
and the GDR "has become closer in recent years." According to Vogel, 
numerous East German philosophical works were being reprinted in the 
Soviet Union as part of an intensive philosophical exchange effort.94 
Discussions of the basis of East German "socialist democracy" 
reveal the .extent of Soviet influence in the ,development of the state 
organization of the GDR. The Soviet ex~"ple is constantly cited and 
efforts are continually made to emulate the USSR's model. The deputy 
chairman of the GDR State Council, Friedrich Ebert, explained the 
importance of the experiences of the USSR in an analysis of East German 
local government. Bourgeois democracy proclaims the equality of all 
citizens, Ebert stressed, while in reality creating domination by 
capitalist "exploiters." By contrast, he claims, the Soviet state 
organization destroys this swindle by implementing genuine democracy, 
the real equality of all working people. Accordingly, it is to the 
Soviet example of state organization that the GDR as well as other 
93Ibid ., April 17, 1974, pp. 5-6. 
940stsee Zeitung, May 28, 1974, p. 4. In Translations on Eastern 
Europe, No. 942, August 9, 1974, pp. 1-2. 
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95 
socialist states look as a model for their own governments. In order 
to expand what the SED refers to as "democratic collaboration" by the 
citizens in the management of the .state organization, the GDR has begun 
to experiment with the so-called "voters' mandate" or referendum. This 
is also viewed as an effort to build on the basis of Soviet innovations 
in popular control of government. East Ge~an accounts cite an 
evaluation of Soviet experiences with the mandates as a major· 
contribution to their understanding of the proper use of such a 
h . 96 mec anlsm. East German experimentation with the voters' mandates is 
by no means the only example of the SED's effort to mold its governmental 
organization in the image of that of the USSR. Both Ulbricht and 
Honecker displayed a readiness to look to the.Soviet examp1~ for numerous 
features which might be applicable to the GDR. 
The SED's cultural policy represents one of the most remarkable and 
extensive areas of East German emulation of the Soviet model. Ulbricht 
frequently referred to the impossibility of creating a socialist 
national culture in the GDR without the frat~rna1 help, guidance, and 
cooperation given by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in "a11 
aspects of life. ,,97 While Ulbricht began to deviate from the USSR in 
certain foreign policy questions, he never strayed far from the 
95Friedrich Ebert, "Staat und Demokratie ,unserer soz~alistischen 
Gessellschaft" ("State and Democracy in Our Socialist Society"), 
Einheit, Vol. 29, No.4, 1974, p. 396. 
96Neue Justiz, Vol. 28, No.1, 1974, pp. 1-6. In Translations 
on Eastern Europe, No. 857, February 27, 1974, p. 35. 
97SWB, October 8, 1969, EE/3197/C2/l. 
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orthodoxy of the CPSU's cultural policy. Honecker has continued the 
cultural policy' inherited from his predecessor. The Soviet Union 
remains the primary influence affecting the East German.cultural policy. 
The SED stresses its concern for the harmonious development of its 
cultural policy and its determination to guarantee the more systematic 
inclusion of cultural problems in party life. In order to do this, 
according to a recent article in Einheit, the experiences of the Soviet 
Union will continue to be used as a guide for determining the cultural 
98 
standards of the people. Efforts to improve social control over the 
population are also based on Soviet experiences. GDR sources state 
that they are looking to basic enterprises, collective farms, offices, 
and organizations as the means of implementing more complete social 
control. T~is choice is described as one which was based on a study 
99 
of the experiences of Sovie~ popular control organs. The 
intensification of the effort to strenthen ties. between the GDR and the 
USSR was further illustrated by the 1974 order requiring training in the 
100 Russian language for all university students. Such a requirement 
would obviously facilitate the creation of closer bonds between the tNt) 
states by easing communication between Russians and the bet~er educated 
and presumably leading members of East German society. 
98Rudi Raupach, "Initiator der Kulturabeit" ("Initiator of 
Cultural Work"), Einheit, Vol. 29, No.3, 1974, p. 334. 
99Staat und Recht, Vol. 23, No.4, 1974, pp. 571-579. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 923, June 28, 1974, p. 50. 
100Gesetzblatt der DDR, Part I, No. 14, March 27, 1974. In 
Translations on Eastern Europe, No. 908, May 29, 1974, p. 15. 
249 
The measures discussed above, as well as many others implemented 
during th~ last six years by the GDR, illustrate the official effort to 
draw East German society more closely within the orbit of Soviet society. 
This policy must be viewed as a logical concomitant of the SED's 
Abgrenzung policy. The GD~ is being demarcated from the FRG and at the. 
same time integrated ever more firmly with the Soviet Union and its 
allies. The development of a social and cultural policy compatible with 
that of its allies is seen by the SED as being just as important as 
compatible foreign policies. 
IV. IN SUMMARY: JU~IOR ALLY OR SATELLITE? 
This chapter has considered the relationship between the GDR and 
the USSR regar4ing foreign policy questio~s impinging on the West Berlin 
issue as well as matters relating to the domestic development of the 
GDR. The latte!' has b.een included in view of the connection between 
foreign and domestic policies spoken of by both the USSR and the GDR. 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that Ulbricht, during his 
last years as First Secretary, began to depart from the USSR's desired 
course on a number of foreign policy questions. This by no means 
implies that there was anything like a rebellion by tilt: mall who had 
been considered for so many years Moscow's most faithful puppet. 
Rather, it was an effort by Ulbricht to e~ert more influence on the 
Kremlin's policy in certain areas of foreign policy. This effort did 
not extend to domestic policy questions. Ulbricht's independence was 
resisted by the Soviet Union and apparently played a major role in 
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helping the ,Soviet leadership decide upon the need for Ulbricht's 
removal. Gerhard Wettig has speculated that the Soviet need for 
practical cooperation at this time demanded a "pragmatic renunciation 
of confrontation." Ulbricht's reluctance to renounce confrontation 
obviously ran counter to Soviet needs. According to Wettig, at the same 
time as the USSR was working to achieve cooperation with the West in 
order to benefit from Western economic and technological advancements, 
it also saw a need that the Eastern camp's relationship with the West 
be Udetermined by the awareness of an insurmountable antithesis and 
unrelenting militancy if 'socialism' is not to give itself up. ,,101 
Honecker was able to retain East German sensitivity to Soviet desires 
for an ideological confrontation that not involving any military 
aspects. The new First Secretary has returned the GDR to its former 
position as an especially cooperative, reliable ally. East German 
social policy throughout this period has remained close to the Soviet 
guidelines. This is important because it demonstrates that the GDR's 
efforts to resist Soviet pressure during the last Ulbricht years did 
not represent an attempt to dramatically alter East German society. 
Any efforts by the SED to initiate serious changes in the pattern of 
East Germany's social and cultural development, what one might consider 
a new version of de-Stalinization, coupled with a recalcitrance in 
foreign policy questions, would have undoubtedly been viewed with 
101Gerhard Wettig, "Sowjet Politik zu Westeuropa" ("Soviet Policy 
Towards Western Europe"), Osteuropa, No.7, 1974, pp. 851-852. 
251 
considerable alarm by the USSR. De-Stalinization and desatellitization 
are two separate processes and the Soviet Union has always preferred 
that they be kept apart. A union of the two might be considered cause 
for intervention, as was the case in Hungary in 1956. 102 The SED under 
Ulbricht made its reluctance to create such a union very clear by its 
continued orthodoxy on domestic questions. In so doing, it further 
emphasized its basic satisfaction with its status within the Bloc. 
While one cannot determine the degree or tone of the pressure that 
the USSR might have exerted on the SED behind the scenes, it is obvious 
that the disagreements between itself and the GDRls leadership were 
handled with relative delicacy. The fact that it was possible to handle 
its disagreements in this manner makes one inclined to view the GDR not 
as an abject satellite but rather as a junior ally. Even allies, after 
all, frequently have serious disagreements. What would seem to 
characterize the ally relationship is the more circumspect manner of 
resolution of disputes contrasted with the heavy-handed methods typical 
of earlier periods of Soviet-East European and East German relations. 
In this instance the Soviet Union was no longer compelled to rely upon 
the introduction of Red Army tanks in order to restore a more desirable 
situation for itself as had been necessary in 1953 in East Germany. 
However, before concluding that the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and the GDR is the same as that between the United States and 
the FRG, two factors should be taken into consideration. First, the 
102Brzezinski, p. 434. 
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differences of opinion in the last Ulbricht years were not nearly as 
great as those in the 1968 Czech-Soviet disputes. Accordingly, the 
stakes weren't so immense; the~e was no suggestion that the GDR was 
about to leave the Bloc. Therefore, it was easier for the USSR to 
adopt a more casual method of conflict resolution, one not involving 
force. Second, it should also be remembered that the Ulbricht-Kremlin 
disputes did lead to the removal of the GDR's leader. That in itself 
points cut the nontraditional relationship between the GDR and the USSR. 
The GDR may no longer be a satellite, but it is still not a completely 
independent state. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM 
In order to gain a fuller appreciation of the significance of the 
GDR's West Berlin problem and its relationship to East Germany's 
membership in the Soviet Bloc, it is necessary to develop an overview 
of this issue in terms of its possible long-range impact. This overview 
will be developed, first, through a reexamination of the significance of 
the Soviet influence which has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
Second, the West Berlin issue will be approached with a consideration of 
its actual meaning for the GDR's political system. Next, an effort will 
be made to evaluate the nature of the "threat" posed by West Berlin to 
the SED regime and, on the basis of this, an attempt will be made to 
determine the root motives of the East German policy on West Berlin. 
A final concern will be an evaluation of the significance of the 
so-called era of detente for the West Berlin dispute. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE 
The Soviet Union's influence on the GDR must now be evaluated in 
light of two considerations: first, it is important because it affects 
East Berlin's relations with the socialist community of states; and, 
second, it is significant due to its impact on the GDR' s foreign policy. 
In neither of these aspects is the GDR's siutation unique. It is the 
subject of what is essentially the same policy for each of the member 
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states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. While there are significant 
variations between the respective applications to each of these states, 
these variations are a function of local conditions and issues, not of 
a separate policy goal. In short, the USSR is primarily concerned about 
the implementation of a policy which will strengthen East European unity 
and embellish and perpetuate Soviet leadership over the alliance. 
The Soviet Union's belief in the necessity for East European 
neighbors who were "friendly" to the USSR was demonstrated in the last 
years of World War Two. Immediately after the Teheran Conference in 
1943 Stalin initiated a particularly bold political line with regard to 
the political situation of the states bordering it on the West. l While 
the USSR was first concerned about the situations in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, its interest extended to what is now the rest of the 
socialist community of states in East Europe as well as Greece and 
Turkey. Stalin was determined to have a protective cordon between 
Russia and its western" neighbors who, in Stalin's mind, were evidently 
seen as potential invaders. The Soviet response to the invitation to 
participate in the European Recovery Program illustrates Stalin's 
conception of the dangers facing the USSR. He had no intention of 
allowing Soviet participation and when Poland and Czechoslovakia 
expressed interest in the progra~> Stalin pressured them into reversing 
their positions. Stalin saw Polish and Czech participation in the 
European Recovery Program as the first step in the direction of a 
lAdam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1968), 
pp. 354-356. 
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defection to the West and this, he felt, would present a challenge to 
the very survival of Communist power in the .Soviet Union. 2 The 
maintenance of a string of sate11itel states between itself and the West 
was clearly viewed as an absolute necessity for the military and 
political security of the USSR. The securing of such a protective 
shield had been a major Soviet goal during the war and after the war 
its preservation assumed the highest priority in Soviet foreign policy. 
The military importance of the East European satellites rested, 
however, on a traditional conception of war. In the context of a 
nonnuclear war, such as the Second World War, Stalin's exercise in 
geographical strategy was a highly rational one. However, th~ advances 
in military technology of the past quarter of a century have made this 
strategy obsolete. Today, the USSR's protective cordon could easily be 
bypassed by modern miss1es and high-flying aircraft. The East European 
buffer states can no longer protect the territory of the Soviet Union 
frOID a direct and sudden military assault. What would have served as 
a valuable and effective shield against a Nazi attack in 1941 is no 
longer of any real military significance. 
In spite of the dramatically diminished military value of Eastern 
Europe, Moscow has not downgraded the importance of the region. Not 
only does East Europe augment the traditional military forces of the 
Soviet Union, making the Warsaw Pact force one of the most powerful 
military organizations in the world, but it also enhances the political 
2Ibid ., p. 436. 
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position of the USSR. First, it serves as a demonstration of the 
applicability of the basic Soviet-style system to countries other than 
the USSR. The success of the "peoples' democracies" in East Europe is 
considered a fulfillment of a major stage in the development of world 
'1' 3 SOCl.a l.sm. It is now possible to speak of more than socialism in one 
country since the system has spread th.r:oughout <!.n entire region 
encompassing eight separate states if Yugoslavia and Albania are counted. 
Second, it makes it possible for the Kremlin to act as spokesman for a 
group of states rather than simply one state. In this fashion the 
political impact of the USSR is magnified. In an international 
organization such as the United Nations it has a bloc of votes on which 
it can count in almost any situation. In short, while East Europe may 
be of less value militarily than it once was, its political significance 
continues to justify the importance that Moscow attaches to its alliance 
with its small neighbors. Finally, the el::onomic importance of East 
Europe should not be overlooked. East Europe provides the USSR with 
valuable markets for its products and, in turn, also produces a 
considerable amount of commodities vital to the Soviet economy, The 
economic significance of the Soviet-East European alliance has been 
such that many autho~ities feel that progress in the development of 
economic ties between the USSR and Eastern Europe actually exceeded 
progress in the formation of effective political bonds. 4 
3 Shalva Sanakoyev, The World Socialist System (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1972), pp. 59-65. 
4Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), pp. 287-288. 
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A pro-Soviet East Europe derives additional importance from its 
value to the Soviet Union as a laboratory for experimentation with 
numerous Marxist theoretical concepts. Nish Jamgotch, Jr., has written 
a brief book in \'lhich he examines the efforts of the Soviet Union to 
develop so-calleci "international relations of a new type" between itself 
and East Europe. The current relationship between the USSR and East 
Germany will facilitate a careful analysis of the success that the 
Soviet Union has enjoyed in its endeavors relative to this ideal type 
of international relationship. While in the past it was common to 
dismiss the relationships between the Kremlin and its East European 
client states as being of a purely "satellite" character or, in other 
words, characterized by total subservience on the part of .the minor 
states, the tendency to consider the Soviet alliance system as more 
of a genuine political coalition has increased in recent years. S 
Accordingly, the issue to which Jamgotch addresses himself has become 
more significant. The East German case, as a review of previous 
chapters would indicate, may serve as a demonstration of the sort of 
alliance that the USSR is hoping to create in Eastern Europe. An 
examination of the Soviet Union's apparent designs will also provide 
a better understanding of the GDR's place in the Soviet coalition. 
According to Jamgotch, the most basic condition postulated by the 
Soviet Union for the development of international relations of a new 
SLouis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics 
of Regions (Englewood Cliffs, New .Tersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 
pp. 366-367. 
type is proletarian internationalism, which is defined as a set of 
principles collectively guiding the world socialist movement. 6 The 
East German case illustrates acceptance of this precept as a guide to 
its policy. Both Ulbricht and Honecker repeatedly cite~prole~arian 
internationalism as the foremost authoritative concept in the 
formulation of the SED'S policies. Honecker enunciated the GORis 
consistent attitude relative to proletarian internationalism. in May, 
1974 in his speech on East German-Soviet friendship. He spoke then 
of the advanced stage of GDR~Soviet relations, stressing that "every 
step we are taking today" is determined by the GDR's membership in 
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the Sovial alliance system. Only through complete unity, he emphasized, 
7 
could the socialist state community achieve security and peace. 
A second essential attribute of the development of the new type of 
international relations is the concept of socialist internationalism. S 
This involves a complete and equal sharing in the benefits derived by 
members of the socialist community of states. !n short, it is a 
socialist affirmation of all for one and one for all. Also, just as 
the entire community advances as a result of the successes achieved 
by individual states, each state also suffers from mistakes made by 
other members. This concept provided the theoretical underpinning for 
Ulbricht's warning in 1968 that the Czechoslovakian experiments would 
result in harm to all of the members of the Soviet alliance, not simply 
6Nish Jamgotch, Jr., Soviet-East European Dialogue: International 
Relations of a New Type? (Stanford University: The Hoover Institution, 
1968), p. 94. 
7 Neues Deutschland, May 13, 1974, pp. 1-2. (Hereafter cited as ND.) 
8 Jamgotch, p, 95. 
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in harm to the Czechs alone. Socialist internatioJ'!,alism is described in 
Soviet accounts as a "motive force" in the world socialist system today. 
It is seen as the best contribution 
For the economic and political development of each 
country with the common effort to strengthen fraternal 
cooperation and mutual assistance of socialist states. 9 
East German authorities have emphasized the logic of a situation in 
which all the "revolutionary forces" share equally in the successes and 
setbacks of socialism. This, they assert, leads to an "interlacing of 
interests" and to "joint responsibility" in the development of the 
socialist community.lO The forecasts relative to socialist 
internationalism predict increased cooperation in economic, military, 
and cultural endeavors. The GDR, as noted previously, has been one 
of the most enthusiastic members of the Bloc in its proclamations of 
the need for increased cooperative efforts in these areas. East German 
enthusiasm can most likely be attributed to, first, the need to develop 
a sense of identity in the GDR with the Bloc, something which would 
limit the attraction of the FRG to East Ge~man citizens if accomplished. 
Cultural and economic cooperative ventures are especially important in 
this respect. Second, the GDR t s position as the "front line" of 
socialism obviously makes the SED conscious of military matters so it 
is reasonable to expect the leadership to stress the military aspects 
9 Sankayev, pp. 131-132. 
lOHarald Neubert, "Interrelationship of National and International 
Aspects in the Socialist Community of States," German Foreign Policy, 
Vol. XIII, No.2, 1974, p. 137. 
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of the alliance with the Bloc. A close military relationship with the 
Bloc, in effect, puts the power of the USSR on the line in defense of 
the GDR. Finally, as Peter C. Ludz has noted, the GDR enjoys certain 
economic benefits as a result of economic cooperation with the Bloc. 
East GeI:ll\any has profited more than its neighbors in the "international 
socialist division of labor" which was begun in 1967. As a result, the 
GDR has achieved an economic monopoly in East Europe in certain key 
industrial products, especially in the chemical industry.ll 
Jamgotch explains that the Soviet conception of the new type of 
international relations is distinguished by the continued existence of 
sta';;e sovereignty, limited independence, and Soviet restraint upon 
excessive intrusions in East European affairs. 12 The East German case, 
once again, is illustrative of the fulfillment of this objective. The 
GDR state organization obviously possesses sovereignty over its territory 
in most respects today. Furthermore, the SED stresses the element of 
stat~ sovereignty as a necessary component for the new type of, 
. . 1 1· 13 ~nternat~ona re at~ons. If qualifications are to be expressed 
regarding the complete sovereignty of the GDR, their application must 
be to certain foreign policy restrictions which are clearly derived 
from the insistence by both the GDR and the USSR for a common socialist 
foreign policy. In this respect, the SED has echoed the Soviet view 
llpeter C. Ludz, The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies 
(Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1970), pp. 66-68. 
12 Jamgotch, pp. 98-99. 
13 Neubert, pp. 136-137. 
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that national considerations should not be .allowed to interfere with the 
attainment of communitywide objectives for the Bloc. Spokesmen for the 
SED have declared that a socialist country should not concentrate 
exclusively on tasks which serve primarily its own national state 
interests. First consideration must be given to those tasks which 
benefit the entire community. However, the East German leadership feels 
that there are no "antagonistic contradictions between the national and 
international interests of the socialist countries." The two are said 
to form a "unity" of common interests. 14 Thus, limited independence is 
seen as a possibility because of the community of interests within the 
Bloc. Soviet hesitancy about blatant and excessive intervention in the 
GDR's internal affairs has been illustrated by the relatively restrained 
way in which it exerted its influence in the ouster of Ulbricht. His 
removal was not followed by public denunciations in either the GDR or 
the USSR. Nor was Ulbricht charged with legal offenses and subjected 
to prosecution, as was commonly the case during Stalin's time in East 
Europe. By contrast, Ulbricht \\las allowed to retain an important office 
in the GDR. 
Honecker summarized the SED's view of the successful achievement of 
international relations of a new type in 1971 when he said, 
The GDR grows stronger and thrives as part of the whole of 
the socialist community of states. The construction of 
evolved socialism in our country is thus directed towards the 
welfare of our own people and the increasing unity, strength 
and attractiveness of our socialist fraternal alliance. lS 
14 Neubert, p. l3S. lSND, October 9, 1971, p. 1. 
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The development of this new type of international relations, in the view 
of the SED, is consistent with both Soviet and East German needs. On 
the one hand, the socialist community, including the GDR, is becoming 
increasingly solidified. On the other hand, the "class-determined 
differentiation" of the GDR and the FRG is being intensified.16 
Therefore, the need of the GDR for a thorough delimitation from the 
Federal Republic converges smoothly with the Soviet Union's oft stated 
desire for greater Bloc unity during the era of superpower detente. 
This coincidence of East German needs and Soviet policy eases the 
coordination of their foreign policies today. One need not operate on 
the assumption of Soviet directorship over questions relating to the 
GDR's foreign policy to see how Soviet and East German needs complement 
each other. The common foreign policy for which the GDR and the ,USSR 
are working makes it necessary to view the West Berlin problem, not as 
an isolated issue, but as a policy object for coordinated resolution by 
the two allies. The importance that the USSR places on the West Be~lin 
issue was emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union saw a need to 
work for the conclusion of the Quadripartit~ Agreement on West Berlin. 
The Soviet Union was certainly motivated in its negotiations on the 
Quadripartite Agreement by the desire to eliminate a situation in which 
West Berlin was, as Brezhnev said, "a detonator of tension and crisis.,,17 
16 Nuebert, p. 140. 
17L• I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1972), p. 480. 
263 
Such a desire is thoroughly consistent with the Soviet policy of detente. 
The elimination of West Berlin as a potential source of tension would 
greatly strengthen the USSR's detente policy. However, the Quadripartite 
Agreement has an additional effect. As a result of it, the GDR will not 
be in a position to act independently on West Berlin by asserting that 
the matter is one of little concern to the USSR and its alliance. 
Rather, the East Germans must act in at least approximate unity with 
the Kremlin and must coordinate efforts under the umbrella of a Soviet 
policy taking into consideration more than the issue of West Berlin 
alone. The haste with which the GDR has acted to negotiate agreements 
with the West Berlin Senate and the Federal Republic which were 
specified by the Quadripartite Agreement as necessary for the full 
implementation of the treaty demonstrates the SED's understanding of 
its role. 
II. THE WEST BERLIN ISSUE: BASIC OR PERIPHERAL? 
East German treatment of the West Berlin issue, it is reasonable 
to assume, will vary according to the perceived nature of this problem. 
If it is viewed as a peripheral or occasional problem, then the 
prospects for compromise and accommodation will be much greater. If 
the West Berlin problem is, in fact, simply one of several relatively 
equal concerns faced by the GDR, a more casual, balanced view of the. 
matter will be possible. However, if this issue is one which is, in 
the perceptions of the SED's leadership, basic to the GDR as a state, 
there will be little likelihood that the SED's concept of the proper 
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approach to this problem will be one involving a willingness to 
compromise on essential points of dispute. In other words, the stakes 
will be too high to permit the GDR to sustain a serious setback on the 
West Berlin issue if it is seen as a problem of vital concern to the 
survival of East Germany as a state. 
One especially important way in which the West Berlin issue has 
been manifested has been in the public reaction to the construction of 
the Berlin Wall is 1961 and its continued rigid maintenance since that 
time. The consciousness of this situation among the East German 
population has undoubtedly varied since August, 1961. Though there 
are no East German accounts dealing with the specifics of the public 
reaction to the Wall, with the exception of the numi:;rous propaganda 
reports that the country's population rejoiced at the construction of 
this "antifascist protective wall," Western journalists who have been 
permitted to visit the GDR frequently report the persistent dismay with 
which the East Germans view the Wall which separates them from friends 
and relatives in West Berlin. lS Apparently many, if not most East 
Germans refused to belie~e that the Wall was designed not to keep them 
in but rather to keep Westerners from entering. This disbelief was 
verified by the number of East Germans who attempted to escape across 
the GDR-FRG frontier, either in Berlin or elsewhere, following the 
construction of the Wall. In the first six years after the securing 
of the border, 26,000 East German citizens managed to cross illegally 
l8John Dornberg, The Other Germany (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1968), pp. 109-110. 
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19 into the West. ~he number of successful escapes leveled off to about 
5,000 per year after the first few years but rose to 6,450 in 1973. 20 
While this exodus is in no way comparable to the losses prior to 
August, 1961, it is testimony to the suspicion that the official 
justification of the Wall has met with considerably less than universal 
acceptance. 
The SED's concern over the public's reaction to the complete 
partition of West Berlin from the -rest of the city was reflected in 
changes in the career patterns of the Central Committee which occurred 
after 1961, according to Peter C. Ludz. His extensive study shows that 
the structure of the Central Committee in 1963 had changed in two 
directions as compared with the Central Committee elected in 1958. 
First, the "professionalization" of political functionaries in the party 
apparatus increased and, second, functionaries with leading technical 
and administrative occupations were found in greater numbers in 1963. 
In addition, individuals from educational professions were more 
prominent in the new Central Committee. Ludz interprets this relative 
"opening" of the SED toward different elements of GDR society as an 
effort by the party to achieve at least a partial rapprochement between 
itself and the East German population after the erection of the Wal1. 21 
19Ibid ., p. 111. 
20 Summary of World Broadcasts, January 2, 1974, EE/4489/A1/1. 
(Hereafter noted as SWB.) 
21peter C. Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 239-240. 
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The Ludz interpretation of the shifts in the composition of the SED 
Central Committe~ suffers from the same shortcoming as many journalistic 
works dealing with perceptions of the Wall, namely, the lack of 
empirical justification for the proposition that the construction of 
the Wall fundamentally changed the perception of the regime among 
certain strata of the population in East Germany. While it is not 
unreasonable to infer the unpopularity of the regime before the Wall, 
it hardly follows that the erection of the Wall necessarily made the 
SED even more unpopular among particular segments of the population. 
However, one might justifiably view the SED's "opening" as an effort 
to broaden the base of a regime that was already unpopular, a good move 
wi th or without the Wall. 
An additional important consideration for the SED in dealing with 
the West Berlin problem is the impact of developments on the party 
cadres. While this may not be the greatest problem faced by the SED's 
workers today, it is one of the closest and most visible. A demonstrated 
success in resolving the West Berlin matter would undoubtedly ease the 
labors of the SED agitation-propaganda cadres in presenting the party's 
case to East German citizens. In the same fashion, an apparent defeat 
would spell an increase in the difficulties they face. The advantages. 
that the SED would enjoy as a result of "proving" the validity of its 
policies in any important area are just as obvious as the disadvantages 
from which it would suffer should its policies be repudiated by 
developments. Ludz has asserted that the political system of the GDR 
has remained unstable and has posited three reasons to substantiate his 
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argument of political instability. First, he writes, "s.ubstantial 
segments of the population continue to withhold unqualified, active 
support from the party and its politics." Many groups are still openly 
hostile to the regime, according to Ludz. Second~ there has not been a 
development of a "national consciousness" in the GDR. The result is 
that the normal citizen remains insecure regarding his conceptions of 
the correct sort of political behavior. Finally, Ludz believes that 
the GDR's close identification with the USSR in foreign policy matters 
has resulted in a feeling that the GDR is not a sovereign state. He 
concludes that as a result of the continuing political instability of 
the regime, the SED's foreign policy considerations are of particular 
. h d . . . f E G 22 A d' 1 Importance to t e omestlc sltuatlon 0 ast ermany. ccor lng y, 
the results that the party achieves with regard to one of its most 
prominent issues, the West Berlin problem, will be of great importance 
in determining the ability of the SED to strengthen its regime. This 
involves not only the work of the cadres in encouraging efforts to reach 
economic goals, but also in striving for the development of a national 
consciousness for the GDR, The morale of the cadres, who certainly 
follow political developments much more closely than the average 
citizen, will be directly affected by the success or failure of the 
party leadership in achieving its objectives long before the general 
population .. Their morale, m turn, will have an impact on their ability 
to mobilize public support for the SED policies in other areas. 
22Ludz , The GDR From the Sixties to the Seventies, p. 54, p. 79. 
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Probably the most important consideration for the SED in approaching 
the West Berlin problem is the issue of East German sovereignty. East 
German insecurity over the question of its sovereignty is reflected in 
the preoccupation of its leaders and its publications with emphasizing 
the sovereignty and permanence of the East German state. On the 
twentieth anniversary of the GDR's founding in 1969, W~lter Ulbricht 
went to great lengths to stress the reality of East Germany's statehood. 
Asking the question "What constitutes a modern state?," Ulbricht 
answered himself by stating that a modern state must be a socialist 
state and that the GDR "is the modern German socialist state to whom 
23 the future belongs." Recent East German accounts are careful to 
point out that, contrary to Western charges, the GDR's sovereignty is 
not in any way infringed by its close alliance with the USSR. 24 The 
FRG, however, according to numerous East German accounts, is the state 
which has curtailed its national sovereignty, having done so by its 
alliance with the capitalist states. 
The continued existence of a city of two million "on the territory 
of the GDR," as Ulbricht never tired of repeating, is obviously seen as 
an infringement of East German sovereignty. Considering sovereignty as 
the exercise of control over ones own territory, it cannot be denied 
that the GDR does not enjoy complete sovereignty in that it lacks 
control over West Berlin. For a regime suffering from political 
23ND , October 7, 1969, p. 3. 
24 Neubert, pp. 139-140. 
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instability, as Ludz asserts, such a deficiency must seem considerable. 
The existence of West Berlin, even as an independent political entity 
such as the SED prefers to consider it, must serve as a reminder of the 
incompleteness of the GDR. The SED's anxiety was undoubtedly intensified 
during the years when the Federal Republic pursued a policy calling for 
reunification of the two German states. Faced with a conception of West 
Berlin as only slightly less than a Land of the FRG and as a potential 
base for an effort to achieve reunification in some undetermined manner, 
the East German leadership probably was forced to condition itself to 
regard West Berlin as an aggressive enemy outpost. As Bonn began a 
retreat from a policy which involved such hostility toward the East 
German regime, the need for the SED to regard West Berlin as one of the 
most serious threats to the existence of the GDR diminished. Yet, the 
old attitude seems to have survived the gradual transition in West 
German policy. Even the most recent East German accounts and statements 
continue to reflect an attitude of animosity toward West Berlin. Though 
there have been fluctuations in the intensity of·this approach, the 
official East German view has been consistent even during those periods 
of relative progress in resolving the West Berlin problem. The tone 
has varied but the essentials have remained the same. The demands for 
a reduction of the political presence of the FRG and for the cessation 
of a variety of allegedly anti-GDR activities in West Berlin have 
clearly indicated the desire of the SED to work toward a situation in 
which the Western city will "blend in" with its surroundings.and be more 
amenable to an eventual merger with the GDR. In short, th.ere is no 
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indication that the SED feels secure enough to be able to indefinitely 
tolerate the existence of a separate city within its own territory. 
In view of these considerations it is necessary to conclude that 
the West Berlin issue is, from the East German point of view, not a 
peripheral or secondary issue. It is nota matter on which the SED 
can afford to accept a serious, long-term setback, such as, for example, 
one which would involve an increase in West Germany's official presence· 
in West Berlin. The statement by theGDR government protesting the 
FRG's Environmental Office in West Berlin is a reflection of this. 25 
Rather, the West Berlin issue involves concerns which are viewed as 
basic to the GDR as an independent state and which will, therefore, 
require the SED to refuse in the long run to abandon its view that all 
of Berlin is actually part of the GDR. 26 This demand, dropped for 
several years in m:'der to accommodate East Germany's .policy to that of 
the Soviet Union, will ultimately have to be reasserted. 
III. THE WEST BERLIN THREAT: POLITICAL OR MILITARY? 
Having concluded that the West Berlin issue is one which poses 
questions basic to the existence of the German Democratic Republic, it 
is now necessary to determine the nature of the threat, if any, which 
West Berlin presents to the SED. In other words, what is the 
25Poreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin, GDR), Vol. 14, No. 22, 
August 2, 1974, p. 167. 
26 Albert Norden, Thus Wars Are Made (Dresden:. Verlag Zeit im 
Bild, 1970), p. 244. 
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significance of this challenge to the.GDR? Should West Berlin be viewed 
as a military or as a political threat to East Germany? The answer to 
this question should facilitate an understanding of the possible 
motivations that underlie the SED's policy on West Berlin. 
The question of the significance of West Berlin as a military 
threat to the GDR is the easiest one to consider. On the many 
occasions when the major powers have confronted each other in Berlin, 
West Berlin has served as a base from which the Western powers, 
particularly the United States, could threaten retaliatory action 
against the Russians and their East German allies. However, even during 
the most severe of the many crises, such as the one in 1961, the Western 
response to Communist pressure has been uneven. On some occasions the 
United States would give the appearance of a willingness to engage in 
military action if necessary while on others the American determination 
to stand firm in the face of possible war \'las in doubt. 27 The record of 
the 1961 crisis was especially illustrative of Western restraint, in 
spite of frequent statements of the intention to fight if necessary.28 
Therefore, even during those times of greates~ tension, when West Berlin 
seems to pose the most serious military threat, the restraint or 
timidity of the American and Western leaderships served to lessen the 
possibility of war. The lack of a military clash in Berlin during any 
27 James L. Payne, The American Threat (Chicago: Markham Publishing 
Company, 1970), pp. 52-56. 
28 Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 133-139. 
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of the many confrontations of the past years points to the conclusion 
that the West Berlin problem need not necessarily erupt into war. 
Experience has shown that war is avoidable. However, it is still 
possible to argue that West Berlin poses a military threat to the GDR 
and its allies through its function as a trip-wire. That is, armed 
aggression in Germany beginning in Berlin would clearly involve the 
Western powers at an early moment. This, however, is probably more 
significant for the Soviet Bloc as a whole rather than for East Germany 
alone. 
The absence of war in the past does not, of course, resolve this 
question. There is still th~ consideration of West Berlin as an advance 
outpost of the Western military forces. It is not unreasonable to argue 
that the presence of NATO forces one hundred and ten miles inside the 
territory of the Warsaw Pact constitutes a serious threat for more than 
a possible trip-wire function. However, this argument rests primarily 
upon the assumption that a nonnuclear war is a possibility in Europe. 
The validity of this assumption would require considerable restraint 
upon the part of both the. WTO and NATO in the event of an outbreak of 
armed hostilities involving Germany. The conventional wisdom on this 
matter, of course, is that. such a conflict could be fought by nonnuclear 
means until one side perceives that the course of events is running 
against it. When this happens, if the stakes in the contact are too 
great to permit a defeat, the temptation to utilize nuclear weapons 
would be irrestible. After all, if the defeat would entail the 
disintegration of one's empire, or the termination of a highly valued 
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"way of life," then it is not inconceivable that a rational 
decision-maker might decide that a nuclear war is the lesser of the two 
evils, as Herman Kahn has argued in his discussion of nuclear war by 
"calculation. ,,29 This is not to argue that the .loss of East Germany 
would necessarily lead to USSR to prefer war, but should a situation 
arise in which war was chosen, the value of West Berlin as a military 
outpost would be diminished as long-range missiles and bombers took 
the place of conventional forces. Therefore, considering the present 
alliance systems in Europe, both of which have impressive nuclear 
potential, the likelihood of a nonnuclear war in which West Berlin 
plays a strategic role is very small. While the disintegration of 
the alliances might bring some change to this situation, speculation 
on that requires such a radical alteration of the conception of the 
political power distribution of Europe as to be virtually meaningless. 
West Berlin's military value is, at best, only of marginal importance 
to the Western powers today. 
Concluding then that West Berlin does not constitute a serious 
military threat to the GDR under present circumstances, it remains to 
consider the city as a political thre,at to the SED's regime. In this 
context, the motivations for the concern expressed by the SED on the 
West Berlin question become more apparent. First, West Berlin continues 
to serve as an important outpost of Western broadcasting efforts. The 
East German press and the SED's spokesmen have frequently expressed the 
29Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Avon 
Books, 1962), pp. 53-61. 
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regime's concern over the concentration of Western broadcasting media in 
West Berlin as well as .along the .GDR-FRG frontier. 30 Western journalists 
visiting the GDR have noted the degree of anxiety of the SED over the 
fact that many East Germans seem to watch and listen to Western radio 
and television. This is expressed in a variety of efforts aimed at 
discouraging citizens who wish to tune in West German and West Berlin 
progr~s. These efforts range all the way from instructing school 
children in the evils of Western media to lectures by local party 
activists. 3l In addition to the influence of the Western media which 
are based in West Berlin, the SED has for many years had reason to fear 
that the values of the society it was constructing might not be 
sufficiently appreciated because of the appeal exerted by West Berlin 
on GDR citizens who saw their own part of Berlin as shabby by comparison 
with the more modern Western sectors. However, the tremendous amount of 
construction which has been completed in East Berlin with the last few 
years has probably served to lessen the psychological impact of West 
Berlin's prosperity. This, coupled with the increase of economic 
problems in the West generally, has probably decreased the significance 
of West Berlin as a propaganda tool against the GDR. 
The economic impact of West Berlin on the GDR in the past years 
has probably bothered the SED more than the appeal that the city might 
have for di5~ffecteuEast German citizens in general. West Berlin has 
30 Volksarmee, No. 17, 1974, p. 6. 
31 Dornberg, pp. 233-235. 
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affected the East German economy in two important ways in the last two 
or three years. The first was to act as a funnel thrqugh which hundreds 
of thousands of Western-purchased GDR marks flowed into the East German 
economy. Not only did the GDR's currency suffer as a result, but, 
according to the GDR press, East German citizens were forced to compete 
at a disadvantage with Western tourists for the purchase of certain 
valuable commodities frequently in short supply. In the fall of 1973, 
the SED took steps to eliminate much of the need for "illegal" East 
marks by doubling the required amount of currency that had to be 
exchanged by visitors corning into the GDR while at the same time 
continuing an intensified effort to apprehend currency smugglers. 32 
While the economic damage that East Germany suffered as a result of 
illegal currency exchanges was of little consequence compared with the 
activities prior to the construction of the Wall in 1961, it was 
evidently serious enough that the SED was willing to risk damage to 
the process of detente with West Germany in order to attempt to bring 
it to a halt. While the minimum required exchange amount was lowered 
in 1974, it remained well above the previous minimum. 
A second way in which West Berlin presented an economic threat to 
the GDR was by its use as a base for organizations specializing in 
aiding escapes from East Germany. The economic significance of this 
activity is derived not from the numbers involved but from the types 
of individuals who were being aided in leaving the GDR illegally. More 
32 ND, November 6, 1973, p. 3. 
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and more highly trained specialists were being smuggled out of East 
Germany to the FRG.and West Berlin where they enjoyed the prospect of 
much higher salaries in their professions. The East German press 
continually cited West Berlin as a haven for "gangs of criminal 
smugglers" which were composed of many West Berliners and U.S. military 
personnel stationed in West Berlin. 33 Through its use by such 
organizations, the SED has frequently charged, West Berlin is being 
manipulated as a tool against the politic~l stability of the GDR. 
Finally, West Berlin must be considered a political threat to the 
SED's regime in that it stands as a symbol calling into question the 
permanence of the GDR. In the context of West German politics today, 
West Berlin is not being used.to the fullest extent in this fashion. 
However, the termination of the Brandt government could well mark the 
end of a period in which the FRG sought to back away from challenges 
to the permanence of East Germany as a separate state. The manner in 
which the Brandt government came to an end could well hasten.a process 
of either revers·al or restraint of the Ostpolitik begun during Brandt's 
years. The disclosure that Gunter Guillaume, a close advisor to the 
Chancellor, was in fact a longtime agent of the East German security 
service tended to confirm suspicions that the Social Democrats under 
Brandt's leadership had entertained illusions with regard to the 
intentions of the Soviet Bloc states. The subsequent sensational 
treatment in much of the press of the Guillaume case, coupled with 
33Ibid ., November 1, 1973, p. 2. 
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suggestions that the GOR was directing an espionage campaign embracing 
other leading West German political figures 34 increased the prospects 
for additional pressure on the Bonn government to alter its policy 
toward not only East Germany but also the Bloc itself. The decision 
to go ahead with plans for establishment of a branch of the Federal 
Environment Office in West Berlin shows how the city can be used to 
facilitate a reversal of policy which the SED considered a political 
attack on the GDR. 
Following his elevation to the office of Chancellor. ,the West German 
newspaper I~ndelsblatt, an economic journal which had followed Schmidtts 
career closely because of his background in economic affairs, predicted 
that Schmidt would approach the FRG's Ostpolitik with a more pragmatic 
view than his predecessor who had held a somewhat emotional view on the 
question of relations with the East. Much was made in the Handelsblatt 
analysis of the fact that Schmidt had been much more vocal in his 
reaction to the Czech invasion of 1968 than Brandt and other leaders 
of the Social Democratic Party. Schmidt, the journal stressed, had seen 
the invasion of,Czechoslovakia as justification for the FRG to shelve 
35 plans for a Moscow-Bonn rapprochement. By the summer of 1974, West 
German newspapers were noting Schmidt's tendency to concentrate on 
domestic policy at the expense of Ostpolitik. While there were no 
governmental statements indicating a formal change in the FRG's policy, 
34Berliner Morgenpost, May 23/24, 1974, p. l. 
35Handelsblatt, May 10, 1974, p. 5. 
West German commentators were noting that the policy of detente under 
Schmidt was differing greatly from that policy under the Brandt 
government. As the Frankfurter Rundschau editorialized with favor in 
July, 
It could be a good thing that the small steps taken so far 
become even smaller. Rappro,chement from now on will not be 
marked by the prospect of revolutionary change so much as by 
pressure to maintain the equilibrium. 36 
A more puzzling question has been raised by the changed position 
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of the FRG in Sino-Soviet relations since the end of the Brandt regime. 
In the first days after ,Schmidt's assumption of the office of Chancellor, 
one West German newspaper noted that Schmidt had long enjoyed the favor 
of Red China because he considers a strong Atlantic alliance and close 
ties with the United States still to be in the ,best interests of 
37 Europe. Presumably, Brandt was regarded.by the Chinese as overly 
critical of the Atlantic Alliance and too friendly to the Soviet Bloc. 
When a delegation of Federal Republic parliamentarians announced their 
plans to visit Red China in September or October of 1974, plans were 
well under way for a visit by Schmidt himself in the spring of 1975. 38 
Considerable controversy erupted in September when another West German 
delegation under the leadership of Christian Democrat leader Helmut Kohl 
toured Red China and was toasted by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Red 
China with a reference to West Germany as the "one and only German 
36 Frankfurter Rundschau, July 20, 1974, p. 4. 
37Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 17, 1974, p. 5. 
38Die Welt, August 20, 1974, p. 1. 
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nations." At another point, Premier Chou En-lai was quoted as having 
said that he had never heard of a city called Kaliningrad but only of 
Koenigsberg, an old German city incorporated into the USSR after 
World War Two. Pravda regarded this as an attac~ by the Chinese on 
both the USSR and the ,GDR and an effort by them to intervene in European 
ff ' 39 a a~rs. The fact that Schmidt's visit to Moscow occurred on schedule 
in October, 1974 helped dispel Soviet fears of an early union between 
the Chinese and the West Germans. Yet, the possibility remains that the 
West Germans might become a factor in the competition between the USSR 
and Red China. 
The possibility of collusion between Peking and Bonn and the more 
cautious Ostpolitik of the Schmidt government raise the possibility that 
West Berlin might be used to mark an alteration of West German policy. 
This is not because there is a direct re~ationship between the West 
Berlin problem and Sino-Soviet-West German affairs but because it is 
simply one of the most convenient opportunities for confrontation. 
It is in a sense a barometer of the relations between the powers 
involved in the disputes over the German question. The absence of 
a concerted effort on the part of the Bonn government to exploit the 
West Berlin situation in some fashion does not remove the continuing 
threat to the stability of the SED regime in East Berlin. Brandt's 
departure makes the possibilities of a renewal of West Berlin's status 
39Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 36, 
October 2, 1974, pp. 16-17. (Hereafter noted as CDSP.) 
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as what Honecker described as a "thorn in the flesh of the GDR" much 
greater than in recent years. 
IV. MOTIVATIONS OF THE GDR'S WEST BERLIN POLICY 
The most simple way to phrase the question which is the object of 
this discussion is: Was the SED's policy on West Berlin arrived at 
independently or was it formulated as a result of Soviet dictation? 
As previous chapters have indicat~d, the influence of the Soviet Union 
on East Germany is indeed, to say the least, profound. It is reflected 
not only in the many twists and turns of the SED's foreign policy 
statements but also in the elements which compose the society the SED 
is working to create. Clearly, the Soviet model is viewed as an 
extremely valuable and authoritative guide for the officials of the 
East German regime. In 1972 Honecker praised the GOR's alliance with 
the USSR as the "foundation for our successes" and described East 
Germany's friendship with the Soviet Union as "sacred for us, for the. 
working class of the GDR and for our people.,,40 He recently declared 
that the SED and the CPSU were in agreement on all political, 
ideological, and theoretical questions and that "every step" taken by 
the GDR was based on the alliance with the Soviet Union. 4l Undoubtedly, 
no factor is of greater importance to the SED than its relationship with 
its Soviet ally. Citations of the value of the GDR-Soviet alliance are 
40 ND, January 7, 1972, p. 2. 
4I Ibid ., May 13, 1974, pp. 1-2. 
outnumbered only by references to the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
itself. 
Yet, the phrasing of this question obscures as much as it might 
reveal because it creates an impression that it is possible to speak 
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of a dichotomy in East German decision-making on West Berlin in which 
some policies would be classified as independent while others would be 
classified as dictated. No such simple classifications are possible. 
An examination of the West Berlin issue as it affects the GDR reveals 
that there is an apparent equality of interests between East Berlin and 
Moscow on this matter. The fact that West Berlin continues to represent 
a serious political threat to East Germany leads to the conclusion that 
the SED turned to the Soviet Union in hopes of achieving a solution that 
enabled the GDR to make the best of a less than perfect situation. 
While the Quadripartite Agreement can in no way be viewed as the ,final 
solution to the West Berlin issue for the SED, it does, in view of East 
Germany's efforts to accommodate its policy with that of the USSR, 
provide the ,GDR with the assurance that it can enjoy the prospect of 
firm support from the ,Warsaw Treaty Organization. The situation which 
existed prior to Ulbricht's removal as First Secretary was one in which 
East Germany was in danger of being isolated from its own allies and 
thereby losing its viability as a state. Ulbricht's efforts to impede 
the process of a Soviet supported detente threatened to estrange East 
Germany from the \'ITO without bringing any change in its position relative 
to the West. The SED's recognition of the futility of such a course was 
reflected in Ulbricht's ouster in May, 1971 as First Secretary and his 
replacement by an individual who enjoyed the backing of the Kremlin. 
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'flle Soviet Union's interest in the West Berlin question has been a 
reflection of its global interests in the development of detente between 
itself and the United States. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
which demonstrated beyond all doubt. as Roger E. Kanet has written, that 
East Europe is "considered a sphere of primary intere.st or domination 
that will be prevented at all costs from significantly lessening its 
dependence on the Soviet Union,,,42 cleared the way for tne Soviet policy 
of detente by restoring, even if by force of arms, the unity needed for 
extensive dealings with the West. For both East and West, Berlin was 
the symbol of a willingness to work for progress in the normalization 
of relations between the two superpower blocs. Brezhnev, as previously 
noted, had described Berlin as a "detonator of tension and crisis," a 
statement with which few could disagree. Therefore, Berlin became a 
convenient symbol because of a widely held view of the city as a 
potential source of international tension. In addition, the Berlin 
issue was an extremely important segment of the overall German problem 
and an important issue in the Western alliance because of the concern 
of West Germany for the city. Furthermore, while the USSR had a stake 
in the Berlin problem, the disposition of that matter was not so great 
as to prevent at least some prospects for compromise in view of the 
crucial technological needs of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's 
perenial lag in technology was such that by the end of the 1960's in 
42Roger E. Kanet, '~zechos1ovakia and the Future of Soviet Foreign 
Policy," in The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on 
Eastern Europe, edited by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz 
(New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 95. 
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some areas it was behind the United States by as much as forty years. 43 
This Soviet need for technology cons~itutes for the .USSR the practical 
side of detente. An improvement in East-West relations could bring 
Western technology to the Soviet Union and an improvement in the West 
Berlin situation could bring the necessary changes in East-West 
relations. Therefore, post-Czechoslovakia East European unity, coupled 
with a continuing need for Western technology, made the time right for 
progress in normalization of West Berlin's situation. Ratification of 
the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland was also made 
conditional on progress on the .West Berlin question by the Brandt 
government. Therefore, a resolution of the West Berlin problem, even, 
if only a partial one, became an absolute necessity for the Kremlin. 
The primary consideration for the USSR became one of overcoming East 
Germany's resistence. This obstacle was removed by two steps. The. 
first was revealed in Eri~h Honecker's report.to the SED Central 
Committee in May, 1971, upon his return from the Twenty-fourth Congress 
of the CPSU. In his report, Honecker stated that the Congress had 
confirmed both the rightness and the necessity of the SED's Abgrenzung 
policy with regard to the Federal Republic.44 By giving this assurance, 
the Soviet leaders had relieved the SED of its fear that de~ente would 
lead to an infiltration of East Germany by West German influences. They 
43Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Technology: System vs. Progress," 
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, September/October, 1970, pp. 19-21. 
44ND , May 4, 1971, pp. 2-3. 
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had also given support to the SED's resistance of contacts with the West 
which, in the minds of the party leaders, might spell disaster for their 
politically insecure regime. The second step in the removal of the GDR 
as an obstacle to the Soviet Union's global aspirations was achieved by 
the forced retirement of Ulbricht. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to conclude that either the GDR was 
forced into a reversal of its rigid policy on.West Be~lin or that it 
made the decision solely on its own. The GDR's leadership made the 
decision on the basis of what it perceived as being in its best interest 
in terms of maintaining its viability as a member of an alliance system 
directed by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and what it saw as 
advancing its position relative to West Germany on the other hand. 
By pursuing a policy compatible with the global interests of the USSR, 
the SED was able to stress the community of interests existing within 
the Bloc and demonstrate its support for the concept of a unified 
socialist foreign policy. It also avoided a self-imposed isolation 
from its allies which could have aggravated the East European situation 
as much as the Czechoslovakian developments in 1968, developments which 
the SED was most active in denouncing. The GDR improved its position 
relative to West Germany by the further development of the Abgrenzung 
policy with an endorsement by Moscow. The process of the complete 
demarcation of East Germany from its western neighbor could now be 
completed with the assurances that it had the support of the alliance 
system which was presented as the foundation of every success enjoyed 
by the GDR. The SED's position on the West Berlin question itself 
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improved as the GDR was now in a position to act as a competent autho~ity 
for the resolution of the many details to be worked out pursuant to the 
Quadripartite Agreement. This included such matters as traffic 
arrangements which, in the past, had been viewed by the West as matters 
for resolution by the World War Two allies themselves, with East Germany 
specifically excluded. The SED enjoys the right to take political 
initiatives, but only as long as they fall within the ,boundaries of 
Soviet guidelines. Thi~ is at the heart of the discussions of a 
coordinated socialist foreign policy. Independent actions may be taken 
only within the framework of a generally approved policy. The 
Quadripartite Agreement specified certain subsidiary agreements which 
were to be negotiated by the GDR and the FRG and these secondary matters 
are those concerns which would be clearly considered the responsibility 
of the SED. In the future, one could anticipate that the GDR may take 
independent initiatives affecting GDR-FRG relations, but not altering 
the ,fundamental East-West relationship. Ulbricht's efforts to slow 
the process of detente obviously fell into the latter category and for 
that reason were considered beyond the limits of tolerable independence. 
V. THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM IN THE ERA OF DETENTE 
The groundwork for the present policy of detente pursued by the 
Soviet Union in Europe today was laid in 1968 with the WTO's invasion 
of Czechoslovakia. With its intervention, the USSR demonstrated the, 
firmness of its intention to maintain its control over the East European 
communist party states and, at the same time, established the principle 
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that Eastern contacts with the West must be made only with the approval 
of Moscow. West Germany's prompt acceptance of this principle was 
indicated by its e~forts to negotiate a treaty on the renunciation of 
force with the Soviet Union before attempting to do the same with 
Poland. The theme of East-West negotiations became the recognition 
of realities rather than the earlier discussions of bridge-building 
to the East by exploitation of polycentrism. Such.efforts were all 
too often perceived by the USSR as little more than attl;:J1lpts to 
undermine the basis of the USSR's security system in Eastern Europe. 
The reactions of the Soviet and East German presses to the Czech reforms 
expressed the disapproval with which the Soviet leadership regarded 
these developments. However, after 1968 and the renewed stress on 
unity which could be seen in the frequent calls for a coordinated 
foreign policy, it became possible to speak of detente in Europe. 
This relaxation of tensions was possible only because Moscow no longer 
had reason to fear that it constituted a threat to its East European 
system. 
The Soviet Union's dialogue with the West was facilitated by the 
policy which it began to enunciate regarding West Be~lin. Whereas in 
the past, the USSR had issued frequent calls for an immediate withdrawal 
of all Western troops and the creation of West Berlin as a "demilitarized 
free city," as Krushchev had demanded in 1958,45 by 1971 it was talking 
4S Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore~ 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 90-92. 
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ab.out the recognition of the status quo regarding the city. The 
Quadripartite Agreement proclaimed that "ties between the Western 
sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained 
46 
and developed," a sharp contrast with the Soviet pronouncements of the 
previous decade. It also declared that West Berlin-West Germ~n traffic 
would be "unimpeded" and would "receive preferential treatment.,,47 
These pledges, by themselves., constitute what would have seemed an 
impossibility considering most of the past rhetoric on the West Berlin 
problem. The reactions of the West were summarized in the introduction 
of the West German Press Office's release of the text of the agreement 
and related documents. 
Berlin lies in the heart of Europe. To reach.a settlement 
t4erehas been described not only by the .Federal Government 
but also by its Allies as a test of . . . the serious desire 
of the Soviet Union to enter into unquestionable and irrevocable 
obligations for detente and security in Europe .... When 
the representatives of the Four Powers have set their 
signatures under the important work, the peoples of Europe 
will have reason to hope that they will be able to address 
themselves, with prospects of success, to the further great 
tasks of detente and cooperation that lie before them. 48 
This statement clearly reveals the extent of expectations regarding the 
completion of what is often referred to as a settlement of .the Berlin 
problem. 
The implicit assumption that the West Berlin issue has been 
settled, however, seems lacking in justification. The interruptions 
46The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (Bonn: Press and 
Information Office of the FRG, 1971), p. 12. 
47Ibid ., pp. 11-12. 48Ibid ., pp. 9-10. 
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of traffic between West Berlin and the ,Federal Republic during the 
summer of 197449 were a particularly vivid illustration .of the ease 
with which agreements can lose.their meaning. Even in the absence of 
inter~uptions in the flow of traffic to and from West Berlin, the 
question of the value of the guaranteed transit rights by themselves 
remains. The insistence of the Soviet Union and the GDR that they have 
the right to prevent the entry into W~st Berlin of certain individuals 
or classes of individuals SO indicates that the city remains considerably 
less than sovereign in the eyes of its Communist neighbors. If it is 
possible for the USSR and the GDR to raise this issue, then it is 
equally possible to question the course of domestic affairs in West 
Berlin in othe~ respects. If the USSR and its East German allies 
insist on creating, through pressure, a West Berlin that differs very 
little from Leipzig, what value should the West attach to transit rights 
to the city? After all, the .right to travel to West Berlin has been 
only one aspect of the total West Berlin problem. Talk of transit 
rights has been based on an assumption that West Berlin's internal 
affairs may remain as they are or be altered only by the West Be~liners 
themselves. Yet, events subsequent to the conclusion of the Berlin 
agreement lend substance to the belief that the .internal situation of 
West Berlin might have to be altered as the price of guaranteed transit 
rights. The confidential nature of these rights was clearly demonstrated 
49New York Times, July 23, 1974, p. 3. 
SOIbid., July 21, 1974, p. 3. 
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by the ruptures in West Berlin traffic following the announcement by the 
FRG that a branch of the FRG Environment Office would be opened in the 
. 51 c~ty. 
Is one justified then in the belief that the West Berlin problem 
has been resolved by the process of detente? It seems unlik~ly that 
one could justifiably make such a claim. Detente has brought a 
relaxation of the tensions surrounding the West Berlin dispute, but the 
basic situation remains essentially as it has been since the end of 
World War Two. The Soviet Union and the GDR have made concessions, 
but they are of such a nature that their reversal is possible at 
literally a moment's notice. The ease with which such a reversal could 
be accomplished was shown by the events of·the summer of 1974. 
What effect has detente had on the independence of the GDR? All 
evidence points to the conclusion that detente has been accompanied by 
a lessening of the independence of the USSR's German ally. In this 
regard, the GDR's situation is not markedly different from that of its 
other East European neighbors. As Walter Laqueur has written, "the 
Communist 'pluralistic universe' is largely mythical. On the contrary, 
the Soviet Union has reestablished its authority over most Communist 
parties in the world. . . This process of consolidation started 
in 1968 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, ironically, resulted 
in the removal of Walter Ulbricht as SED First SecretarY, a man who had 
5l Ibid ., July 22, 1974, p. 2. 
52Walter Laqueur, Neo-Isolationism and the World of the Seventies 
(New York: The Library Press, 1972), p. 5. 
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been one of the most enthusiastic advocates of the invasion. Detente, 
therefore, has resulted in a diminution of East German independence and 
has made the West Berlin problem a central concern of Soviet policy as 
the Kremlin has sought to demonstrate its desire for detente by 
"progress" on the Berlin question. The effect has been to charge the 
SED with the implementation of the subsidiary details of the agreeme~t 
on West Berlin without giving it any real authority in determining the 
overall configuration of that agreement. Today, the .GDR is limited ,in 
its initiative-making power to questions that fit within the framework 
of general Soviet foreign policy. Soviet policy sets the direction 
while the GDR may do no more than act as an advocate of that policy. 
The West Berlin problem remains with us in spite of the signing 
of the Quadripartite Agreement, which was widely hailed as a sett1~ment 
of the problem. Detente has brought recognition of West Berlin's ties 
with the Federal Republic, but those ties existed prior to 1971 and did 
not come as a result of detente. The Quadripartite Agreement, as an 
example of the recognition of realities, merely noted the existence the 
"ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG" and asserted 
that they "will be maintained and developed taking into account that 
these sectors continue not to be a consistent part of the FRG.,,53 Of 
greater importance is the nature of the Soviet conception of detente. 
This conception is predicated on a belief that detente involves change. 
As a recent commentary in World Marxist Review observed, "the dialectics 
53The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, p. 12. 
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of international detente" must be seen as a "combination of cooperation 
54 
and stl:'uggle." Accordingly, the Soviet Union and its allies cannot be 
expected to regard the status que in Berlin as final. It is simply one 
point in a continuing process which, as they, see it, will result in 
victory for the Uprogressive forces" of the world. This problem is not 
unique to the USSR on the Berlin question, but affects the Soviet view 
of international relations with the West in general. 
Since the Soviet policy is predicated upon an assumption of change, 
it is appropriate to consider the factors that will condition change 
regarding the West Berlin situation. One of the most crucial factors 
is Soviet politics. The potential for confrontation in West Berlin 
continues to exist and represents a serious threat to the perpetuation 
of the policy of detente. Should shifts in the distribution of power 
in the Soviet Union occur in such a way as to increase the Kremlin's 
desire for confrontation and decrease its need for detente the West 
Berlin issue could serve as a convenient occasion for a dramatic 
reversal of policy. The relationship between Soviet internal politics 
and Soviet foreign policy have been explored by Michel Tatu in his 
analysis of the 1962 Cuban missle crisis. Tatu concludes that 
Khrushchev's Cuban move was part of a series of Soviet initiatives 
designed to bolster his standing within the Kremlin hierarchy while 
54Jan Prazsky, "The Dialectics of Detente," World Marxist Review, 
Vol. 17, No.9, September, 1974, p. 130. 
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fundamentally altering the world balance of power. 55 The same thing 
could happen again involving a crisis over West Berlin. While it is 
impossible to predict, the continuation of the Berlin problem means 
that confrontation remains a future possibility. 
East German politics is a second conditioning factor. Internal 
political demands could affect the GDR's West Berlin policy, especially 
if West Berlin should pose.a serious threat to .the stability of the 
SED's regime. Should the West Berlin comrnunicatio~s media present the 
GDR with what its leaders might perceive as a serious threat to the 
power of the SED, one would expect to see considerable agitation for 
a reversal of the present West Berlin policy. It would always be 
possible for the SED to argue that the influence of Wester~ media 
api1ling over into the GDR is creating difficulties in the construction 
of socialism. It might even be able to present a case that would 
persuade the Russians to allow the implementation of East German 
initiatives against West Berlin. The continuation of the loss of 
valuable personnel to the West as a result of the attractions of West 
Berlin and the FRG might also serve to trigger demands for sanctions 
against the city. If the SED was able to present a reasonable case 
that large numbers of people trained by the GDR were fleeing to West 
Berlin as a result of the promise of higher salaries, then the USSR 
might agree to go along with East German demands for "reparations" from 
55Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 
pp. 261-276. 
West Berlin industries. Such an eventuality would dramatically alter 
the present West Berlin situation. 
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West German political developments will also affect future changes 
in the West Berlin situation. Should the leftward drift of the Social 
Democratic Party be accelerated by the activities of the party's young 
militant left wing, a possibility which has been noted frequently,56 
the impact on West German policy could be considerable. An equally 
sharp turn toward the right as a result of an increased appeal by the 
more conservative parties, something which might happen should the SPD 
move leftward, might also bring a reversal of the current policy on West 
Berlin. More spy scandals might have a similar effect. 
Finally, NATO politics will have an important effect on the West 
Berlin situation. NATO policies, of course, are to a large degree a 
function of American political developments and the increase of 
isolationist sentiments in the United States would clearly have a 
significant impact on NATO. It would lead to a weakening of the 
Atlantic Alliance which would, in turn, make a unified Western policy 
on issues such as West Berlin more difficult than at present. The 
lack of Western unity would obviously give the Soviet Union an advantage 
in any negotiations of West Berlin. A shift in the opposite direction 
of isolationism is also a possibility. If this should be the case, the 
USSR might witness the formulation of a NATO policy calling for detente 
at a higher price and with demands for more meaningful concessions on 
56 Laqueur, p. 42. 
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all matters subject to negotiation. Communist organs have noted this 
possibility and expre!i.sed thei,r firm belief that such an eventuality 
, 57 
would result in defeat for the West. 
West Berlin's situation is, therefore, one which is a function of 
a variety of conditioning factors. The central point, however, is ,that 
the West Berlin problem has neither disappeared nor been totally and 
finally stabilized. F~ather, it is subj ect to change and will likely 
continue to evolve in the years ahead. The final chapter will consider 
the present status we have arrived at and the possibilities for 
resolution of the problem in the future. In each of the possible 
scenarios of resolution, consideration will be given to the impact on 
the continuing issue of independence for the East German leadership. 
57 Prazsky, pp. 130-131. 
CHAPTER VII 
SCENARIOS FOR A FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BERLIN PROBLEM 
This chapter proposes to evaluate the Quadripartite Agreement of 
1971 in order to determine its effect on the status of West.Berlin. 
What has changed now that the Agreement has gone into force? The answer 
to this question will enable us to ascertain West Berlin's present 
situation in terms of its advancement toward a final resolution of the 
Berlin problem. In addition, this chapter will attempt to plot a 
variety of prospective solutions to this lingering post-War issue. 
These solutions will be presented as though part of a continuum from 
the most to the least desirable on the basis of what may be logically 
determined as in the interest of East Germany. In each case, the impact 
on the GDR's independence from Soviet influences will be considered. 
I. THE EFFECT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1971 
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was intended not to resolve 
the West Berlin problem as such, but rather to settle those questions 
which have been responsible for most of the quarrels and difficulties 
regarding the status of the city. Expectations that the agreement would 
"settle" the problem were neither justified nor fulfilled. An 
examination of the agreement itself quickly demonstrates its intentions 
regarding the city. Its primary concern seems to have been the 
stabilization of the West Seriin ~3sue by a recognition of the status quo 
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in most respects. The principle questions with which the Agreement 
dealt were the traffic problem, the ~atter of representation of West 
Berlin ,abroad, the participation of West Berlin in international 
activities of the FRG, visits by West Berlin residents to the GDR, 
and ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. 
2;)6 
The traffic problem is first considered in paragraph A of Part II 
of the Agreement. In this section, the four occupying powers agree that 
traffic to and from West Berlin and the FRG will be "unimpeded" and that 
"such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the most simple 
and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment."l 
Annex I of the Agreement specifies the details of the arrangements for 
implementing this provision. The essential point is that traffic 
through the GDR's territory becomes the responsibility of the East German 
authorities who are to work directly with the West German and West Berlin 
officials. Costs related to traffic on the communication routes to West 
Berlin are to be paid in an annual lump sum by the FRG to East Germany.2 
This is a departure from the previous situation in which traffic matters 
were always and exclusively referred to the occupying powers because 
East and West German officials would not work together. Air traffic and. 
military traffic are not considered in the Agreement and remain the 
exclusive responsibility of the Four Powers. The positions of the major 
powers in Berlin change little as a result of the Agreement leading to 
on Berlin (Bonn: Press and Information 
--~~~~~~~~~--~------------
, p. 12. 
2Ibid ., pp. 14-16. 
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the conclusion by three scholars of international law that the FRG and 
the GDR sti11 have "only limited sovereignty" in control of transit 
traffic. 3 
The matters of representation of West Be~lin residents abroad and 
the participation of West Berlin in international activities of the 
Federal Republic were considered in Annex IV. Provisions are made for 
the FRG to perform consular services for permanent residents of West 
Berlin. This step constitutes an important concession by the Soviet 
Union. The provision relating to West Berlin's participation in 
international activities also must be seen as an example of the 
willingness of the Soviet leaders to grant an additional concession. 
In section C of Part 2 of the Annex, the FRG is given the right to 
represent the "interests of the Western sectors of Berlin in 
international organizations and international conferences.,,4 In the 
next paragraph, this right is broadened to include West Berlin's 
participation with the Federal Republic in international exchanges 
and exhibitions. 
Paragraph C of Part II of the Agreement considers the issue of 
visits by West Berliners to the GDR and declares that such visits will 
be possible for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial 
r.easons in addition to tourism. 5 For this purpose, additional border 
3Gunther Doeker, Klaus Melsheimer, and Dieter Schroder, "Berlin and 
the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971," American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 67, No.1., January, 1973, p. 59. 
4The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, pp. 19-20. 
5Ibid ., p. 13. 
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crossing points were opened and five offices were established in West 
Berlin where permanent residents of the city could apply to visit the 
GDR. The conside!'eble delays which were immediately assoc.iated with 
this system gave credence to the belief that the SED did not actually 
welcome the prospect of a sharp increase in human contacts across the 
Wall. 6 The doubling of the entry fees and the required minimum exchange 
amounts in 1973 was another indication that the East German leadership 
wanted to discourage such contacts. 
The most important concession to the West comes in paragraph B of 
Part II .with the assertion that "ties between the Western sectors of 
Berlin and the Federal Republic will be maintained and developed. . 
The importance of this expression of a special relationship between the 
FRG and West.Ber1in has already been discussed in terms of its impact 
,,7 
on the .position of the GDR at that time. This clearly represents a 
reaffirmation of the status quo by the USSR favorable to the Western 
position. However, this is coupled with a Western disavowal of any 
claims that West Berlin is a "constituent part" of the FRG. Accordingly, 
the West German Bundestag and the Bundesrat will be denied the right to 
hold any future plenary sessions in West Berlin, no small concession in 
itself in view of the symbolic value attached to these demonstrations of 
West German ties with West Berlin. This prohibition extends to other 
constitutional or official acts by eoverning bodies of the .FRG and 
6Suddeutsche Zeitung, March 21, 1972, p. 3. 
7The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, p. 12. 
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meetings by committees of the West German political parties. 8 An 
additional shortcoming for the West in this provision of the Agreement 
is the lack of a definition of "ties." The period after the 
implementation of the Agreement has been filled with East German 
arguments about the difference between "ties" and "bonds" between 
the FRG and West Berlin. 9 
Experiences of the three years following the completion of the 
Quadripartite Agreement have justified statements of those who denied 
that a situation had evolved in which all the differences of the past 
twenty-five years would be forgotten. The official view of the Bonn 
government was expressed early in 1974 by President Gustav Heinnemann 
who, while visiting West Berlin, asserted, 
. What has emerged for Berlin and its citizens could 
surely be no ideal solution; and yet it ,is something that is 
easier to live with than the ,previous circumstances .... 
With this Four-Power Treaty, a circumstance emerged that has 
been tediously created, and that nobody considers the best of 
all possible solutions, an arrangement that has been accepted, 
has been recognized as being a basis on which Berlin can 
function .10 
The present situation is, therefore, viewed by the West German government 
as an improvement over the previous arrangement, but by no means a 
perfect or final solution. In this regard, their position is like that 
of the Soviet and East German leaders who advocate a conception of 
8Ibid ., p. 17. 
9Neues Deutschland, November 9, 1973, p. 3. (Hereafter noted as 
NO.) 
lOThe Bulletin (Press and Information Office of the FRG), Vol. 22, 
No.8, February 28, 1974, p. 52. 
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detente based.on a belief in the continuation of change. There is a 
generally held view that the status quo is less than desirable, in spite 
of concessions that each side might justifiably regard as an improvement 
in terms of their particular interests. According to Doeker, Melsheimer, 
and Schroder, in te,rms of international law, Greater Berlin remains as a 
"special area in Germany" and the status of that special area has not 
been changed by the Quadripartite Agreement. ll The Berlin problem has 
clearly not been resolved. It is, then, at this point appropriate to 
turn to a consideration of alternatives to the present Berlin situation. 
II. TOTAL INCORPORATION:. THE MAXIMUM SOLUTION 
Professor Elmer Plischke has hypothesized that there are two 
primary sets of options for consideration in an effort to formulate a 
resolution of the Berlin problem. The first matter is the prospects 
for reama1gamation of the two halves of the city. Considering the 
present conflict of interests between the major powers involved, he 
concludes there is little prospect for a reunification of the city. The 
second option relates to the method of settling the Berlin question 
within the context, of the broader German problem. This, according to 
P1ischke, is the most appropriate and reasonable of the options but, 
life reamalgamation of Berlin, remains unattainable under present 
circumstances. 12 The problem of present-day realities is obviously 
11Doeker, Me1sheimer, and Schroder, p. 61. 
12Elmer Plischke, "Resolving the Berlin Question: an Option 
Analysis," World Affairs, Vol. 131, No.2, July, 1968, pp. 94-99. 
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the major stumbling block in a.n effort to formulate scenarios for 
resolution of this pro'lJlem. The~efore, in those which are discussed 
here, there will be no assumption that the status quo is our starting 
point. Rather, each w.i~l be approached in terms of its desirability 
and the status quo will be evaluated as it helps or hinders such a 
resolution. 
Certainly the best and most final settlement of the Berlin issue 
would be the total incorporation of West Be~lin into the GDR. From 
the East German point of view this would represent the maximum gain for 
the GDR in resolving this problem. It would mean tha~ West Berlin would 
finally become, as Ulbricht liked to say, the "western suburbs of the 
capital of the GDR." Through an implementation of this solution, the 
basic abnormality of the Berlin situation, the physical division of the 
city between the Communist and non-Communist worlds, would be eliminated. 
The benefits that the East German regime would accrue as a result 
of this would be considerable. First, the GDR would be able to add 
one hundred and eight-five square miles of territory to its capital 
city. At present West Berlin comprises over 54 percent of what was 
formerly Greater Berlin,13 thus by its addition to East Berlin, the 
GDR capital would be more than double in size. Second, the GDR would 
gain over two million new inhabitants,14 asswning that the majority of 
West Berlin's residents either chose to remain or were unable to leave. 
13John Brose and Kathleen Kerr, Berlin in Brief (West Berlin: 
Press and Information Office of the Land Berlin, 1969), p. 61. 
l4 Ibid ., p. 64. 
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For a nation with a population of only seventeen million"the addition 
of two million people would be an extremely significant increase. 
Likewise, the industry of West Berlin would also be a valuable boon 
to the East German economy. 
While the material advantages that the .GDR would gain from the 
incorporation of West Berlin are of great value, the psychological 
benefits that East Germany would enjoy are even greater when the SED's 
most pressing needs are taken into consideration. First, there would 
be a significant increase in the GDR's prestige by virtue of having the 
largest city in both Germanies as its capital. lS This would help dispel 
the impression of East Germany as a "rump" nation created out of the 
poorer sections of Hitler's Germany. In addition, this would lend to 
the enhanced stability of the ,GDR since the region which for many years 
seemed to call into question the permanence of East Germany as a separate 
state would have finally become part of that state. For many years West 
Berlin served as what many West Germans regarded as a pan-German 
16 
symbol. The removal of this symbol once and for all would be a 
serious psychological setback for those desiring German reunification. 
Furthermore, with West Berlin no longer existing as a separate entity 
inside East German territory, the Berlin Wall could at last be 
dismantled. This would enable the SED to claim that it, not the FRG, 
had succeeded in restoring the unity of Berlin. The GDR would derive 
lSIbid., p. 61. 
l6Die Welt, August 31, 1971, p. 6. 
303 
tremendous propaganda value out of its demolition of the Wall erected in 
1961 to prevent an "imperialist invasion" of the GDR, as East German 
spokesmen have claimed. Finally, the SED would have removed what Erich 
Honecker described as a "thorn in the .flesh of the GDR, . . . a 
front-line city and bridgehead of revanchist policies against the 
S '1' t t t ,,17 oc~a ~s s a es .... West Berlin would no longer be a potential 
base for either escape organizations or espionage operatio~s. Nor would 
non-Communist radio and television stations exist inside the territory 
of a Communist state. This itself would improve East Germany's situation 
relative to preventing unwanted communications with the West. 
There is, however, a potential loss associated with this solution. 
Melvin Croan has written that the SED regime has grown accustomed to 
tension since its creation and still needs a degree of.tension in order 
f h b f d bl f " 1 ""d ' 18 to compensate or tea sence 0 aura e sense 0 nat~ona ~ ent~ty. 
West Berlin's situation inside the GDR provided the SED with its best 
opportunity for confrontation with the West on an occasional basis and 
for stressing to its citizens that there were enemies within their midst 
on a permanent basis. It was not difficult for Ulbricht, Honecker, and 
others to create a sense of tension as the GDR was presented in constant 
confrontation with Western spies, agents, and provocateurs. Without 
West Berlin as a "thorn in the flesh," the SED will be deprived of one 
of its important unifying elements. 
17 NO, June 7, 1972, p. 1. 
l8Melvin Croan et a1., "The Role of the GDR Within Eastern Europe," 
Eastern Europe in the'1970s, edited by Sylva Sinanian, Istvan Deak, and 
Peter C. Ludz (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 245. 
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In terms of its effe(:t on East Germany's evolution toward 
independence, this solution provides both positive and negative aspects. 
The GDR would gain independence in that its dependency on the Soviet 
Union as the representative of East German interests with the Four-Powers 
would be eliminated. In addition, the successful resolution of the West 
Berlin problem would mean that the SED would no longer need fear a 
Soviet "sellout" of East German interests on this question because the 
question would no longer exist. However, the possible methods for 
accomplishment of this solution might leave the SED even more indebted 
to the Kremlin than in the past. This brings us to the question of the 
feasibility of this solution. 
How would it be possible for the East Germans to gain control of 
West Berlin? Obviously, they lack the resources to achieve control of 
the city by themselves. Only the ,USSR has the political and military 
power to do this and there seems to be little prospect for change in 
this situation in the foreseeable future. Clearly, Soviet action of 
some sort would be necessary for the East Germans to achieve this 
objective. One way in which the Soviet Union could secure the ,city 
would be by a coup. Given the proper circumstances, one of which would 
be a diminished Western interest in West Berlin, a real possibility in 
the wake of the 1971 Berlin Agreement and the subsequent progress of 
detente, the Soviet Union and its East German allies could quickly seal 
off the city in a fashion similar to that used in 1948 and couple this 
with a series of moves inside West Berlin by civilian supporters designed 
to rupture the city's communications as much as possible. Assuming that 
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the Western military presence in West Berlin is considerably reduced, or 
still better, completely terminated, such an effort might well succeed. 
This action would, however, require the USSR to be willing to risk war 
unless it is reasonably certain that the West will not, in fact, 
actually go to war for Berlin. 
A more likely avenue, however, would be for the USSR to work out an 
exchange with the Western powers whereby they would be given control of 
West Berlin in return for some other concession to the West. This would 
involve no risk of an armed confrontation with the West and might 
actually be presented as an action consistent with detente. As a result 
of Soviet military advances during the era of detente, the USSR enjoys 
the very real prospect of military superiority over the Western powers, 
10 
according to a.number of Western scholars on Soviet and world affairs.-~ 
If this materializes, it is possible that in the not too distant future, 
the USSR might be able to negotiate an exchange by which the West would 
yield West Berlin in return for some much less important compensation. 
The West, negotiating from a position of decided weakness, might be 
forced to accept unfavorable terms. 
Obviously, whichever route is used to effect Communist control over 
West Berlin, the East Germans would be more indebted to the Soviet Union 
than ever before. However, an important distinction here is that they 
would be indebted for something already delivered. At present, they are 
dependent upon the USSR to fulfill a continuing service for them, a 
19Robert Conquest et al., "Detente: an Evaluation," Survey, 
Vol. 20, Nos. 2/3, Spring/Summer, 1974, pp. 8-9. 
.. 
service which can be altered depending upon the mood of the J(remHn's 
leadership. In sh~!"t. the SED would be replacing dependency with 
increased indebtedness. The latter seems preferable fl'om the East 
German point of view. 
III. TOTAL INCORPORATION: A TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE 
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This alternative is similar to the previous solution in that its 
end is the same. a reunified Berlin. However, in several important 
aspects. it differs from the total incorporation of West Berlin by a 
more or less unilateral action. Accordingly,it enjoys at least two 
advantages over the former method of resolution. 
This settlement would come about as the result of an exchange of 
territory between the GDR and the FRG. It would have to be something 
upon which both sides were in agreement. It is not inconceivable that 
the East Germans might decide that an exchange of, possibly, Suhl bezirk 
in the southwestern part of the GDR plus parts of Erfurt bezirk, 
including the city of Erfurt, might be acceptable in return for West 
Berlin. In order to avoid the sort of thing that occurred in the first 
months after the construction of the Berlin Wall when many people chose 
to risk death rather than resign themselves to remaining in East Germany, 
a population transfer should be arranged. The population of Suhl bezirk 
is over half a million and, assuming that approximately one half of the 
population is Erfurt bezirk is involved, there is an additional half 
million to be moved, plus the population of Erfurt, which is two hundred 
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20 thousand. Therefore, the East Germans will have approximately 
1.2 million people to move while the West Germans will have to consider 
the transfer of two million people. In spite of the trouble involved, 
such a massive transfer is preferable to the alternative. This movement, 
of course, is not a particularly monumental task compared with those 
which took place in Europe in the first years after World War Two. 
There would be an obvious disparity in terms of the actual amounts 
of territory involved in this exchange. However, regardless of exactly 
what formula was used in determining which land the GDR would sacrifice~ 
it is almost certain to have to surrender a larger amount of territory 
in order to, one, provide the West Germans with at least one fairly 
large city, and two, to approximate the number of people involved in 
the exchange. Considering the real estate the East Germans would be 
receiving, this exchange would still be to their advantage. 
Such an exchange would be characterized by orderliness and bilateral 
negotiations between the East and West Germans. A political precondition 
for these negotiations would be an extremely favorable atmosphere of 
detente involving both Germanies and their major allies. It could never 
take place in the. presence of serious, basic disputes between the two 
alliance systems. In this respect, this solution differs markedly from 
the first one considered. 
All that is required of the USSR in this case is that it allow its 
East German ally to participate in the negotiations and attempt to work 
20Statistical Pocket Book of theGDR (Berlin, GDR: Staatverlag der 
DDR, 1973), pp. 11-12. 
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out an arrangement for the Berlin problem on its own. The four occupying 
powers in Berlin would all have to be in agreement to a .surrender of 
their rights in Berlin for this solution to be feasible. It is 
reasonable to conclude that, for the Western powers, this would present 
little problem. First, they are there ostensibly to defend.the interests 
of the population of West Berlin. Should the. West Berlin Senate express. 
its desire for such a solution, and such a desire would be a prerequisite 
for this plan, then there would be no reason for the West to object. 
Second, considering the current economic and political problems of the. 
Western powers, it would be in their interest to eliminate at least part 
of their German commitment. 
The situation for the Soviet Union is somewhat more complex. 
Agreement would require a willingness on their part to yield what amounts 
to a powerful lever that it exerts in limiting East German freedom of 
action. By virtue of its status .as the protector of East German 
interests in relation to the West Berlin problem, the USSR has an 
advantage in dealing with the SED. A complete resolution of the West 
Berlin question would deprive them of this advantage. At the same time, 
this solution also involves the sacrifice of a jointly held lever that 
the USSR and the GDR hold against the West. For years the existence of 
West Berlin as an outpost of Western prestige gave the WTO powers a 
convenient target at which to strike in the .event of a serious East-West 
disagreement. This solution, as well as the previous one, would require 
a loss of·one of the Warsaw Pact's .best weapons. 
The effect of this solution upon East German-Soviet relations would 
be to increase the GDR's independence. East Germany's dependence upon 
the USSR as the protector of its sovereign interests in West Berlin 
would be terminated. Also, unlike the previous settlement, this one 
requires no Soviet action which would measurably increase the GDR's 
indebtedness to the Kremlin. 
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The principal advantages of this plan over the previous one are, 
first, that no hostile East-West confrontation is required, and, second, 
that this proposal could actually be presented as serving the .interests 
of detente. Obviously, by this method, there is no threat or possibility 
of·an outbreak of military hostilities between the powers involve~. 
This very fact increases the feasibility of this alternative. Regarding 
the second advantage of this over the first plan, it must be kept in 
mind that this route would be consistent with current Soviet policy. 
Furthermore, since no show of force by the East.is involved, there is 
nQ necessity for a humiliation of a West which might see itself as 
militarily inferior. Notions of military inferiority or superiority 
do not play any part at all in this scenario. 
It is also important to note that all the gains which the GDR would 
have enjoyed by the previous alternative are preserved in this plan with 
two exceptions. First, the GDR would not gain the entire population of 
West Berlin and, second, since this plan involves an orderly transfer of 
the population, it is reasonable to conclude that much, if not most, of 
the material wealth of the city, including industrial installations, 
would also be removed. In addition, of course, the East Germans are 
required to surrender some territory of their own. 
The primary disadvantage of this route is that it would likely 
require that the FRG be recognized as a power with the right to act on 
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the full and final disposition of the West Berlin issue. West Germany 
would not only be acting on behalf of West Berlin, but would also be 
inheriting the population and most of the movable resources of the city. 
IV. A COMMUNIST CONTROLLED WEST BERLIN 
The two previous alternatives for a settlement of the Berlin 
problem resulted in the disappearance of West Berlin as a separate 
entity. In this scenario, West Be~lin continues to exist as what is 
essentially a sep~rate city with its own government. While the city 
is Communist controlled, the ,control is exercised, not through the SED, 
but rather the ,SEW, the West Berlin branch of theGDR's Socialist Unity 
,Party. The SEW is responsible for the operation of the city government 
and acts through the West Berlin Senate. Other political parties would 
either be surpressed or would operate as "echoes" of the ~EW. Such 
political parties as the Christian Democrats would almost certainly have 
to be completely abolished while the Social Democrats might be merged, 
with the SEW just as the East German Social Democratic party was united 
with the Communist Party after the war to form the ,SED. 
In this scenario, the matter of Allied rights in Berlin becomes a 
special concern. To allow the Four Powers to continue as so-called 
occupying powers in the city would be to perpetuate what would be, by 
this time, an obviously uneeded relic. 
Berlin would most likely be terminated. 
Therefore, Four-Power rights in 
This seems probable for two 
reasons. First, the SED's anti-Western attitude would make the 
continuation of American, British, and French rights in West Berlin 
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most difficult. The SED, as a communist party, would be inclined to 
regard the Western forces as a hostile element. Second, and most 
obvious, there would be little need for maintenance of the Western 
garrisons to defend the rights of a pro-Soviet West Berlin. The 
rationale of the maintenance of Western forces in the city was that 
they would provide protection against the USSR and the GDR. Under the 
terms of this settlement, the East Germans and the Russians would be 
regarded as West Berlin's protectors. 
A West Berlin controlled by the SEW would, of necessity, have to 
be subjected to a social revolution such as that undertaken in the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation after the war. West Berlin's economy is on 
a capitalistic basis with Western banks and other financial institutions 
in operation there. The Federal Republic's currency is used in West 
Berlin. Branches of West German commercial enterprises are situated 
in West Berlin. All of these as well as any other vestiges of capitalism 
would have to be eliminated or brought under the control of the state. 
The schools would also have to be remodeled so as to reflect the views 
of the SEW. The West Berlin police force would have to be carefully 
examined and purged of any "hostile" elements. In short, the SEW would 
face a task of completely restructuring the society of a city of two 
million people so as to make it compatible with the society of the GDR. 
How could the SEW manage to gain control of West Berlin? Its 
ascension could most easily come about as a result of political and 
economic turmoil. Should the Western nations suffer from a serious 
economic depression, West Berlin would be affected~ A consequence would 
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well be the political upheaval that would facilitate the SEW's seizure 
of power through the electoral process. In its efforts, the SEW would 
c~rtainly be able to count on substantial support from the GDR. The 
GDR might even be expected to engage in covert intervention in West 
Berlin politics or in some other manner attempt to subvert the politic~l 
processes so as to aid the SEW. The GDR and the USSR together could 
apply external pressure on West Berlin at this time. They could issue 
a series of protests against "fascist provocations" by the .SEW's 
opponents or they could promise the city that it would enjoy special 
benefits as a result of indicating its "political maturity" by electing 
the SEW. The prospect of removing the Berlin Wall could even be raised 
as an incentive to vote for the.SEW. The main point is that the SEW's 
elevation to power would be as a result of the operation of the West 
Berlin political system. Its control would be gained by essentially 
democratic methods aside from the external pressure of its allies across 
the Wall. There would be no organized violence although there might be 
considerable unorganized violence through demonstrations and riots 
designed to show the failure of the non-Communist political forces. 
Nor would Soviet or East German troops play any role in the SEW's 
victory. It would be important to avoid the introduction of direct 
military pressure on West Berlin lest the Western powers take 
countermeasures. The atmosphere of detente would be helpful in aiding 
the SEW's victory since it would diminish fears of a "Communist menace" 
among the West Berlin electorate. Military confrontations would likely 
weaken that favorable atmosphere. 
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The advantages of this scenario over the previously discussed ones 
are that it involves no serious East-West confrontation, it requires no 
exchanges of territory, nor does it demand that the FRG be re·eognized as 
the authoritative agent of the ,West Berliners. The GDR still enjoys the 
benefits of an increase in its real Sstate holdings, enhanced prestige 
and stabil-;'ty, and the removal of what Honecker described as a "thorn" 
in the GDRls flesh. It would also be possible to remove the Wall once 
"hostile elements" in West Berlin were subdued. 
In terms of East German-Soviet relations, the GDRls position would 
improve as a result of the ,implementation of this scenario. The Soviet 
contributions in this case would consist of a willingness to give up its 
special rights in Berlin and any assistance which it might possibly give 
in the application of external pressure on West Berlin. Consequently, 
the GDR does not substantially increase its indebtedness since the ,USSR 
would not be required to make any extraordinary efforts. East German 
independence is increased as a result of the settlement of the Berlin 
problem in this fashion. 
The nature of the arrangement that results from this sequence of 
events raises a question as to the permanence of West Berlin as a 
separate SEW-controlled entity. Would such an arrangement be expected 
to endure indefinitely? It would probably be maintained just long 
enough to enable the SEW to complete its social revolution and to allow 
the Western powers to leave and forget Berlin. If the separate status 
was officially terminated too soon, the Western powers might feel 
compelled to make some response, even if only to indicate that they 
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realized they had been outmaneuvered or deceived. The West, however, 
might prefer to overlook any Communist duplicity in order to avoid a 
confrontation in which they would have little to gain in view of a fait· 
accompli in West Berlin. 
V. A "FINLANDIZED" WEST BERLIN 
In this variation West Berlin continues to exist as an independent 
entity under non-Communist control. There has been neither a social nor 
a political transformation of the city. East German-West Berlin 
relations are essentially cordial or, at the very worst, not openly 
hostile. West Berlin is viewed as neutral and allied with neither 
East nor West. In spite of its neutrality, West Berlin's trade with 
the GDR is extensive and of special importance to the city's economy. 
There is no l~er a Four-Power status for the city and there are no 
Western troops present~ West Berlin is not operated as a United Nations 
protectorate but is regard~d as a'sovereign political entity. 
In spite of West Berlin's independence and neutrality, it is 
subject to intervention in its internal affairs by the GDR. In this 
regard, the pattern of East German-West Berlin relations resembles that 
of the Soviet Union and Finland. This relationship is characterized 
by frequent Soviet intervention in Finnish domestic political affairs. 21 
The Finnish government was initially described as sufficiently to.the 
21Bengt Matti, "Finland," Communism in Europe, Vol .. Two, edited by 
William E. Griffith (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 374-375. 
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left to allay Soviet suspicions, but sufficiently representative of the 
center and bourgeois elements not to seem a prelude to communist 
d· t h' 22 l.C ators l.p. With the passage of time, Soviet influence over Finland 
increased, but there was no move to establish a dictatorship under the 
control of the Finnish Communist Party. West Berlin's position is 
geographically much worse than that of Finland in relation to the USSR, 
so one might expect a speedier increase in East German influence over 
the city than occurred with the Finnish-Soviet relationship. Should. 
West Berlin's political affairs reflect an increase in the influence 
of what the SED considers "anti-Communist" elements, GDR-West Berlin 
relations will undergo a distinct chill, This deterioration in their 
relations may be.characterized by anyone or several of a variety of 
actions that the East Germans could take in response to West Berlin 
developments. First, trade and economic agreements could be jeopardized 
as the East Germans announce an intention to suspend trade in areas 
vital to West Berlin's economy. This is probably one of the more 
restrained tIn'eat::; that the East Germans could take. A second step 
that they could take to indicate their displeasure would be to recall 
the East German ambassador or any other GDR representatives that are 
stationed in West Berlin. An even more drastic step could be the 
announcement by the GDR that in view of a "threat to peace" originating 
in West Berlin the East Germans and the West Berlin authorities should 
22Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," The Conduct 
of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. 
Fleron, Jr. (Chicago:. Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971), p. 241. 
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engage in military consultations. The purpose of such consultations 
would be, according to the GDR, to consider the estab1.ishment of an East 
German military base in West Berlin to protect the population of the 
city from "anti-Communist elements." This corresponds to a similar 
threat maqe by the Soviet Union when political developments in Finland 
in 1961 took a turn hostile to Soviet interests. 23 This announcement 
by the GDR would have the effect of a threat to take military action 
against West Berlin. The objective of these East German measures would 
be, not an actual takeover of the city, but rather the suppression of 
those elements viewed as hostile to the GDR. The goal would be achieved 
if the West Berlin authorities agreed to take the necessary steps to 
suppress the offending political movement or individual. The key point 
is that the West Berliners themselves would be correcting the situation. 
It would not be desirable for the .East Germans to actually take the 
steps unilaterally. 
Just as unfavorable domestic developments in West Berlin would 
inspire threats from the GDR, good relations would be rewarded by 
favorable economic arrangements, the exchange of official state visits 
by East German and West Berlin political figures, and symbolic gestures 
such as the waiver of certain passport and visa requirements for visits 
by West Berliners to the GDR. Similar developments took place in 
Finnish-Soviet affairs during those periods of especially good relations. 
The situation between West Berlin and the GDR would be one in which the 
23Matti, p. 374. 
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West Berliners could enjoy a cordial atmosphere with their East German 
neighbors, but only at the price of sacrificing certain of its freedoms 
on occasion. 
This situation is one which could develop as the product of 
continued East-West detente and Western neglect of West Berlin. No 
upheavals in West Berlin are required. No East German-Soviet external 
pressures are necessary to create a neutral West Berlin. In fact, the, 
opposite, Communist benignity, would do more to advance the development 
of such a West Berlin since it would encourage a belief that West Berlin 
could coexist peacefully with its neighbors. The only Soviet 
contributions in this scenario are, first, the continuation of its 
policies of detente, and, second, a willingness to surrender Four-Power 
rights in Berlin. Neither would have the effect of measurably 
increasing East Germany's indebtedness to the USSR. 
The principal advantage of this arrangement for the GDR is that 
West Berlin ceases to act as an irritant to the East German regime. 
West Germany's political presence in West Berlin could be completely 
eliminated. Anti-Communist political activities and demonstrations 
could also be banned in West Berlin. The feasibility of this scenario 
is indicated by the success of detente so far in promoting an image of 
the USSR and its allies as status quo powers. West Berlin has also 
witnessed steps toward eliminating anti-Communist demonstrations, such 
as the annual observance of the 1953 East German uprising which was 
cancelled for the first time in 1974. 24 As West German and 
24New York Times, June 13, 1974, p. 3. 
318 
anti-Communist influences are terminated in West Berlin, they can be 
gradually replaced by an East German political presence. A shortcoming 
of this arrangement, however, is that the GDR is deprived of the 
material and psychological benefits that would have accrued to it by 
the total incorporation of West Berlin. It should be stressed at the 
same time that the~e benefits are not completely lost for all time since 
this arrangement could not be considered a final settle~3nt of the West 
Berlin question. It seems more likely to be simply one phase in a 
transitional development of the city's status. 
The effect. of such an arrangement on East German independence 
relative to the Soviet Union would be positive. With West Berlin no 
longer representing a serious problem, the GOR's dependence on the USSR 
in dealing with the West would be decreased. At the ,same time, East 
Germany would be\in a position to handle its West Berlin affairs with 
much less help from the Soviet Union by means of economic and political 
arrangements. 
VI. WEST BERLIN AS A FREE CITY UNDER UN SPONSORSHIP 
This alternative and the previous one probably come closest to 
approaching the situation as it now exists in West Berlin. This 
scenario, however, represents a departure from the previous ones in 
that it does not overwhelmingly favor the East German interests. In 
this case there would be an internationally sponsored effort to 
perpetuate what is essentially the status quo. The West German 
political presence is to be muted. West Berlin's political affairs 
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are to be free from outside intervention by either the East or the West. 
The economy of West Berlin would retain its capitalistic features and 
its trade would continue to be oriented toward the West. The Four-Power 
status of the city would have been terminated by the establishment of a 
United Nations protectorate and transit rights to the city would be 
guaranteed by the UN which would likely be responsible for control of 
the westward corridors. 
This arrangement could come about as a product of detente and 
Western efforts to provide a stable foundation for West Be~lin's 
independence. The Western powers would no longer act as the guarantors 
of West Berlin's rights since the city would have become a UN 
responsibility just as Danzig before World War Two was supervised 
by the League of Nations. This solution would have to be worked out 
by the former occupying powers under United Nations aegis. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the.FRG and the GDR, who are also now members 
of the UN, would also be. consulted regarding the arrangement and that 
their support would be essential. The two Germanies could hardly be 
expected to oppose this very strenuously since it is a plan which could 
be presented as in the best interests of peace. Therefore, their 
support could almost be taken for granted although they would obviously 
work for the most advantageous arrangements for themselves as the 
program was formulated. 
As with the .previous scenario, East Germany would no longer be 
dependent on the USSR as the sole protector of its interests regarding 
the West Berlin problem after the adoption and implementation of this 
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policy by the UN. The problem, of course, is not removed by this 
program, but it is out of the hands of the East Germans and the Soviets. 
In the .United Nations the .Soviet-Ied bloc would ha,ve to act with the 
GOR in order to advance the East Germans' interests relative to West 
Berlin should there be any conflict regarding the city's status or 
operations. This means that the East German government would remain 
dependent on the Soviet Union for support in the General Assembly and 
the Security Council. However, the USSR alone would not be able to 
guarantee the protection of East German rights. This is especially 
true in the General Assembly where the USSR would have to rely upon 
the votes of not only the .WTO states but also the so-called Third World 
nations as well. Therefore, the GOR's dependence would become diluted, 
as it has to appeal to a variety of groups in order to secure support 
necessary for successfully waging a fight in the United Nations. 
Overall, the GOR's independence would be increased by the implementation 
of this program for West Bel'lin. TIte incl~ea.5e, ho~~ver, would not be as 
great as in those scenarios where the West Berlin question was given a 
final resolution. 
There are several advantages that would accrue to the GOR under 
this plan. First, the removal of U.S., British, and French troops from 
West Berlin is, by itself, a victory for East Germany. The maintenance 
of hostile garrisons inside the GOR's territory could hardly be regarded 
as a minor consideration by the SED. Thus, its removal would not be 
considered a minor accomplishment. Second, the East Germans profit 
under this plan by virtue of not having to recognize a special FRG-West 
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Berlin relationship. By having the UN work out the arrangements, the 
GDR is insulated from that denger. What the East Germans accept through 
the plan is the authority and responsibility of the United Nations. 
Finally, the East Germans would benefit by the fact that the West Berlin 
problem is being handled in an atmosphere of relative harmony and 
reconciliation, a necessity for agreement by the former occupying 
powers. By their participation in this process, the East Germans can 
boast that they have made a contribution to the cause of detente in 
Europe. 
The proposal considered here is not without its disadvantages for 
the East Germans. First, the GDR is deprived of the enjoyment of the 
important material gains that corne with total incorporation. The 
psychologicai boost that it would get from possession of the entire 
city of Greater Berlin is also lost through this formula. Probably 
most important is the fact that United Nations supervision of West 
Berlin makes any future unilateral Communist moves regarding the city, 
such as those involved in some of the preceding scenarios, much more 
difficult. Of course, the same prohibition is operative against future 
Western moves in West Berlin. 
VII. WEST BERLIN IN AN EAST-WEST GEru4AN CONFEDERATION 
This option would bring reamalgarnation of Berlin by reunification 
of the two Germanies in a genuine confederation. Representatives would 
be elected throughout all of Berlin and Germany to an all-German 
legislature. Districts could most easily be formed by adherence to 
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preexisting polit:i,cal subdivisions, bezirks in the GDR and Lander in the 
FRG. They could be formed in Berlin on the basis of the boroughs 
established in 1920 and thus avoid lumping East and West Berliners 
together in one district. The representatives would all sit together 
as equals in one legislature which might well be located in Berlin. 
The most appropriate method of apportio~ent of the districts would be 
by population. 
In an article in 1969, Professor Elmer Plischke discusseu the ways 
in which reunification of the ,two Germanies might be achieved. The only 
feasible method, he concluded, was by agreement among the ,four ,wartime 
allies with theGDR and the FRG. 25 In addition, it should be observed 
that agreement among these six powers would be possible only during an 
era of detente. Both blocs must also be willing to sUl·rendera maj or 
ally to create what would probably have to be a neutral Germany. The 
problem of a formula for representation in the national legislature 
would be the major sticking point since the prospects of both sides 
for achieving dominance in the confederation would be dependent upon 
it. Straight population might be the most appropriate formula, but 
it is one which would reduce the political forces of the GDR to the 
status of a permanent minority. Acceptance of that would be difficult 
for both the USSR and the GDR. 
The effect of this option on GDR-Soviet relations would be 
revolutionary since the GDR would cease to exist as a separate entity. 
25Elmer Plischke, "Reunifying German: An Options Analysis," World 
Affairs, Vol. 132, No.1, June, 1969, p. 34. 
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The principal concern would now be all-German-Soviet relations. The 
implementation of this option would probably result in an increase in 
the feelings of goodwill toward the USSR in Germany since Soviet 
approval would have been a necessity for its coming into force. The 
USSR would be unlikely to approve of the .creation of a reunified Germany 
unless it felt that the new state would be reasonably friendly toward 
the USSR. 
The main advantage of this plan is that th~ East German ele~ents 
would have a chance to win contro~ of both West Berlin and West Germany 
by becoming the .dominant force in the confederation. Should that happen, 
the result would be a communist Germany that could be much more 
independent of the USSR than the GDR could ever hope to be. This 
independence would be a function of the fact that power would most 
likely have been gained without any major Soviet efforts, assuming the 
GDR elements take control on their own through legal processes, and that 
the reunified German state would be considerably stronger economically 
and politically. The only hope for an SED victory in the new Germany 
would rest in the prospect for a union of communist and procommunist 
forces in the West with the SED. Even at that, it would require much 
more than their combined strengths as of this time. Therefore, the 
prospects for an SED takeover would not seem to be too good. This leads 
to the major disadvantage of the plan, the prospect that the SED could 
lose everything. Not only would it fail to take control of the. 
confeder~tion if its union with the left wing elements of the Western 
part of Germany should prove weak, but it would also have lost. its own 
preserve in the East. The smaller population of the GDR and its 
relatively weaker position with regard to the FRG increases the 
likelihood of defeat and at the same time diminishes prospects for 
the implementation of such an option. 
VIII. WEST BERLIN AS A LAND OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
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In this scenario, West Berlin becomes a full-fledged Land of the 
Federal Republic. In spite of the fact that the .Ber1in Constitution of 
1950 and the FRG Basic Law proclaimed West Berlin a Land of the FRG,26 
West Berlin's membership in the Federation was never realized. The 
Constitution was more an expression of a wish than a statement of fact. 
In order to effect We~t Berlin's membership as a Land of the FRG 
several steps would, of necessity, be taken. First, West Berlin would 
have representatives in the West German legislature who would be voting 
members, not merely observers. Prior to 1971, West Berlin sent 
representatives to Bonn, but they lacked the right to vote. After the 
conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971, the practice of 
having representatives from West Be~lin was terminated with the 
arrangement whereby the West German legislature periodically held 
sessions in West Berlin. 27 To make West Berlin's status as a Land 
a reality, both customs would have to be revived with the one 
modification regarding the voting status of the West Berlin 
26 Brose and Kerr, p. 66. 
27Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 24, 1971, p. 3. 
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representatives. A second necessary step is that the Federal Republic 
would require extraterritorial rights on at least one corridor from 
West Germany to W~st Berlin. This, of course, would harken back to 
the experiences of the 1930s when Hitler demanded a German highway and 
railroad from East Prussia across Polish territory to the port city of· 
Danzig. Hit1e~ at the time insisted on German extraterritorial rights 
over the superhighway and the railroad which his country was to 
28 
construct. Yet, a West German controlled access route to West Berl~n 
would be the only absolute guarantee of West German transit rights to 
the city. Finally, there would be the introduction of elements of toe 
FRG military into West Berlin. The Four-Power status of the city would 
have been terminated out of recognition of the fact that West Berlin's 
status has been "normalized." This scenario is based on the assumption 
of agreement by the Western powers to a West German acquisition of. 
West Berlin as a Land, therefore, their willingness to withdraw from 
West Berlin need present no problem. The USSR could refuse to assent, 
but since it has no troops in West Berlin, its refusal would be no bar 
to realization of this scheme. 
Such a development as described above would be unlikely during the 
era of detente. It would require a complete reversal of present Western 
policy and, at the same time, a considerable weakening of the position 
28William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 455-457. 
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of the Soviet Union and its allies relative to the Western powers. The 
best chance for this happening is the chain of events described by 
Andrei Ama1rik in analyzing the possibilities for the weakening of 
Communist power in Russia due to mirtority unrest and Chinese pressures 
29 in the East. In short, this scenario requires the West to be able 
to act from a position of strength. In so doing it can force the Soviet 
Union and East Germany into making the concessions necessary for 
incorporation of .West Berlin into the Federal Republic. 
This development would have a deteriorating effect on East German-
Soviet relations. The GDR would view the .USSR as having failed to 
protect its interests on a particularly vital question. It might even 
feel impelled to pursue its interests without the aid of the Soviet 
Union. However, the USSR, feeling the threat of Western pressure, could 
be expected to view any deviations from its policy line much more 
seriously than as under normal circumstances. Even a small departure 
would become a luxury that the .B1oc could not afford. As a result, 
while GOR-Soviet relations are subjected to a severe strain, the 
independence of the East Germans will likely be subjected to further 
restrictions. 
While this development offers no advantages for the East Germans, 
it does present the SED regime with serious disadvantages. The GDR 
would suffer a tremendous psychological defeat as a result of what 
29Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 62-65. 
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could be seen as the complete loss of West Berlin. Furthermore, the 
permanence of the GDR would once more be placed under serious doubt as 
the Pan-German role of West Berlin is reemphasized. This arrangement, 
however, is not likely to be final because of the doubt that it creates 
regarding East Germany's future. It has the effect of reopening basic 
questions concerning the future of Germany, questions which have lain 
dormant for almost two decades. Therefore, attention is immediately 
directed to the possibility of the reunification of the two Germanies. 
There is, however, another possibility concerning this option. 
Should West Berlin become a Land of a Finlandized West Germany, the 
impact on the GDR and the requirements necessary for the implementation 
of this program would be very different. First, a union with a 
Finlandized FRG would be possible during the era of detente and would 
not require a weakening of the USSR and its allies. Second, under these 
circumstances there need not be a deterioration of East German-Soviet 
relations. The Soviets could present this action as part of a long-range 
program for advancement of the GDR's interests. Certainly, there would 
be no embarrassment as a result of an apparent defeat of major 
proportions for the Bloc. 
IX. WEST BERLIN AS THE KEY TO REUNIFICATION 
The loss of West Berlin to the GDR does not represent a direct 
challenge to the existence of the Federal Republic. The incorporation 
of West Berlin into East Germany would not inspire the SED to annex 
West Germany if only because it lacks the power to do so. The SED 
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would simply feel that it had taken what was rightfully its own.by 
consolidating its territory and removing a foreign social and political 
body. The Soviet Union and East Germany's military impotence wquld 
restrain any further expansionist tendencies. Also, West German 
stability would serve to discourage the SED from harbouring any such 
ambitions. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that the FRG 
could probably endure the psychological defeat that would be brought 
on by the loss of West Berlin. While it might bring the downfall of 
a government, it would not likely lead to the overthrow of the system. 
The inability of parties such as the National Democratic Party of. 
Germany (NPD) to take hold in the West German political climate is an 
indication of the .basic stability of the system. 
By contrast, the incorporation of West Berlin into the FRG as a 
Land would undoubtedly inspire the .Bonn government to push for more. 
Such an event could only take place during a time of extreme weakness 
of the Soviet Bloc or fluidity on the part of the USSR. This weakness, 
coupled with the GDR's political instability, would make East Germany 
a tempting target for the FRG. Under these circumstances, the old dream 
of reunification on terms favorable to West Ge~any could be rekindled. 
Thus, after West Berlin assumed membership in the Federation, Bonn 
might well begin to pressure for a truly "special relationship" with the 
GDR. It might suggest closer economic ties and intensified cooperation 
on certain projects. Proposals for some sort of political cooperatio~ 
might al~o be advanced. Soviet weakness might make West German offers. 
attractive to the SED. This would be especially true if those offers 
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gave the SED assurances of some satisfactory role in an enlarged 
Federation. The West Germans might even be able to rely upon 
anti-Russiall attitudes to appeal to the East Germans as "fellow Germans." 
If the Western powers raised no objections, the West Germans could talk 
about the ,potential role of a reunified Germany in Europe. '(his 
development is, of course, highly dependent on either the willingness 
of the other Western powers to accept the idea of a stronger, reunified 
Germany or their inability to prevent it. If such a union should be 
effected, it would naturally mean a blow of immeasurable proportions 
to the USSR. This would be the Soviet Union's first really big setback 
internationally, its first significant territorial loss. While the idea 
of a reunified Germany might have fit in with Soviet policy twenty years 
ago, there seems to be no chance of its fitting in with the ,USSR's 
policy today. East Ge~many is too important to the USSR economically, 
militarily, and politically. EVen a pro-Communist reunited Germany 
could hardly be considered good news for Moscow since such a Germany 
might well ,become a major rival within the world Communist movement as 
China has become. 
The feasibility of such a development as this should not be 
dismissed lightly. In discussing the long-term question of the concept 
of the German nation, Professor Joachim Remak has observed that "every 
German frontier is artificial, therefore impermanent. . . ,I: Hls 
studies indicate that on the average, there has been one major change 
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30 in its borders and political organization every twenty-one years. The 
last major changes, of course, took place over a quarter of a century 
ago, so it would not be unrealistic to anticipate some additional change 
in the years immediately ahead. A major change in the fG~tunes of the 
Soviet Union could be a factor which would contribute to such events. 
In examining the matter of a union between the GDR and the FRG, 
Professor Remak writes, 
Yet the idea of a union is one whose time will come again; 
it is used to being recycled. How soon? Who knows? In what 
form? Who can guess? Perhaps it will be an association 
between the two German states, or a wholly new beginning, or 
a European confederation tnat will blur the old borders--no 
one can foretell the future's precise shape. But change there 
will be; it has been the law of German life. Federal Republic 
and GDR arc no more likely to be the final stages in the 
development of German history than the Deutsche Bund or the 
North German Federation were. 31 
30Ibid ., p. 186. 31 Ibid • 
CHAPTER VI II 
SUMMARY 
i • East German foreign po11cy on the West Berlin issue since 1968 has 
moved toward the assertion of independence and subsequently returned to 
what must be regarded as a more traditional pattern. The last Ulbricht 
years witnessed a growing East German pride coupled with independe~t 
expressions on not only the West Berlin question but also a number of 
related matters. The West Berlin policy should be viewed essentially 
as a symptom of a larger pattern of resistence to Soviet desires. This 
trend began most conspicuously with the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention 
in Czechoslovakia which gave the GDR an opportunity to emphasize both 
its ideological firmness and its co~ception of itself as enjoying a 
s.pecial relationship with the USSR. This direction was reversed in 1971 
with Ulbricht's replacement by Honecker, an action which clearly 
involved the support if not the actual participation of the Soviet 
leadership. Honecker's loyalty has been reflected in the SED's 
enthusiastic support for the major elements of Soviet foreign policy. 
This support has extended to active East German participation in the 
anti-Chinese polemics. The new leadership has made no claims of a 
special position in the Bloc during this time nor has it asserted the 
uniqueness of East Germany's example to Communist and developing nations 
as during the last Ulbricht years. 
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The insecurity of the East German regime has been reflected in th~ 
SED's strenuous efforts to develop its concept of the nation and to 
create a ,distinct developed socialist society in the GDR. These efforts 
have been coupled with the policy of,Abgrenzung by which the ,SED hopes 
to cement its rupture from the western part of the former German Reich 
and the ,emphasis on the ideological struggle which is said to ,be 
intensifying during the period of detente. While there is no evidence 
of a desire for a military confrontation with West Germany, the ,GDR has 
not neglected military preparedness and has placed even greater emphasis 
on the military class mission of its youth. This program has involved 
the broadening of , military training efforts and, at,the ,same time, a new 
civil defense campaign. The idea that the ,GDR is being continually 
subjected to hostile attention from West Germany has been retained, thus 
preserving the element of tension that many observers feel the GDR needs 
to compensate for its lack of a fully developed sense of nationality. 
West Berlin's position as a Western outpost provides the SED with its 
most convenient opportunity for intensifying tension. For this reason" 
a renewal of conflicts between the GDR and West Berlin must be viewed, 
at least in part; as evidence of the ,SED's insecurity. 
An evaluation of the apparent influence of the Soviet Union on East, 
Germany's foreign policy relative to West Berlin during this period 
demonstrates the development of a relationship in which the USSR no 
longer has to dictate to the GDR in the manner assumed to be 
characteristic of the major power-satellite relationship. Enough shared 
attitudes have been developed that it is now possible to speak of an 
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essential community of interests between the GDR and the .USSR on basic 
issues. While East Gernmn statements assert that this holds true for 
every case, it is reasonable to assume that differences do occur. Yet, 
these have not been nearly great enough to require a show of force by 
the Soviet Union. The GDR has apparently come to realize over .the years 
that its fate is cast with that of the Soviet Bloc. Therefore, its 
perception of its self-interest has become such that it has been 
possible for the GDR to enjoy a status .much more like that of a junior 
ally than a traditional satellite. There are differences, but the ,SED 
seems to realize the limits of tolerable diversity. Ulbricht's stands 
during his last years indicate that he failed to appreciate the fact 
that there were limits beyond which he could not go .without incurring 
the serious disapproval of the Kremlin's leadership. Ulbricht's removal 
by his comrades in the SED indicates that his "revolt" was largely a 
personal one; he did not carry with him a majority of the SED Politburo. 
The fact that no other high-level removals followed his also indicates 
that he was largely alone in his defiance. The dismissal of Ulbricht 
illustrates the continuing importance attached by the Soviet Union to 
the maintenance of its hegemony within the East European system and, at 
the same time, it shows that Soviet conceptions have not changed enough 
during the nuclear age to permit a devaluation of the importance of a 
ring of "buffer states" between itself and the West. 
Finally, the presentation of the scenarios for resolution of the 
West Berlin problem indicates the persistence of. the question of West 
Berlin as a factor .in the stability of the SED regime and in the. 
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expansion oX' contraction of East Germany's independence fl'om the Soviet 
Union. It is significant that only the extreme solutions, either a 
total incorporation of West Berlin into the GOR or complete loss of the, 
city to the West with the possible reunification of the two Germanies, 
completely eradicate the problem and thus enhance the ,GOR's independence 
from the VSSR. However, in the latter case, the question of independence 
becomes meaningless in view of the GOR's u~ion with West Germany. The 
essential point is that those resolutions which are favorable t~ the. 
GOR require either the active support of the Soviet Union or the 
successful continuation of a Soviet policy, such as detente, that 
facilitates the evolution of a favorable situation. 
In discussing East German-Soviet relations, David Childs has 
writte~ of a change which has come about largely as a result of the 
development of the economic power of the GDR. According to Childs, 
Apart from the Soviet Union itself, East Germany is the 
most important industrial power in the .Communist camp. It is 
the Soviet Union's biggest trading partner, being responsible 
for roughly one-quarter of Soviet imports and 75 percent of 
its import of machine tools .... In addition, ... the GOR 
has the largest reserves of uranium in Europe, apart from 
those in the Soviet Union itself. l 
Childs also sees the GDR as being of value to the USSR militarily. 
First, the GDR's territory allow~ the Soviet Union to have an outpost. 
of troops to keep hostile forces further from Russian territory. 
Second, the East German coastline is of interest for Soviet naval 
squadrons which lack ports that are open all year round. Finally, 
IDavid Childs, East Germany (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 272. 
the ,East German armed forces the~selves are probably, technically 
speaking, more efficient thall most other WTO allies of the USSR. 2 
Therefore, East Germany's status certainly seems to have risen 
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considerably since the first years after the end of the war. Yet, there 
is little reason, based on an analysis of the West Berlin question, to 
anticipate a dramatic increase in its independence. East Germany simply 
lacks the ability to be a viable state, both in terms of its foreign 
policy needs and its domestic situation, outside of its membership in 
the Soviet alliance system. 
East German dependency on its alliance with the USSR and the very 
definite limits on East German independence are demonstrated by several 
factors. First, the GDR is tied firmly to the Soviet Bloc by ideology 
and by its general orientation. The Marxist-Leninist ideology has had 
a profound influence on the GDR as on the other Bloc nations. As a 
result, they share numerous common characteristics that serve to bind 
them together. In addition, the SED has worked assiduously to orient 
its nation toward the USSR. As mentioned previously, East German 
cultural policy under both Honecker and Ulbricht was particularly close 
to the Soviet model. East German spokesmen have repeatediy stressed the 
need for alliance with the USSR as Honecker did in 1974 when he spoke of 
the alliance with the Soviet Union as the key to every success of the. 
GDR. 3 The GDR's close adherence to the Soviet Union in so many areas, 
2Ibid ., p. 273. 
3Neues Deutschland, May 13, 1974. p. 2. 
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in spite of Ulbricht's brief "revolt,"would make a rupture from the 
Soviet Bloc at this point probably as disruptive as its severance from 
the rest of Germany in 1945. 
The GDR's lack of international stature also serves .to bind it 
closer to the Soviet Union. Until recent years, the GDR had diplomatic 
relations with very few non-Communist states and enjoyed membership in 
also no non-Communist international organizations. While it has worked 
to improve it~ prestige through its technical accomplishments and now 
has diplomatic relations with well over one hundred nations, including 
the United States, the GDR still lacks the .stature of West Germany. As 
a result, East Germany remains dependent upon the Soviet Union as its 
chief advocate in most international questions. The GDR is likely to 
retain a negative image as long as the Berlin Wa1l stands and GDR 
citizens in fairly large numbers still risk their lives to flee their 
country. 
Finally, the GDR seems to lack the \.,rill as well as the ability to 
break away from the Bloc. Ulbricht'S inability to stall detente on the 
Berlin question best illustrated the weakness of a GDR attemptir,g to 
pursue an independent policy. Even more recently, the East German 
compromise on the minimum required exchange amounts, following the 
refusal of the Soviet Union to enthusiastically advocate the SED 
position, demonstrates the GDR weakness. Furthermore, the statements 
of SED spokesmen indicate, if anything, a desire to bring the ,GDR even 
closer to the Soviet Union. 
In conclusion, it might be appropriate to consider the partition 
of Berlin and Germany in comparison with other partitions. The 
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best-known partitioned states, in addition to Germany, are Korea and 
Vietnam. A comparison of the situations of these states with that of 
Germany indicates both similarities and differences. 
The Korean and Vietnamese cases are like the German case in that 
their. divisions were not seen initially as permanent. No power is on 
record as advocating the permanent division of Korea at the 38th 
parallel. Officially, a line was arbitrarily drawn at that point simply 
4 to expedite the surrender of Japanese troops. Likewise, in Vietnam 
the demarcation along the 17th parallel was intended to be a prOVisional 
'1' 5 ml ltary measure. Just as in the German case, these divisions became 
permanent frontiers. 
These three cases are also alike in that there was no internal 
justification for their division along the lines designated. In Korea 
there were no significant cleavages before 1945 which corresponded to 
the political division of the country today. Though there were 
regional differences between north and south, they were not extreme 
and communication between both sections was intense prior to 1945. 6 
While Vietnam contains numerous minority groups, there is no ethnic 
boundary there which corresponds to the north-south political division 
4Gregory Henderson, "Korea: The Preposterous.Division," Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 27, Number 2, 1973, p. 206. 
c: 
"'Harvey H. Smith et a1., Area Handbook for South Vietnam 
(Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 257. 
6 Henderson, p. 205. 
. h 7 e1t ere The Vietnamese, like the Koreans and the Germans, were 
essentially one people before they were divided by the major powers. 
The hosti1ization of division which occurred as a result of the 
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conflicts between the Communist anq non-Communist blocs is a phenomena 
experienced by all t~ree of these nations. Germany, of course, was 
seen as the front line for both blocs in Europe and confrontations in 
Berlin and elsewhere in that nation have frequently corresponded to 
the general mood of relations b~Lwe~n the two blocs. In the same 
fashion, confrontatory groups were organized in Korea after the division 
8 in 1945 and were soon polarized against one another. In Vietnam 
hostility has developed as .the two Vietnams became reflections of the 
Communist and non-Communist worlds of which they had become parts. 
The result was a North Vietnamese hostility to South Vietnam based upon 
a dislike for the general character of the southern regime rather than 
on negotiable substantive disagreements. 9 The result in Korea and 
Vietnam was the outbreak of armed hostilities lasting for long periods 
and involving the direct participation of major powers. No such 
hostilities have occurred in Germany and this good fortune has 
undoubtedly contributed to the much better prospects for rapprochement 
between the two Germanies. 
7Smith et al., p. 69. 
8 Henderson, p. 207. 
9David C. Jordan, World Politics in Our Time (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 179. 
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Unlike East Germany, the ,Communist regime in Korea, as well as in 
Vietnam, has followed a policy stressing self-reliance and 
independence. lO While both the Korean and Vietnamese regimes were 
integrated into the Communist world, neither assumed a position similar 
to that of East Germany. In short, they simply lacked the importance 
to the Soviet Union that the ,GDR seemed to enjoy. Also, because both 
regimes were subject to cross-pressures from the Chinese and the 
Russians, their integration became more difficult. At the same time, 
their independence was greater. As a result, the major powers today 
do not have such vital positions in the two countries that comprom~se 
becomes almost impossible. The Korean case has been the best 
demonstration of this major power flexibility in the era of detente. ll 
The prospects for reunification have been affected dramatically by 
the major power stakes in these three countries. Because of the vital 
positions of the major powers in Germany, external factors make 
reunification of that country a virtual impossibility at this time. 
This is true in spite of the fact that the personal animosities between 
East and West Germans have never developed as in the Korean and 
Vietnamese cases where northerners and southerners were actually 
shooting at each other. The flexibility of the major powers has 
resulted in some fairly significant steps toward the ,advancement of 
detente in Korea. The most notable gain has been the decrease in 
lOBruce G. Cumings, "Kim's Korean Communism," Problems of Communism, 
Vol. XXIII, March-April, 1974, p. 41. 
11 Henderson, p. 210. 
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12 provocative miH tary actions by the North Korearls. The maj or 
accomplishment in Vietnam was the withdrawal of American troops from 
the south. Progress toward bringing North and South Vietnam closer 
together have been negligible. In the Korean case there has at least 
been serious talk, though little actual progress, about reunification. 13 
In summary, one must conclude that reunification is made difficult 
in the German case because of the pOSitions of the major powers and the 
importance of the stakes involved. Both East and West Germany are 
important industrial powers. In the cases of Korea and Vietnam, while 
the partitions are much like the German partition in terms of their 
origins, the outlooks for reunification are affected differently. In 
both cases, the positions of the major powers are more open and less 
opposed to reunification. However, the internal factors make an 
elimination of the partition much more difficult. Even though there 
were no extreme diff~rences separating the people in these nations 
prior to partition, the hostilization of division has been so great 
that armed cvnflict has been a result of the creation of separate 
states. While the prospects for reunification in the near future are 
slim in all three cases, more progress has been made in the German case 
toward bridging the gap between the people involved. Should the major 
powers' positions be altered, this progress would greatly ease the 
difficulty of a reunion. The Koreans and the Vietnamese, by contrast, 
l2Rinn-sup Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies in North 
Korea," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII, January-February, 197~, p. 69. 
l3 Ibid ., pp. 69-70. 
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in spite of a softening of the positions of the major powers, have shown 
an inzlination to want to continue the old policies of open hostility. 
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